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CHOICE OF LAW: ILLINOIS CONTRACT CASES
Robert Keith Larson*

A

LMOST A

CENTURY

ago, a Will County, Illinois, defendant,

sued as acceptor of five bills of exchange, pleaded usury as a
defense, relying on the law of New York which the parties to the
suit had agreed should control the outcome of the case. When a
trial court order striking the plea for immateriality reached the
Illinois Supreme Court on appeal, Chief Justice Scates reviewed
the basic conflicts rule involved and then commented:
This is the general rule, and apparently of great simplicity in
the abstract. Its application however, under certain states
of facts and circumstances, becomes exceedingly difficult, and
is left inextricably confused, by the authorities.'
The Illinois lawyer of today will no doubt readily agree that the
dramatic changes of the past century have done nothing to alleviate
the difficulty so noted by the Chief Justice.2 The conflict of
laws rules remain in disagreement and disorder, a puzzle to
lawyer and judge alike. This unhappy state of the law has not
stemmed the flow of cases but, while a chief justice of a century
* LL.B., Law School, Harvard University. Member, Illinois bar; Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 McAllister v. Smith, 17 Ill. 328 at 333, 65 Am. Dec. 651 at 654 (1856).
The
"general rule" referred to was there stated to be as follows: ". . . the lea loci
contractus, and the lea, loci contractus rei sitae, when respectively applicable, enter
into and form part of every civil contract, respecting rights of property, in things,
and choses in action, and so of lea domicilii, respecting mere personal contracts
such as marriages."
2 See Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New
York, 1935), Vol. 2, p. 1133.
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ago was relatively unhampered by local precedents, and many
of the "certain states of facts and circumstances" were, as he
noted, still in the abstract, the present day judge or lawyer, with
a conflict of laws question, is now confronted by a disorderly and
growing hedge of local authority with which he must reckon.
Peering into that hedge, he can discern no clear pattern of decision.
Instead, he will find rules which seem inconsistent with each other ;3
language far broader than is justified by actual holdings on the
facts ;4 and loose phrases operating to rob the "rules" of certainty
and predictability. "Comity," on the one hand, "public policy"
on the other, and a possible finding of what the parties "must
have intended" in any event, all combine to prevent an accurate
forecast as to the outcome of a given case. Most important and
most provocative are the contract cases in this field.
It is the purpose of this article to present a systematic review
of, and comment upon, only those Illinois cases which deal with
the conflict of laws with respect to contract matters. In that connection, the method of procedure will be fourfold. First, a primary classification and comparison of the cases will be made on
the basis of the issues involved, for it will be seen that different
laws may properly control different phases of a single contractual
transaction.5 Second, a distribution of the relevant events among
the various jurisdictions whose laws are considered may prove
to be of basic importance. Wherever possible, therefore, a major
3 Beale, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 1131, states, in general, that the law of the place of
contracting, the law of the place of performance, and the law intended by the parties have, from time to time, been applied.
4 See, for example, the opinion written in Adams v. Robertson, 37 Ill. 45 (1865).
5 For purpose of illustration, let it be supposed that a married woman, domiciled
in Texas, should execute a note while temporarily in Florida and also there give
a mortgage of her Illinois land to secure the payment of such note. Whether she
has capacity to contract at all, and thus to give an enforcible note, would have
to be determined by Florida law. Assuming the note to be valid by Florida law,
Illinois law would still have to be consulted to determine the validity and effect of
the mortgage as well as the construction to be given thereto. Whether the note
could be negotiated would be controlled by the law of the place where it was
delivered in endorsed form. Other phases of the putative contract would have to
be considered. The law of some one state would form the basis of a determination
as to whether the parties, in fact, agreed to the terms stated; whether their agreement was manifested with sufficient formality; whether it was legal in its purpose;
was supported by legal consideration; gave rise to rights in third parties; had been
effectively performed; or whether any given remedies for breach were available
to the parties.

CHOICE OF LAW: CONTRACT CASES

subdivision of the cases has been made according to three groupings, to-wit: (1) those where all relevant events, except perhaps
suit, occur in one state or country; (2) those where such events
occur in two states or countries, usually, but not always, the place
of "Icontracting" for one, and the place of "Iperformance" for the
other; and (3) those cases where the events have occurred in
three or more jurisdictions. Third, language used by the court
has been considered. Those rules which a court has said it was
applying have been cataloged although alternative grounds for
decision may have existed. Dicta and unreasoned decisions have
been segregated, but not discarded, for even dicta may prove to
be important' Last, where some further subdivision of the cases
would appear necessary, cases have been divided according to the
subject matter of the contract involved. To date, this procedure
has been found to be necessary only with respect to issues concerning construction, but further case developments may render
it useful in connection with other issues as time goes on.7
This alignment of the cases according to issues, to distribution of the facts or "contacts" among the several jurisdictions,
to stated rules, and to kinds of contracts should facilitate comparison and explanation of like cases, should remove many of the
apparent contradictions, and should, for practical purposes, bring
the case-in-point more readily available to the judge and the
lawyer.
I. SUMMARY OF ILLINOIS CONTRACT CASES
A.

CAPACITY TO CONTRACT

The sine qua non of any contractual relation lies in the capacity to contract. Whether a party has capacity to contract will
depend upon whether or not the particular law governing his at6 That dicta may prove to be important is illustrated by the case of Scovill Mfg.
Co. v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 462 at 470, 114 N. E. 181 at 185 (1916), where the court
said: "We do not think the rule laid down in this last case upon the question here
involved was dictum, but even if it was, it was the expression of opinion upon a
point in a case deliberately passed upon by the court and should be held as judicial
dictum rather than mere obiter."
7 An earlier article classifying cases according to kinds of contracts appears in
Bernhard, "A Rationalization of the Illinois Conflict of Laws Rules Applicable to
Contracts," 40 Ill. L. Rev. 165 (1945).
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tempted contract deems him competent or incompetent to enter
into contractual relations. The law recognizes that legal incompetence may attach to the attempted contractual negotiations of
either natural or artificial persons.
Of the former, contracts by married women have provided
much of the litigation. The power of married women to contract
has now been established in many states,' but such power is still
limited in a considerable number of jurisdictions, 2 so the problem
is far from being obsolete. The Illinois cases hold that the question of whether or not a married woman is recognized in law as
being capable of binding herself to a contract is to be determined
according to the law of the place where the putative contract is
made,3 her contractual capacity being considered "legal" rather
than "domicilary. "4 Thus, where a married woman, domiciled
in Illinois, executed a note and joined with her husband in a trust
deed of Illinois land as security for the payment thereof while she
was temporarily in Florida, the court held Florida law, which denied her the power to contract, was controlling.5 The case is re'Madden, Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations (West Pub.
Co., St. Paul, 1931), p. 137. Ii. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 6, illustrates a
common form of statute on the point.
2 Madden, op. cit., p. 142.
3 The clearest case is that of Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, 106 N. E. 206 (1914),
but several cases in which the domicile and place of contracting coincide serve to
support the rule. In Burchard v. Dunbar, 82 Ill. 450 (1876), a suit on a note
charging the married woman's separate estate as security for her husband's debts,
the defendant's domicile was not disclosed, hence was apparently considered immaterial. The case of Nixon v. Halley, 78 Ill. 611 (1875), was a suit In contract
for labor performed and goods furnished, and the defendant's domicile, whether
one of choice or by operation of law is not clear, was apparently the same as the
place of contracting. See also Pomeroy v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 398
(1866), involving an attempted assignment of part of an interest as beneficiary
under an insurance policy, and O'Dea v. Throm, 250 Ill. App. 577 (1928), reversed
on other grounds in 332 Ill. 89, 163 N. E. 390 (1929). In Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 38 S. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed. 368 (1918), Mr. Justice Holmes upheld
an application of Texas law, being the law of the domicile, to strike down a
married woman's contract of suretyship for her husband's debts. The contract was
valid by the law of Illinois where it was made, but was void by the law of Texas,
which was the situs of her domicile and of her property, which had been attached
at inception of the suit. The case should probably be treated as an exception
because of the strong public policy of the form. In this way, the case could be
reconciled with the holding In the Burr case.
4 Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N. E. 1028 (1907), permitted a collateral
attack to be made on an Ohio judgment, taken by confession, on the ground Ohio
law prevented a married woman from making such a note, and her absence from
the proceedings rendered them otherwise void for want of jurisdiction.
5 Burr v. Beckler, 264 11. 230, 106 N. E. 206 (1914).
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markable in that it applied the lex loci contractus rule in a situation where the momentary location of the parties was quite incidental to the whole transaction and could have been purely fortuitous.8 By way of contrast, a married woman's contracts affecting title to real property, either by way of sale or encumbrance, as distinguished from collateral obligations, will, under the
general rule, be governed by the lex situs.7
The rules relating to the contractual capacity of infants
should be the same as those for married women," but, in addition, local licensing statutes may be viewed as restricting the
capacity of even an adult natural person 'to do business, so that
his attempted contract may be held void because of a lack of local
authorization. Thus, the capacity to enter into contracts as a
real estate broker will be governed by the lex loci contractus,9 but
one case does exist in which a locally licensed doctor was not pre6Cheshire, International Contracts (Jackson, Son & Co., Glasgow, 1948), p. 49,
is opposed to that view. His objections are: "First, it will give an irrational
result if the parties conclude the contract in a country where they are transiently
and perhaps accidentally present, and if the law of that country, in opposition to
the proper law, regards the ultimate defendant to the action as lacking capacity.
Secondly, it enables a party to evade an incapacity, imposed upon him by the
proper law, by the simple device of concluding the transaction in a country where
the law is more favorable."
7 Although the court concerned with the case of Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230,
106 N. E. 206 (1914), recognized this fact, it said that, as the note in suit was
void, the trust deed could not be enforced. The best case in point is that of Post
v. First National Bank of Springfield, 138 Ill. 559, 28 N. E. 978 (1891), where a
married woman, domiciled in Texas, there joined with her husband in a mortgage
of Illinois land given to secure the husband's debts. Against the argument that
Texas law accorded her no capacity to dispose of her interest in that fashion, the
Illinois court held the mortgage to be effective because controlled by Illinois law.
The lex 8itus rule found unusual application in Dempster v. Stephen, 63 Ill. App.
126 (1895), where a married woman sued in Illinois for rent due on real property
situated in Canada. Recovery was denied because under Canadian law, the law
of the situs, which was presumed to agree with the common law in the absence
of contrary proof, only the husband could sue. An incomplete report of the facts
weakens the case since neither the plaintiff's domicile nor the place of contracting
is disclosed. Ordinarily, the lex fori would be expected to govern the remedy,
including the matter if the married woman's capacity to bring suit. See also
Tinkler v. Cox, 68 Ill. 119 (1873), holding that a married woman's power to acquire
and hold personal property is governed by the law of the place of the purported
acquisition.
8 No Illinois case has been found bearing on the point. See Beale, op. cit., Vol.
2, p. 1181, and Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (West Pub. Co., St.
Paul, 1938), 2d Ed., p. 267.
9 Frankel v. Allied Mills, 369 Ill. 578, 17 N. E. (2d) 570 (1938). See also the
abstract opinions in Vossler v. Earle, 194 Ill. App. 522 (1915), affirmed on other
grounds in 273 Ill. 367, 112 N. E. 687 (1916), and in Egeland v. Scheffler, 189 Ill.
App. 426 (1914). Attention might be given to Reed v. Kelly, 177 F. (2d) 473 (1949),
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cluded from collecting for his services, contracted for locally, even
though the same were rendered partially while in attendance upon
the patient sojourning in another state where the doctor had no
license. 10 On the other hand, the capacity of a foreign appointed
testamentary trustee to contract for the sale of Illinois realty is
governed by the lex situs," in accordance with the well-recognized
rule.
The contractual capacity of an artificial person may be affected by the law under which it was created, by the lex loci contractus, or both. Thus, the capacity of an inchoate corporation,
in its pre-incorporation stages, is to be determined by the law of
its domicile as a perfected corporation. If such law denies capacity, no contractual liability can arise, notwithstanding a contrary rule in the place of contracting.' 2 Under the same lex
domicilii rule, transactions occurring after incorporation may likewise be held ineffectual. 13 If, however, the capacity to contract
has been given by the state of domicile, the corporation may then
wherein a real estate broker, licensed in Illinois, but not in Wisconsin as required
by a statute of that jurisdiction, made and performed, in Illinois, a contract for
the sale of Wisconsin land. On failure of the client to pay a commission, the broker
sought recovery in a federal district court sitting in Wisconsin, but was denied
recovery. Tacitly applying the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313
U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941), to the effect that a federal court
must apply the conflict rules of the jurisdictions in which it sits, both the district
court and the Court of Appeals found it to be the Wisconsin conflict of laws rule
that such a contract was void and unenforcible, as against Wisconsin public policy,
however valid it might have been under the law of Illinois, where made and performed.
10 Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 245 Il. 180, 91 N. E. 1041 (1910).
11 West v. Fitz, 109 Ill. 425 (1884). The vendee, doubting title or capacity of
a Massachusetts judicially appointed trustee, declined to perform. In the trustee's
suit for specific performance, it was held, under Illinois law, that the judicially
appointed foreign trustee had no power to pass title.
12 Erd & Massey v. Rapid Transit Co. of Illinois, 206 Ill. App. 351 (1917). Compare with Eau Claire Canning Co. v. Western Brokerage Co., 213 Ill. 561, 73 N. E.
430 (1905), where the court considered the capacity of a dissolved corporation to
sue on a contract made prior to dissolution. The Illinois Supreme Court applied
the domiciliary law of Michigan, extending the power of a corporation to sue for
a period of three years after its dissolution, finding the same to be harmonious
with Illinois law on the point.
13 Grimme v. Grimme, 101 Ill. App. 389 (1902), affirmed without dispute as to the
conflicts point in 198 Ill. 265, 64 N. E. 1088 (1902). A Missouri corporation apparently concluded a contract in Illinois, but when the insured changed beneficiaries
to include a person not eligible to be paid under the corporate charter, domiciliary
law was applied to avoid the contract. In Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States v. Frommhold, 75 Ill. App. 43 (1897), the power of the company to
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enter another state and contract there also1 4 unless denied such
right by the second state. 1 5 A foreign corporation which lacks
authority to do business in Illinois may experience difficulty in
securing the enforcement of its contracts here,' 6 but such contracts
17
would, nevertheless, be enforced against the corporation.

declare a forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums under events which had occurred
was denied in conformity with the law of the domicile. In another case, that of
Barth v. Farmers & Traders Bank, 195 Ill. App. 318 (1915), involving the question
as to whether a corporation had authority to invest in certificates of deposit, all
relevant events except suit occurred in one state. See also Starkweather v. American Bible Society, 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133 (1874), holding that domiciliary law,
denying to a corporation the power to take real property by devise, would control
and prevent a New York corporation from acquiring Illinois land in that manner.
A mere excessive acquisition would not defeat title, the question of abuse of corporate power being left to be determined in a proceeding between the corporation
and the state of its domicile: Barnes v. Suddard, 117 Ill. 237, 7 N. E. 677 (1886).
14 In Santa Clara Female Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Ill. 375 at 381, 6 N. E. 183
at 184-5 (1886), the court said: "It is the well settled doctrine that a corporation
created in one State may, upon the principle of comity, exercise within another
State the general powers conferred by its own charter and permitted by the law of
its own State, provided the doing so be not inconsistent with the laws or public
policy of such other State." See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.)
519 at 588, 10 L. Ed. 274 at 308 (1839), where the statement was made that it is
'very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries
of the sovereignty by which it is created ... Yet, as in the case of a natural person,
it is not necessary that it should actually exist in the sovereignty in which the contract is made. It is sufficient that its existence as an artificial person, in a State
of its creation, is acknowledged and recognized by the law of the nation where the
dealing takes place; and that it is permitted by the laws of that place to exercise
there the powers with which it is endowed."
15 Carroll v. City of East St. Louis, 67 Ill. 567 (1873). This view has been carried to the length where it has been held that a foreign insurance company, not
authorized to do business in Illinois, may not recover in an Illinois court on a
contract made with an Illinois citizen, even though made outside of the state.
Thus, in Buell v. Breese Mill & Grain Co., 65 Ill. App. 271 (1896), where a receiver
of an insurance company sued to collect an assessment from an Illinois policy
holder under an insurance contract entered into in Wisconsin with a Wisconsin
company, not authorized to do business in Illinois, the court, at page 275, denying
recovery, said: "Can the violator of our laws come into our courts, with a courteous
bow, and enforce a contract which has been secured in disregard of the statutory
prohibition? True it is, that the contract was made in Wisconsin; but true it is
also, that the property insured is in Illinois." See also Swing v. Thomas, 120 111.
App. 235 (1905), where an Illinois court refused to enforce an Ohio decree of
assessment against policyholders in a company, not licensed to do business in Illinois, on the ground that the acts of the company were void ab initio as to Illinois
citizens until the company was licensed in Illinois. An annotation in 75 A. L. R.
446 collects cases from Illinois and elsewhere dealing with the effect of the foreign
corporation's subsequent compliance with local conditions for doing business on contracts made prior to compliance.
16

See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.125.

17 O'Malley v. Bank of Montreal, 349 Ill. App. 224, 110 N. E. (2d) 473 (1953).
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B. FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT

1. ContractualIntention
Assuming capacity to contract to exist, it would next be essential to ascertain whether the parties possessed the requisite
contractual intention and sufficiently displayed evidence of that
fact to produce a contract in law. In that regard, courts sometimes isolate the question as to whether or not the parties actually agreed to the terms of the contract and, finding no real agreement, achieve the result that no contract was made. This tends
to be true where some vital matter has been omitted from a written contract, or where the written terms are oppressive or obscure.
Although questions of this character are primarily matters of fact,
they tend to generate issues of law when, at a given stage of the
negotiations, one jurisdiction would recognize an agreement and
another would not.
Where the contract has been made and is to be performed
entirely within another state, Illinois courts will apply the law of
that other state to find a solution to this question of agreement.'
Similarly, where a contract is made in one state but is to be performed in another, the lex loci contractus will control. 2 Thus, in
Coats v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company,3 certain potatoes were shipped in Iowa to a Pennsylvania destination but were lost en route. The question presented was one as
to what law should determine the effect of the shipper's acceptance
of a bill of lading containing a limitation of liability. Pennsylvania law was not considered. Illinois law placed upon the carrier
I Milwaukee & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 74 Ill. 197 (1874).
2 Coats v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 239 Ill. 154, 84 N. E. 929 (1909) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 69 Ill. 260 (1873). In the last mentioned case, goods shipped
in Indiana for Kansas were destroyed by fire in Chicago after the defendant railroad had delivered them into the custody of a connecting carrier. Under Indiana
law, the carrier was liable only to the limit of its line. Under the law of Illinois, it
was liable for the goods over the entire journey. The court applied the law of
Indiana, where the bill of lading had been issued. See also Cohn v. Adams Express
Co., 170 Ill. App. 174 (1912) ; Waxelbaum v. Southern R. R. Co., 168 Ill. App. 66
(1912); Fuller v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 165 Ill. App. 279 (1911) ; Clingan v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 163 Ill. App. 68 (1911); Chicago & West
Michigan R. R. v. Hull, 76 Ill. App. 408 (1898).
3239 Ill. 154, 87 N. E. 929 (1909).
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the burden of showing that the shipper assented to the limitation.
Iowa law, on the other hand, presumed assent to the limitation by
the shipper's acceptance of the bill. The court, holding that Iowa
law should control, said:
It is conclusively settled by the decisions of this court that
the contract having been made in Iowa, and not, so far as
it appears, with a view to the laws of any other State, it must
be governed by the law of the State where it was made. The
decisions are not all in harmony upon this question. Appellees cite many eminent and respectable authorities holding a
contrary view, but the decisions in this State are uniform in
4
support of the view we have announced.
A scattering of dicta support the rule so stated, 5 but in other cases
the court has determined the question of assent simply as a matter
of fact, either without stating any conflict of laws rule,6 or with
some accompanying lip service to a general rule that the law of
7
the place of contracting governs the existence of a contract.
Two limitations upon an application of the rule of lex loci
contractus appear in the decisions. First, the rule is subject to
an exception that the contract will not be enforced where enforcement is contrary to the public policy of the forum.8 Secondly, a
number of cases indicate that the lex loci contractus rule creates
only a presumption, which may be rebutted by circumstances show4 239 Ill. 154 at 161, 87 N. E. 929 at 931.
Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Boyd, 91 Il. 268 (1878); Noyes v. Hines, 220
Ill. App. 409 (1920) ; Gamble-Robinson Commission Co. v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co.,
169 Ill. App. 319 (1912) ; Simpson Fruit Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 I1. App.
158 (1910).
6 See Wenz v. Business Men's Accident Ass'n of America, 212 Ill. App. 581 (1918),
where the court never reached the conflicts problem, and Brinker v. Scheunemann,
43 Ill. App. 659 (1891).
7 0'Dea v. Throm, 250 Ill. App. 577 (1928), reversed on other grounds In 332
Ill. 89, 163 N. E. 390 (1929); Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Co. v. Furthmann, 149 Ill. 66, 36 N. E. 624, 41 Am. St. Rep. 265 (1893).
s In Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co., 256 Ill. 66, 99 N. E. 893 (1912),
a shipping receipt form limiting liability, valid in New York where made, was held
unenforcible as against Illinois public policy. See also Mowery v. Washington
National Insurance Co., 289 Il. App. 443, 7 N. E. (2d) 334 (1937), as to contract
conditions in fine print. The public policy exception will not be applied in favor of
one who comes to this state seeking to repudiate his contract by bringing a tort
action to recover discriminatory exactions under the contract: News Publishing Co.
v. Associated Press, 190 Ill. App. 77 (1914).
5
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ing that the parties intended the law of some other place, usually
the place of performance, to determine this question of assent
One case, reaching a result based upon the lex loci solutionis, must
also be rationalized on this ground although the court does not
adequately consider the conflict of laws problem. 10
Two other cases involving questions of assent should be considered. While the aforementioned rules can reasonably be applied to natural persons, there is some indication that they are
not the only rules which govern agreements made by artificial
persons, which persons may have a limited power to assent. Thus,
the question whether a pre-incorporation "agreement" will be implied and held binding upon a corporation subsequently formed
will be determined by the law of the corporate domicile, and not
by the law where the "agreement" was "made," according to
the Appellate Court holding in the case of Erd & Massey v. Rapid
Transit Company of IUinois." The result of the case, exoneration
9 Benedict v. Dakin, 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712 (1910) ; Coats v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. R. Co., 239 Ill. 154, 87 N. E. 929 (1909). In Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild,
69 Ill. 260 at 263 (1873), the court said: "The rule upon that subject is well settled,
and has often been recognized by this court, that contracts are to be construed
according to the laws of the state where made, unless it is presumed from their
tenor that they were entered into with a view to the law of some other state.
There is nothing in this case, either from the location of the parties, or the nature
of the contract, to show that they could have had the law of Illinois in view, or
any other law, than that of the place where it was made." Italics added. Indication that there is an initial presumption in favor of the lex loci contractus may be
found in Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174 I1. 13, 50 N. E. 1019 (1898), and
Altland v. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 151 Ill. App. 291 (1909), both dealing with the
legality of claimed exemptions from liability, and in the case of Adams v. Robertson, 37 II. 45 (1865), a usury case.
10 In North Packing & Provision Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Ill.
App. 275 (1897), the plaintiff brought assumpsit for damages resulting from defendant's tardy delivery of a telegram. The message form stated that defendant's
liability for incorrect transmission was limited to the telegraphic charges. As the
message, sent from Boston, was to be delivered in Chicago, the court held the
contract was one to be performed in Chicago, hence was governed by Illinois law,
although no reasoning was given beyond the phrase "lex loci solutiones." On
retrial and second appeal, 89 Ill. App. 301 (1899), the defendant argued that
Massachusetts law should have been applied. This argument was at once rejected
because concluded by the former decision, but also because it was immaterial on
the ground the limitation of liability referred to inaccuracy in transmission, not
delay in delivery. The latter decision was affirmed, without discussion of the conflicts point, in 188 Ill. 366, 58 N. E. 958 (1900). The presumption was shifted to
the law of the place of performance in George v. Haas, a usury case, 311 Ill. 382,
143 N. E. 54 (1924), and dictum based thereon may be found in Oakes v. Chicago
Fire Brick Co., 311 Ill. App. 111, 35 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941), affirmed in 388 Ill.
474, 58 N. E. (2d) 460 (1944), which involved a question arising under the statute
of frauds.
11206 Ill. App. 351 (1917).
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of the corporation under domiciliary law, is harmonious with those
12
cases which hold that domicile determines questions of capacity.

On the other hand, a failure to raise the conflict of laws
question probably cost the defendant an adverse judgment in the
case of Delta Bag Company v. Leyland & Company, Ltd.13 The
plaintiff company there sought to recover from defendant, an
Illinois resident, for damage done to merchandise on defendant's
steamship operating between Liverpool, England, and New Orleans, Louisiana. The defendant pleaded that the bill of lading
contained a limitation of liability, but the Illinois court held that
Illinois law, placing the burden of showing assent upon the carrier,
applied and that the defendant had failed to carry this burden. It
would have been open to the defendant to plead and prove the
law of England, or of Louisiana, to the contrary if it could do
so but, in the absence of such proof, the court, even if it had
recognized the conflicts problem, would have been obliged to apply
a foreign common law which would have been presumed to be the
same as that of Illinois.
In rare instances, contracts otherwise valid may be open to
criticism because fraud, duress, or mistake may have been present
at the moment of the making thereof. Only a few cases present any
choice of law problem falling in that area. One such case applied
the rule of lex loci contractus,1 4 and other cases indirectly involving questions of fraud seem to be in accord therewith.' 5 Where
12 See prior discussion of this case in the section dealing with capacity to contract.
13 173 I. App. 38 (1912).
14 Hartliep Transit Co. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 288 Ill. App. 140, 5 N. E. (2d)
879 (1937), concerned a suit on an Insurance policy issued in Iowa to a trucking
firm organized there, sending its vehicles through many other states and into Canada. Recovery was sought for an accident occurring in Illinois. It was held that
Iowa law, which barred the defendant from pleading fraud unless a copy of the
application was attached to the policy, was a matter relating to the substance of
the contract and not simply remedial in character, hence called for an application
of the lex loci contractus.
15 Woodbury v. U. S. Casualty Co., 284 Ill.- 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918), seemed to
involve a question of fraud and duress, but the ultimate question was the sufficiency
of a seal on a release. Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum, 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915 (1901),
dealt with the question of waiver of fraud. As the local subordinate lodge of a
Massachusetts benefit society had knowledge of the insured's fraud, its continued
receipt of dues after such knowledge constituted a waiver of the fraud under Illinois law. Since the location of the home office of the organization supplied the only
foreign element, the case is entitled to little weight.
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the title to land is concerned, however, the lex situs will undoubtedly govern the point as to whether or not the contract may
be reformed for mistake. 6
2. Formal Validity
At this point, the question becomes one as to whether the
parties have sufficiently manifested their intentions to form a
contract, either written or oral, which meets the test of law, since
certain types of contracts must be in writing, or be evidenced by
a written memorandum, to possess legal effect.' 7
Illinois conflicts case law relating to formal validity deals
chiefly with the statute of frauds, which has been held to relate to
the "substance" of the obligation rather than to the "remedy."'ll
On that basis, the statute of that jurisdiction where the contract
is made will operate to govern essential formalities both in those
cases where all matters of contracting and performance are concentrated in one state 9 as well as in those instances where the
contract has been made in one state but is to be performed in
20
several other states.

16 Post v. First National Bank of Springfield, 138 Ill. 559, 28 N. E. 978 (1891),
involved a married woman who executed a mortgage in Texas on land in Illinois.
In a suit to correct a mistake arising from an erroneous designation of the mortgagee, and to foreclose, the court, against defenses of undue influence and lack
of evidence of mistake, applied Illinois law, found the evidence relating to the
mistake to be sufficient, and treated the mortgage as being effective after it had
been suitably reformed.
17 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Oh. 59, §§ 1-2, and Vol. 2, Ch.
121-Y2, § 4.
18 Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 311 Il. App. 111, 35 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941),
affirmed in 388 Ill. 474, 58 N. E. (2d) 460 (1945). Although prior cases had clearly
rejected the rule of Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (1852),
which treated the statute of frauds to be "procedural" in character, the Illinois
Supreme Court here took strange comfort in finding that case to be similar to the
one before it. Murdock v. Calgary Colonization Co., 193 Ill. App. 295 (1915), also
holds the statute of frauds to be "substantive." See annotation in 161 A. L. R.
820, particularly p. 823.
19 Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. 1111 (1893) ; Reid, Murdoch & Co. v.
The Northern Lumber Co., 146 Ill. App. 371 (1909). The case of Brinker v. Scheunemann, 43 Ill. App. 659 (1891), involved a battle of counter-offers sufficient to
create a doubt as to any real agreement, hence the court probably did not need
to discuss issues arising under the statute of frauds.
20 Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 311 Il. App. 111, 35 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941),
affirmed in 388 Ill. 474, 58 N. E. (2d) 460 (1945). As a defense to an action for
breach of an oral contract relating to employment, the defendant pleaded the

Illinois statute, insisting .on an application of the lex loci solutionis. But the court
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Although few cases are to be found where the contract has
been made in one state but is to be performed in another, divergent
rules do appear. A place-of-contracting rule may be derived from
the case of Scudder v. Union National Bank of Chicago.21 There,
a parol acceptance, given in Chicago, of a bill of exchange drawn
in Missouri by a Chicago firm on a Missouri firm, was held governed by Illinois law, notwithstanding the fact that the law of
the place of payment, to-wit: Missouri, required a written acceptance. Two other cases stand on the rule that the law of the place
of performance, or payment, should control formal validity. In
the first, that of Mason v. Dousay,22 a bill of exchange was drawn
in Michigan, in favor of a resident there, upon a Chicago drawee,
payable and accepted in Chicago. The Illinois Supreme Court
applied the law of the place of performance, i. e., payment, at
the time it enforced the oral acceptance. In the other, that of
Hall v. Cordell,23 the defendant orally promised in Missouri to
accept a bill to be drawn upon him in the future. The bill was
afterwards drawn, in Illinois, upon the defendant drawee, an
Illinois resident, and was made payable in Illinois. Against the
plea that Missouri law required the acceptance to be in writing,
the United States Supreme Court held that Illinois law governed
this formality, and it enforced-the agreement under Illinois law
permitting an oral acceptance.
Some matters in connection with these three cases should be
noted. First, each case presented a clear-cut attempt to avoid a
said: "Where a contract is to be performed in various States, as in this case, the
lex loci contractus must control. Otherwise, if the place of performance is to
govern, the law would find itself in a hopeless tangle." See 388 Ill. 474 at 479, 58
N. E. (2d) 460 at 462. Other cases in which performance occurred, or might have
occurred, in several states are the real estate brokers cases of Vossler v. Earle,
1.94 Ill. App. 522 (1915), abst. opin., affirmed on the evidence in 273 Ill. 367, 112
N. E. 687 (1916), and Murdock v. Calgary Colonization Co., 193 Ill. App. 295
(1915). See also Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. The Northern Lumber Co., 146 Ill. App.
371 (1909), and Chicago & West Michigan R. R. Co. v. Hul], 76 Ill. App. 408 (1898).
In the last mentioned case, the court applied the Michigan statute of frauds to
a shipping contract entered into in that state, holding that, under it, a condition
limiting liability had to be in handwriting, not printed.
2191 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245 (1875).
22 35 Ill. 424, 85 Am. Dec. 368 (1864).
23 142 U. S. 116, 12 S. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956 (1891).
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promise on the technical defense of the statute of frauds but,
in each, the court upheld the contract, perhaps under the belief
that, by the general policy of contract law, promises once made
should be kept.24 Second, it should be noted that each of these
cases dealt with a formality required in the acceptance of a negotiable instrument. It has been suggested that cases of this nature
should be segregated from those dealing with other contract matters because the necessity for uniformity in such cases has resulted
25
in a rule which would be unduly rigid if given general application.
If that suggestion were to be followed, the only authority remaining in Illinois would lie in those cases dealing with a one-state
or a many-state situation, where it has been indicated that the
lex loci contractus will control in accordance with the general rule
on the subject.2 6
Aside from the fundamental idea that the formal validity of
a contract affecting title to land must be determined by the lex situs,
and other laws will be held to be immaterial, 27 a scattering of
cases dealing with matters of form other than some aspect of
the statute of frauds usually announce a lex loci contractus rule.
Unfortunately, these cases are inconclusive on their facts, either
because the place of making and the place of performance coin24 See Cheatem and Reese, "Choice of Applicable Law," 52 Col. L. Rev. 959
(1952), at p. 978.

25 Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories in Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement," 51
Yale L. J. 893 (1942), particularly p. 918. The author's purpose, arguing for such
segregation, would be to eliminate the weight of cases usually favoring a lex looi
contractus rule in contract matters generally.
26

Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 270-1.

27 Post v. First National Bank of Springfield. 138 Ill. 559, 28 N. E. 978 (1891),
dealt with the necessity for a separate acknowledgement by a married woman.
Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. 1111 (1893), is consistent therewith although
it announces a lex loo! contractus rule. An elaborate statement of the rule appears
in 1-arrison v. Weatherby, 180 Ill. 418 at 435. 54 N. E. 237 at 239-40 (1899), where
the court said: "The validity and construction, as well as the force and effect,
of all instruments affecting the title to land, depend upon the law of the State
where the land Is situated. This rule includes wills, as well as deeds, contracts or
agreements: and it includes the form and mode of the execution of the will, as
well as the power of the testator to make the devise or disposition of property
contained in the will."
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cide, 28 because there were several places for performance,29 or
because, as in one case, the court simply applied Illinois law for
the reason the contract was said to be an "Illinois" contract 0
3. Essential Validity
Whether a contract has been made for an illegal purpose and
is, therefore, unenforcible, will be determined according to the
lex loci contractus if weight can be given to the majority of cases
which have arisen in Illinois, both as to those in which the performance was to be rendered in several states 3 ' as well as to
those in which the place of contracting and the place of performance coincided.12 Some cases merely assume the rule, thereby
28 Hakes v. Bank of Terre Haute, 164 Ill. 273, 45 N. E. 444 (1896), dealt with
the question as to whether or not a note was negotiable in form. Pfiueger v.
Broadway Trust & Savings Bank, 265 Ill. App. 569 (1931), affirmed without
contest on the conflicts point in 351 Ill. 170, 184 N. E. 318 (1933), considered
whether negotiability was vitiated by a recital of the existence of a trust agreement in a bond. National Bank & Investment Co. v. Larsh, 262 Ill. App. 363
(1931), concerned a chattel mortgage properly recorded at the place where the
mortgage was given. The cases of Doumas v. Mormella, 251 Ill. App. 397 (1929),
and St. Paul Cattle Loan Company v. Hansman, 215 Ill. App. 190 (1919), each
held that a recording of a chattel mortgage in a state other than where given
and where the property was situated would be insufficient.
The ques29 Woodbury v. U. S. Casualty Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918).
tion involved was the sufficiency in law of the symbol "L. S." as a seal. The instrument involved was a release, hence is here classified as "performable" in more
than one state.
3oIn Mowery v. Washington National Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 443, 7 N. E. (2d)
334 (1937), a life and accident insurance policy was issued In Missouri but was
to take effect at the residence of the insured in Illinois. Some policy conditions
in fine print violated Illinois law. The court had little trouble finding that the
parties intended that the contract should be subject to all the legal regulations
at the situs of the residence, hence was an "Illinois" contract.
31 Frankel v. Allied Mills, 369 Ill. 578, 17 N. E. (2d) 570 (1938), a contract by
an unlicensed real estate broker; Vossler v. Earle, 194 Ill. App. 522 (1915), abst.
opin., affirmed on other grounds in 273 Ill. 367, 112 N. E. 687 (1916), another
unlicensed broker's case which rejected the lex 8itU8 rule; Zeigler v. Illinois Trust
& Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 91 N. E. 1041 (1910), dealing with part performance
in a state where the plaintiff physician was not licensed; Bell v. Farwell, 176
Ill. 489, 52 N. E. 346 (1898), involving a stockholder's liability to creditor where
the law of the corporate domicile was equally available. See also Illinois Central
I. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. 1019 (1898) ; Fuller v. L. S. & M. S. R. R.
Co., 165 Ill. App. 279 (1911).; Ginsburg v. Adams Express Co., 160 111. App. 566
(1911); and Altland v. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 151 Ill. App. 291 (1909), all
dealing with a carrier's attempt to limit liability.
32 Schlee v. Guckenheimer, 179 Ill. 593, 54 N. *E. 302 (1899), concerned an option
to purchase further quantities, attached to an original contract of sale. Roundtree v. Baker, 52 Ill. 617, 4 Am. Rep. 597 (1869), was a suit on a note given, and
presumably payable, in Kentucky for the price of a slave. Anstedt v. Sutter, 30
Ill. 164 (1863), dealt with a sale of liquor on credit. Davis v. Mosbacher, 252
Ill. App. 536 (1928), and Davis v. Wirth, 249 Ill. App. 544 (1928), concerned the
validity of notes authorizing judgment by confession. See also Benza v. New Era
Association, 238 Ill. App. 435 (1925), reversed as to Illinois domestic law in 323
Ill. 297, 134 N. E. 129 (1926).
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avoiding the law of the forum, 33 or else yield only dictum, 34 Federal courts sitting in Illinois have applied Illinois rules concerning
legality to cases based on Illinois contracts3 5 and, conversely, Illinois courts, asked to apply federal law, have utilized federal tests
on the point.36
In those instances where the contract was made in one state
and was to be performed in another, however, the courts have
broken away from the simple place-of-contracting rule and have
taken one or the other of two approaches, both measured in terms
of the intentions of the parties. In Lewis v. Headley,37 for example, the plaintiff sued on notes made in Illinois, to be paid
in Illinois, which had been given as collateral security covering
certain small denomination bills of a New Jersey bank deposited
in an Illinois bank pursuant to an agreement made in New Jersey.
The deposit violated an Illinois law prohibiting the circulation of
bills of this type. Denial of recovery could have been grounded
on the lex loci contractus, to-wit: Illinois law, for the notes, and
the deposit in consideration for which they had been given, were
both made in this state. For that matter, the denial of recovery
could have been grounded on an Illinois policy on the subject.
But the court apparently saw fit to base the decision on a "place
of performance" rule, for it said: ". . . the parties to the agreement are presumed to be informed in regard to the law of the
place where performance is to be made, and to contract with a
33 Ellison v. Adams Express Co., 245 Ill. 410, 92 N. E. 277, L. R. A. 1915A 502
(1910), dealt with a carrier's agreed-valuation limited liability. The Illinois
statute was denied extra-territorial effect.
Macomber & Whyte Rope Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 225 Ill. App. 286 (1922), concerned a similar problem and
both the Interstate Commerce Act and the Illinois statute were held inapplicable,
the court applying "common law," without reference to the common law of Wis
consin where the contract was made. Dean & Son v. W. B. Conkey Co., 180 Ill.
App. 162 (1913), involved a contract for royalties made by a corporation not duly
authorized to do business in Illinois. The cases of Chicago & West Michigan R. R.
v. Hull, 76 Ill. App. 408 (1898), and Thomas v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. R. Co.,
63 F. 200 (1894), also involved carrier's limitations as to liability.
34

See, for example, Bradshaw v. Newman, 1 Ill. 133 (1825).

35 Interstate Finance Corporation v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (1946).
36

Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 (1944).

37 36 Il1.

433, 87 Am. Dec. 227 (1865).
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view to that law, unless it is otherwise expressed in the contract.
And this is a legal presumption that cannot be rebutted."3

8

Here is probably the most inflexible statement ever made in
all of the Illinois conflicts cases dealing with contracts. Inasmuch
as the case has often been cited, the remark is noteworthy; but
inasmuch as no precedent was cited, and no reasoning given, to
support it, the statement is entitled to little weight. In fact, in a
later case of this type, one involving a contract made in one state
but to be performed in another, it was held that the parties
could make the law of another state, that of defendant's residence
as well as the place of performance, a part of the contract, but
that an express term in the contract, actually in conflict with
particular provisions of the intended law, would be given effect
under the lex loci contractus.3 9
Notwithstanding these rules, a contract clearly contrary to the
public policy of the forum will not be enforced. This exception
has been employed in cases where the contract was made and was
to be performed outside of Illinois" as well as in those cases where
38 36 Ill. 433 at 436, 87 Am. Dec. 227 at 229. Italics added. See also Price v.
Burns, 101 Ill. App. 418 (1902), where the court applied a "place of delivery"
rule to a contract clearly against Illinois public policy, and annotation in 166
A. L. R. 1353 at 1370.
39 See Rose v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 144 Ill. App. 434 (1908).
In that
case, a Kentucky resident applied for and received delivery of a policy, in Kentucky, from a New York insurance company. The policy provided that it was to
be governed by New York law. The latter required the giving of certain notice
as to premiums due before a company could declare a policy forfeited for nonpayment of premiums. By the terms of the policy, this requirement was expressly waived. The Appellate Court for the Second District held quite clearly
that this was a "Kentucky" contract and that the special waiver, valid under
the law of that state, controlled the general reference to New York law. However, the aflirmance given by the Illinois Supreme Court in 240 Ill. 45, 88 N. E.
204 (1909), serves to weaken this holding because it was based upon different
reasons, to-wit: (1) that the policy was a "New York" contract, delivery not
being determinative of the place of making; but (2) that the controlling New
York law was not intended to have any effect upon contracts made outside of
that state.
40 Pope v. Hanke, 155 Ill. 617, 40 N. E. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568 (1894), concerned a
note made, endorsed, and payable in Missouri. Israel v. Selman, 263 111. App.
351 (1931), dealt with a loan for gambling purposes, benefiting both parties, made
and presumably performable in Ohio. In Judy v. Evans, 109 Ill. App. 154 (1903),
an unrecorded conditional sale contract, valid where made, was held unenforcible
in Illinois where it would have operated to the detriment of Illinois citizens. The
Illinois policy in this respect has changed, see First National Bank of Nevada v.
Swegler, 336 Ill. App. 107, 82 N. E. (2d) 920 (1948).
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the performance was to be rendered, at least partly, in Illinois. 4 1
Where the contract has no connection whatever with Illinois, the
public policy exception will not be employed to enable a party to
come to this state in order to repudiate his contract by recovering
in tort on the alleged illegal transaction, 42 nor will a foreign
judgment based upon an arbitration award, achieved in an illegal
43
or gambling transaction, be open to collateral attack.
There is occasion to consider the question of usury, which
may affect the legality of a loan contract, as a separate topic
because courts have tended to apply a different rule in such
instances, often utilizing the intentions of the parties, whether
expressed, 44 inferred, 4 5 or presumed, 46 as the basis for upholding
the contract.
Where a contract has been made and is to be performed
in the same jurisdiction, the laws of that jurisdiction will govern
validity insofar as usury is concerned, whether leading to the up41Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co., 256 Ill. 66, 99 N. E. 893 (1912),
dealing with a limitation of a carrier's liability to an agreed valuation, valid
where made, but held unenforcible as contrary to Illinois public policy; Thomas v.
First National Bank of Belleville, 213 Ill. 261, 72 N. E. 801 (1904), a gaming contract; Swing v. Thomas, 120 Ill. App. 235 (1905), concerning an assessment upon
an Illinois policy holder in an insurance company not authorized to do business
in Illinois, based upon a contract entered into in another state but presumably to
be performed, that is: enforced, in Illinois. See also Price v. Burns, 101 Ill. App.
418 (1902), where the court applied a "place of delivery" rule to deny enforcement of an Iowa contract for the sale of a gambling machine and the delivery
thereof in Illinois. In those cases where the contract of sale would merely
violate some local option law, but would not violate a general policy of the state,
recovery has been permitted: Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Miller, 200 Ill. App.
633 (1915); F. W. Cook Brewing Co. v. Vacarro, 188 Ill. App. 387 (1917). See
also annotation in 166 A. L. R. 1353 at 1370.
42News Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 190 111. App. 77 (1914).

43 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908).
44 In McAllister v. Smith, 17 Il. 328, 65 Ara. Dec. 651 (1856), the law stipulated
for by the parties was applied to defeat the contract. But note the legislative
overruling of this case discussed below at note 51, post. See also Merchants' &
Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson, 69 F. (2d) 940 at 943 (1934).
The
parties there stipulated that Illinois law should govern and the court, finding
a preponderance of activity in Illinois, gave effect to the stipulation. Quoting
from Wharton, The Conflict of Laws, the court said:
"'Assuming that their
real, bona fide intention was to fix the situs of the contract at a certain place
which has a natural and vital connection with the transaction, the fact that they
were actuated in so doing by an Intention to obtain a higher rate of Interest than
is allowable by the situs of some of the other elements of the transaction does
not prevent the application of the law allowing the higher rate.'"
45 Tilden v. Blair, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 241, 22 L. Ed. 632 (1875).
46 George v. Haas, 311 Il. 382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924).
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4s
Where the inholding of the contract 47 or tending to defeat it.
terest rate is in excess of the legal rate for such jurisdiction, and
the laws thereof impose only a partial forfeiture to the state, but
do not declare the contract to be utterly void, the courts of Illinois
49
will permit recovery without imposing the foreign penalty.

In those instances where the contract has been made in one
state but is to be performed in another, the rules may vary but an
examination of the cases discloses that in no instance has the
contract been denied enforcement. It could be assumed that if the
contract were to be utterly void in both states because of the usury
it would not be enforced here, but there is no Illinois case in point.
Where the contract would be regarded as valid under the laws of
the state where made, but void by the laws of the state where it
was to be performed, the indications are that it would be held
enforcible under the lex loci contractus.50 If valid in Illinois,
where made, but void under the laws of the state fixed as the place
for performance, the obligation would be enforced by an Illinois
court in conformity with an express statute on the subject. 51
47 United States Mortgage Co. v. Sperry, 138 U. S. 313, 11 S. Ct. 321, 34 L. Ed.
969 (1891) ; Walker v. Lovitt, 250 I1. 543, 95 N. E. 631 (1911); Dearlove v. Edwards, 166 Ill. 619, 46 N. E. 1081 (1897) ; Smith v. Whitaker, 23 Ii. 309 (1859);
Phinney v. Baldwin, 16 11. 108, 61 Am. Dec. 62 (1854).
48 Granite City National Bank v. Cross, 188 Ill. App. 242 (1914). Actually, only
interest was there held forfeited.
49 Barnes v. Whitaker, 22 Ill. 606 (1859), turned on an Iowa law punishing
usury with partial forfeiture to the school fund in the Iowa county where suit
should be brought. The Iowa statute was not enforced by the Illinois court. See
also Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill.521 (1847), where the Illinois court refused to enforce the Massachusetts law punishing usury with a forfeiture of three-fold the
amount reserved. The case of Granite City National Bank v. Cross, 188 Ill. App.
242 (1914), is distinguishable on the ground that the statutory forfeiture there
provided for was limited to the amount of the interest, hence was not considered
to be punitive in character.
50 See Andrews v. Pond, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 65, 10 L. Ed. 61 (1839).
51 Ill. Laws 1857, p. 38, would appear to be a legislative overruling of the holding in the case of McAllister v. Smith, 17 11. 328, 65 Am. Dec. 651 (1856), a suit
based on bills of exchange drawn In Illinois, payable In New York, referring to
New York law, with a rate of interest illegal in both states. Illinois law denied
recovery of Interest; New York law declared the entire contract to be utterly
void. It was held, under a "rule of substitution," that the New York law controlled. The current version of the statute survives in the first part of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 74, § 8. See also Walker v. Lovitt, 250 Ill. 543 at 549, 95
N. E. 631 at 633 (1911), where the court said: "The object of the legislature has
always been the same,-to enable citizens to borrow money outside the State at
the highest rate permitted by law within the State, and to give valid obligations
therefor, though such obligations may be invalid by the law of the State where
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In the converse situation, that is one where the contract
would be usurious and void where made but would-be valid under
the laws of the state where it was to be performed, there is some
indication that a recovery might be denied under the lex loci
5 2 although no Illinois case
contractrs,
deciding the point has been
found. If the state of performance should happen to be Illinois
and one of the parties turns out to be an Illinois citizen, the aforementioned statute would apparently authorize enforcement. 53 If,
on the other hand, the contract should be usurious but not utterly
void by the laws of the state where made, and valid by the laws
of the state where it is to be performed, it would be enforced
under the doctrine that the parties are to be presumed to have
intended the law of the latter state to govern.5 4 Again, where
the contract would be subject to a penalty or a partial forfeiture
where made, but would be utterly void in the state where it was to
be performed, the courts will seek to uphold it, either by discovering evidence that the parties intended the lex loci contractus to
control,5 5 by recognizing that forfeitures are not to be favored,
made. The legislature has power thus to make contracts otherwise invalid enforcible in this State, for in so doing it violates no constitutional limitation." The
case of Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U. S. 384, 12 S. Ct. 1, 35 L. Ed. 786
(1891), also contains a valuable historical review of this statute.
52 See Andrews v. Pond, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 65, 10 L. Ed. 61 (1839).
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 74, § 8, provides:
"When any written contract, wherever payable, shall be made in this state, or [be made] between . . . a
citizen or corporation of this state and a citizen or corporation of any other state,
territory or country . . . such contract may bear any rate of interest allowed by
law ... in this state."
54 George v. Haas, 311 Ill. 382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924).
In that case, a note drawn
in Chicago, Illinois, payable in the Isle of Pines, West Indies, was held governed
as to its "nature, Validity, interpretation and effect" by the law of the Isle of
Pines, which allowed interest at the rate of 10%, a rate declared to be usurious in
Illinois.
55 Tilden v. Blair, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 241, 22 L. Ed. 632 (1875).
A draft drawn
in Illinois, payable and accepted in New York, was returned to Illinois for negotiation. The court concluded, by the following reasoning, that the more favorable
Illinois law should control: "It is, therefore, quite immaterial, under the facts
of this case, that the defendants resided in New York, and that they there wrote
their acceptance on the draft. In legal effect they accepted the draft in Chicago,
when by their authority the drawer negotiated it, and thus caused effect to be
given to their undertaking. Nor is the law of the contract changed by the fact
that the acceptance was made payable in New York. The place of payment was
doubtless designated for the convenience of the acceptors, or to facilitate the
negotiation of the draft. But it is a controlling fact that before the acceptance
had any operation-before the instrument became a bill, the defendants sent It to
Illinois for the purpose of having it negotiated in that State-negotiated, it must
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or by making analogy to the Illinois statute upholding contracts
made in Illinois, performable elsewhere, and reserving a legal
rate. 56
One further case should be noted, that of Merchants' & Manufacturers' Securities Company v. Johnson,5 7 decided by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The contract
there concerned was made in Illinois, contained a stipulation that
the parties intended Illinois law to control, and was to be performed in several states, but mostly in Illinois. The court gave
effect to the stipulation, but with the reservation that the law
"8
stipulated had to bear a "normal relation" to the contract. 1
Usury, unlike true illegality, is not a defense per se but must
be pleaded and proved. 59 If the alleged usury arises under
foreign law, the court will presume that the contract was made in
conformity with its governing law,60 even where the rate reserved
exceeds that allowable in Illinois." But if an amount of interest
greater than that allowed in Illinois is sought to be recovered
by virtue of some foreign law, rather than by the terms of a
be presumed, at such a rate of discount as by the law of that State was allowable. What more cogent evidence could there be that it was intended to create an
Illinois bill?" 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 241 at 247, 22 L. Ed. 632 at 633. Italics added
to emphasize the court's preoccupation with the parties' intentions, as the primary
factor in the choice of law.
56 Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U. S. 384, 12 S. Ct. 1, 35 L. Ed. 786 (1891).
In Andrews v. Pond, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 65, 10 L. Ed. 61 (1839), the United States
Supreme Court said that where the contract is made in one state to be performed
in another, and the parties state no preference as to which law is to control, then
the Zex loci contractu8 is the law governing the question of usury. The case of
Adams v. Robertson, 37 Ill. 45 (1865), another of this type, contains elaborate
dicta on the right to stipulate the law which is to control. Actually, the case
only held that a third party from whom no usury had been exacted had no
standing to plead usury as a defense.
5769 F. (2d) 940 (1934).
58 The court did not define "normal relation" further, but the term seems to indicate a more versatile qualification than that contained in the limitation found in
Adams v. Robertson, 37 Ill. 45 (1865). The many cases found in this study which
utilize the intentions of the parties as a basis for solving the choice of law problem would seem to indicate that the Illinois courts may take a hint from the
Court of Appeals and may borrow the concept of "normal relation" to the contract
from Its apparent origin in the case of Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274
U. S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1926).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 74, § 7, and Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4).
543, 95 N. E. 631 (1911) ; Dearlove v. Edwards, 166
60 Walker v. Lovitt, 250 Ill.
Il1.
619, 46 N. E. 1081 (1897) ; Smith v. Whitaker, 23 Ill.309 (1860) ; Giddings v.
McCumber, 51 Ill. App. 373 (1893).
61 Walker v. Lovitt, 250 Ill. 543, 95 N. E. 631 (1911).
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foreign contract, then the plaintiff must plead and prove the
foreign interest law for, absent proof on the point, the court would
62
presume the foreign law to be the same as that of the forum.
Naturally, there can be no enforcible contract unless ordinary
tests regarding the requirement for consideration have been met.
Whether there is consideration to support a contract presents a
question which may be divided into two parts. First, have the
parties done an act sufficient to satisfy the orthodox test as to
benefit conferred, detriment suffered, or presence of a seal?
Second, will the consideration, deemed satisfactory under one of
these, escape legal prohibition because of some policy of the controlling law? Where both questions can be resolved in the affirmative, the contract is enforcible, at least insofar as the question
of consideration is concerned. As the second part of the question
has already been discussed in the section relating to legality, only
the first part remains to be dealt with.
Where the place of contracting and of performance coincide,
a lex loci contractus rule would seem to be the one to be utilized
to determine the sufficiency of the consideration, since the only
rule to compete with it would be that of the lex fori.63 Where
the contract has been made in one state but is to be performed
in another, the leading case of Pritchardv. Norton64 gives no clear
62 Chumasero v. Gilbert, 24 Ill. 293 (1860); Robinson v. Holmes, 75 Ill. App.
203 (1897).
63 Woodbury v. U. S. Casualty Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918).
Actually,
the case arose out of a contract of the third type, one to be performed in several
states, but it is considered here because the so-called "performance" was negative
in character. The question actually before the court was whether, under the
governing law, to-wit: the lex loci contractus, the symbol "L.S." was sufficient to
constitute a seal so as to bar an attack on the release for fraud in a court of law.
It may be assumed that this would be the equivalent of the question as to
whether the symbol "L.S." was sufficient to obviate the necessity for con4deration.
64106 U. S. 124, 1 S. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed. 104 (1882).
Plaintiff's decedent had
become surety on an appeal bond in Louisiana, in behalf of defendant, without
the latter's express request. Defendant thereafter executed and delivered, in
New York, an indemnity bond against losses on the appeal bond. Under Louisiana
law, the decedent's pre-existing liability as surety was sufficient consideration
for the indemnity, but not so in New York. The court, holding Louisiana law to
govern, said: "The phrase lew loci contractus is used, in a double sense, to mean,
sometimes, the law of the place where a contract is entered into; sometimes, that
of the place of its performance. And when it is employed to describe the law
of the seat of the obligation, it is, on that account, confusing. The law we are
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rule but speaks of the lex loci contractus in a double sense, as the
law of the "seat of the obligation," and as "that which the parties
have, either expressly or presumptively, incorporated into their
contract." Where the contract is made in one jurisdiction but is
to be performed in several, the most recent case indicates that,
at least where the parties, recognizing the possibility of disputes
in various jurisdictions, express their intention that its validity
should be upheld, the court ought to apply the law which deems
the consideration sufficient.6 5 Where performance is negative
in character, however, as in the case of a release, the law of the
place where the release has been given will govern the situation."
C.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT

Assuming that the parties to a contract have assented to the
express terms of the agreement, that it is lawful in its scope,
and is adequately supported by consideration, the problem may
yet arise as to what their intentions were, or rather what intentions will be ascribed to their manifestations, in those situations
not precisely covered by express terms of the contract.
Those cases in which the important elements of the transaction coincide in one state should be segregated from the others.
in search of, which is to decide upon the nature, interpretation, and validity of
the engagement in question, is that which the parties have, either expressly or
presumptively, incorporated into their contract as constituting its obligation."
106 U. S. 124 at 136, 1 S. Ct. 102 at 112, 27 L. Ed. 104 at 108.
65 Reighley v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank, 390 Ill. 242, 61 N. E. (2d.) 29 (1945).
A husband and wife entered into a support contract in Germany, providing for
monthly payments for life, to be secured by a deposit of securities in a Chicago
bank, at the wife's residence. Disputes were to be litigated wherever the plaintiff
filed suit provided, under the law of that place, the contract was regarded as
lawful, and the invalidity of any proviso was not to cause the entire contract to
be declared void. Annulment of the marriage in Germany on the ground of
impotency, execution of a "Chicago contract" in accordance with the "Berlin
contract" and a deposit of securities followed. In a suit to enforce payments,
the defendant argued, inter alia, that the effect of the German annulment was
such as to declare that there had never been a marriage, hence there had been
no duty to support to serve as consideration. Impotency being only a ground for
divorce, not annulment, in Illinois, the argument could not have been made if the
events had occurred in Illinois. Leaning on the expressed intention that the contract should not be held void, the court declared: "No contract should be held as
intended to be made in violation of law, whenever, by any reasonable construction,
it can be made consistent with law." 390 Ill. 242 at 251, 61 N. B. (2d) 29 at 34.
66 Woodbury v. U. S. Casualty Co., 284 I1. 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918).
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In this group, it has been held that where the situs,1 the corporate
domicile, 2 or the place of performance3 are situated in the same
state as that in which the contract was "made," the law of that
state, in force at the time, 4 would govern the construction of the
contract.
As might be expected, the most interesting group of cases,
the one showing the greatest diversity in applicable rules, is that
wherein the contract was made in one state but was to be performed
in another, or possessed some important element, other than execution, in the second state. Because of this diversity, cases in this
group, dealing with an issue of construction, are here further
subdivided according to the subject matter of the contract. Rules
thus derived with respect to contracts affecting title to land and
marital property rights are clearly defined. Variance does appear,
however, in the rules relating to insurance contracts as well as
those bearing on certain other types of contracts.
Taking up the land contract cases first, it may be noted that
agreements executed in one state but affecting title to land in
another will be construed according to the law of the state where
the land is situated.5 Personal covenants, however, executed
1 Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller, 157 Ill. 225, 41 N. U. 753 (1895). The question
was one as to whether, where the contract was silent as to the state of the title,
the vendee could be presumed to have satisfied himself that there were no defects in the title.
2Grimme v. Grimme, 101 Ill. App. 389 (1902), affirmed in 198 Ill. 265, 64 N. E.
1088 (1902).
The company was domiciled in Missouri and the insured was
domiciled in Illinois. The place of execution was not made clear, hence was
apparently considered immaterial.
8 Harris v. American Surety Co. of New York, 372 Ill. 361, 24 N. E. (2d) 42
(1939), involved a surety contract. Otis Elevator Co. v. American Surety Co. of
New York, 314 Ill. App. 479, 41 N. E. (2d) 987 (1942), is a connected case. See
also Bradshaw v. Newman, 1 Ill. 133 (1825), and Allen v. Estate of Henry P.
Allen, 217 Ill. App. 260 (1920), a suit on a note.
4 Belleville Advocate Printing Co. v. St. Clair County, 336 Ill. 359, 168 N. E.
312 (1929).
5 In Alcorn v. Epler, 206 Ill. App. 140 (1917), a deed executed in Illinois but
Conveying land in Texas was governed by Texas law as to the construction to be
given to general covenants of warranty, whether running with the land or as
specific present covenants. The case of Crane v. Blackman, 126 Ill. App. 631
(1906), concerned an Illinois conveyance of Missouri land and the question was
whether the words "convey and warrant" contained a special covenant. See also
Dalton v. Taliaferro, 101 Ill. App. 592 (1901), involving the same question in
relation to an Illinois conveyance of Iowa land. There is dictum in Harrison
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collaterally with land contracts, will be construed under the laws
of the state where such contracts are executed.6
Contracts affecting marital property rights in the nature of
ante-nuptial agreements will be construed by the law of the matrimonial domicile as to movables but by the law of the situs as to
immovables. In the event the domicile should be changed, then
the actual domicile of the couple will govern construction of their
contracts respecting movables, but the lex situs will remain effective as to immovables. 7
While contracts for the carriage of goods have been construed
according to the lex loci contractus,8 one rather unusual case stated
that a contract for the payment of royalties had to be construed
in the light of the law found at the place of performance. 9 It
might be noted, however, that the statement could be classed as
dictum, first because the court found there was no need to engage
in an act of construction, and second because the applicable rules
of the two states were similar in character.
With respect to insurance contracts, it can only be said that
no clear rule appears to have been formulated. Courts have apparv. Weatherby, 180 Ill. 418 at 435, 54 N. E. 237 at 239 (1899), to the effect that
the validity and construction, as well as the force and effect, of all instruments
affecting the title to land, depend upon the law of the state where the land is
situated. The court said this rule "includes wills, as well as deeds, contracts
or agreements; and it includes the form and mode of the execution of the will,
as well as the power of the testator to make the devise or disposition of the
property contained In the will."
An Illinois conveyance of Wis6McCoy v. Griswold, 114 Ill. App. 556 (1904).
consin land with an agreement collateral thereto to hold the vendor harmless in
certain circumstances was held subject to construction according to Illinois law.
7 In Long v. Hess, 154 Ill. 482, 40 N. E. 335 (1895), an ante-nuptial contract made
in Germany was held ineffective to prevent the husband's disposition of afteracquired Illinois realty. Besse v. Pellechoux, 73 Ill. 285, 24 Am. Rep. 242 (1874),
dealt with an ante-nuptial contract and marriage formed in Switzerland with
the parties later moving to Illinois. See also Davenport v. Karnes, 70 Ill. 465
(1873), involving the effect of a parol ante-nuptial agreement intended to preserve the wife's property rights as against her husband's creditors. Cases on
settlement contracts are collected in an annotation in 18 A. L. R. (2d) 760.
8 The case of Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 69 Ill. 260 (1873), involving the question as to whether the parties assent to a bill of lading was implicit, was dealt
with by the court as a case of construction.
9Letup Brewing Co. v. Ems Brewing Co., 164 F. (2d) 290 (1947).
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ently employed the lex loci contractusprinciple in some instances, 10
have stated, in others, that the law stipulated for by the parties,
if not in conflict with express provisions of the contract, should
govern issues of construction," and again, in still other cases, have
relied simply upon what might be called general principles of
12
construction.
Likewise, in an early negotiable instrument case involving
a construction problem, the court declared that the parties could
stipulate as to the law which should determine the meaning of
their bill of exchange, and that whether the same was foreign
or inland in character, but again the declarations appear to be
8
broader than the case warranted.'
Several cases appear where the contract, although made in one
state, was to be performed in several states. A real estate
broker's contract of this type, for example, was construed according to the law prevailing where the contract was made, 14 and the
marital property contract cases mentioned above may be considered to fall in this category, thereby adding the "actual domicile" rule with respect to movables, and the lex situs rule relating
to immovables, to the choice of available law.
loIn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Devine, 180 Ill. App. 422 (1913), a construction of
the words "to their children" was necessary on the point as to whether a condition
of survival was to be implied. The lex loci contractus rule was recognized and
common law on the point was applied, absent proof as to the place where the contract was made or what the applicable foreign law might be. Ingersoll v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 156 Ill. App. 568 (1910), concerned an application for insurance made
in Colorado, with defendant's corporate domicile in New York and reference made
to New York law. The court found a "Colorado" contract, apparently on the ground
that Colorado was the place for delivery of the policy to the insured.
"'Ford v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 283 Ill. App. 325 (1936), dealt
with an Illinois application when defendant's corporate domicile was in New York
and reference had been made to New York law. Construction of a cash surrender
provision was deemed governed by the law referred to since it was not contrary to
any express term of the contract or to any Illinois policy on the subject.
12 Rose v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 240 Ill. 45, 88 N. E. 204 (1909).
No conflicts issue is made apparent in the opinion.
13 Strawbridge v. Robinson, 10 Ill. 470, 50 Am. Dec. 420 (1849). A bill of exchange, dated in Illinois but actually drawn in Wisconsin, was made payable in
Illinois. The defense was that, as a foreign bill, protest was required. No conflict
appears between the law of Illinois and Wisconsin. The court overshot the narrow
holding with a lengthy statement drawn, in part, from Lord Mansfield's opinion in
Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760).
14 In Benedict v. Dakin, 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712 (1910), the question was one
as to the customary amount of a broker's commission in a case where the contract
was silent on the point.
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D. RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THIRD PARTIES

1. Agency Problems
The introduction of a third party into the normal contract
situation may well increase the likelihood that the several parts
of the transaction will be affected by the laws of more than one
jurisdiction, hence contracts made by and with agents ought to
be considered, although presumably the principles stated heretofore should govern each phase of the agency contract, not only as
between principal and agent but also as to each phase of any
contract the agent might make, on behalf of the principal, with
a third person.
The law of the place where the principal and agent enter
into that relationship has usually been said to govern agency
contracts,' and the Illinois cases concerning capacity,2 formal
validity,3 legality, 4 and construction 5 support this rule. These
cases all dealt with the right of a real estate agent to recover commissions from his principal. The right of a third party to recover
against the principal on a contract negotiated by the agent, however, could well be denied unless the agreement authorizing the
agent to sell land complied with the formal requirements of the lex
situs.6 Moreover, the capacity of an inchoate corporation to be
1 See, for example, Dicey, Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons, London, 1949), 6th
Ed., p. 710.
2 O'Dea v. Throm, 250 Ill. App. 577 (1928), reversed on other grounds in 332 Ill.
89, 163 N. E. 390 (1929).
s Vossler v. Earle, 194 Ill. App. 522 (1915), abst. opin., affirmed as to the evidence
In 273 Ill. 367, 112 N. E. 687 (1916); Murdock v. Calgary Colonization Co., 193
Ill. App. 295 (1915). In the last mentioned case, the situs of the land and of the
agency contract was in Indiana, but negotiations were carried on and a contract
made with a third party in Illinois.
4 In FTankel v. Allied Mills, 369 Ill. 578, 17 N. E. (2d) 570 (1938), the agency
contract was "made" in New York but, as the situs of the land, and apparently
the procuring of a buyer, were in Illinois, this would appear to be a strong lex
loci contractus case.
5 Benedict v. Dakin, 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712 (1910), involved an agency contract
made in Louisiana, a buyer found in Illinois, and a sale concluded in Louisiana.
Construction of the agency contract as to commissions was held to be determined
by Louisiana Law.
6 Bissell v. Terry, 69 Ill. 184 (1873), concerned certain letters from a Louisville,
Kentucky, principal to his Chicago agent. They were held insufficient, under the
Illinois statute of frauds, to give the agent authority to sell the land, hence the
third party's bill for specific performance was dismissed.
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bound for pre-incorporation services rendered in its behalf by an
"agent" has been determined by the law of the ultimate corporate
7
domicile.
As between the third party and the principal, the binding
effect upon the principal of the agent's contract is to be governed
by the law of the place where the agency operates to conclude a
contract,8 unless such contract would be contrary to the public
policy of the forum. 9 In that connection, the power of an agent
to waive fraud on the part of the third party has been determined
by the law of the place where the agent entered into the contract. 10
In all of the cases setting forth the lex loci contractus rule, it is
apparent that either the locus of the agency contract and that of
the contract with the third party was in the same state;1" that
the contract with the third party was clearly "made" and was to
be performed in the same state ;12 or that the contract with the
third party was clearly "made" in one state but was to be performed in several. 13 None of the cases found involved a contract
7 Erd & Massey v. Rapid Transit Co. of Illinois, 206 Ii. App. 351 (1917), dealing with an attorney's pre-incorporation services, performed in Missouri, for a corporation ultimately organized in Illinois.
8 Gay v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221, 31 Am. Rep. 76 (1878).
The case of Clingan v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 163 Inl. App. 568 (1911), applied an Indiana
presumption of authority on the part of an agent to bind the shipper to a contract limiting the carrier's liability, even though the agent was Illiterate. See also
Brown v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 36 Ill. App. 140 (1890), involving much the same
proposition.
9 Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co., 256 Ill. 66, 99 N. E. 893 (1912). In
that case, a New York consignor shipped goods to a Chicago consignee, upon order
of the latter, via the defendant company, accepting a receipt form limiting the
defendant's liability. The court applied an Illinois presumption of absence of
authority to permit a limitation of liability. It was also held that such a contract,
here made between an agent and a third party, would be contrary to an Illinois
public policy on the point. It should be noted that, in applying the Illinois presumption, the court either (a) assumed a "place of delivery" rule, which appears to be
unprecedented, or (b) misapplied cases upon which it relied for decision. The cited
case of Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Co. v. Joesting, 89 Ill. 152 (1878),
involved no conflict of laws problem but merely defined the Illinois requirement
of a showing of assent on the part of the shipper. That of Plaff v. Pacific Express
Co., 251 Ill. 243, 95 N. E. 1089 (1911), also cited, was one in which the court applied
Illinois law, presumably the lex loci contractus, to a liability limitation which had
reference to a shipment from Illinois to Texas.
10 Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum, 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915 (1901).

11 Clingan v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R R. Co., 163 Ill. App. 568 (1911).
12 Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum, 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915 (1901).
13

Brown v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 36 Ill. App. 140 (1890).
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with a third party "made" in one state but to be performed in a
second state only. It may be seriously doubted whether the lex
loci contractus rule would be applicable in cases falling into this
category.
2.

Assignment or Transfer

In the event one party to a valid contract should attempt to
assign rights thereunder to a third party, three types of problems
could well arise. It would be necessary, first, to determine whether
there actually was an agreement to assign, one manifested with
all proper formalities, but as the rules governing these matters
have already been discussed they will not be repeated. Second,
assuming an agreement, the assignability of the contract right
may well be brought into question. In the third place, supposing
there has been proper execution of an assignable right, conflicting
sets of laws may generate the problem as to whether that assignment should be given effect as against other, or fourth, persons.
The second and third of these topics will now be considered.
With regard to the matter of assignability, it has been held
that where the execution, delivery, and performance of a contract,
as well as the assignment thereof, all occur in the same state, the
law of that place will govern the assignability of rights under
such a contract. 1 4 Where, however, the contract is made in one
state and the assignment is given in another, assignability is to
be determined according to the law of the place of original obligation, under the most recent case in point,15 but this appears
6
to be in conflict with an earlier lex loci contractus rule.'
14 Pomeroy v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 398 (1866).

15 See Coleman for use of Haberman v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 285
Ill. App. 542, 2 N. E. (2d) 349 (1936). An assignment given in Illinois, to an
Illinois resident, of wages earned by an Indiana resident in Indiana was there held
governed as to assignability by Indiana law. It would seem that the lex loci contractus, or place of assignment, rule was clearly rejected and the law of the original
debt was applied.
16 In sharp contrast to the Coleman case mentioned in the preceding footnote is
the earlier decision in Monarch Discount Co. v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 285 Ill. 233, 120
N. E. 743 (1918). In that case, wages earned in Indiana by a resident thereof
were assigned In Illinois. Although the assignment was void under Indiana law,
Illinois law was applied to uphold it. The explanation may lie in (1) the defendant's failure to show employment in Indiana at the time of the assignment, and
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As to the effect of an assignment against other, or fourth,
parties, it has been held that a foreign assignment, valid where
made, of contract rights (debts) having their situs in Illinois, the
place of the debtor's residence, ought to be enforced by Illinois
17
courts provided the rights of local creditors are not involved,
but that such assignments should be denied enforcement, where
the rights of local creditors have become involved, is borne out,
at least by dicta. 1 8 In one case, where the debts were presumably
situated in various jurisdictions, the federal Court of Appeals
drew upon the situs of a preponderance of the relevant events,
as well as the stipulation of the parties, as decisive in the selection
of the applicable law, thereby avoiding any necessity for reliance
upon the place-of-contracting rule. 19
Independently of these matters, but generally related thereto,
other questions will arise where the claim of the transferee grows
(2) a failure to prove Indiana law for the record. Another case, that of Angelina
County Lumber Co. v. Michigan Central Ry. Co., 252 Ill. App. 82 (1929), appears
to be a logical and chronological intermediary between the Monarch and the Coleman cases, although inconclusive by itself. Lumber had there been sold in Texas
and resold, subject to inspection in Illinois. The account due on the resale was
assigned by the original Ohio purchaser, in Ohio, to a finance company. The
vendee on resale rejected the lumber on inspection. When the unpaid original
vendor asserted title, the question was presented as to whether or not the right
to replevy was cut off by the assignment. Whether the assignee of the account had
received all of the assignor's rights in case of rejection was not made apparent.
Without considering Ohio law, where the assignment had been given, the court,
apparently persuaded by the fact that the original contract was made in Texas,
held that Texas law, rather than the Illinois Sales Act, should control, but stated
no specific rule.
17 Consolidated Tank Line Co. v. Collier, 148 Ill. 259, 35 N. E. 756 (1893), concerned an assignment validly made in Iowa, for the benefit of creditors, of debts
situated in Illinois, which was upheld as against Ohio creditors, the same not
being detrimental to Illinois citizens. Woodward v. Brooks, 128 Ill. 222, 20 N. E.
685, 15 Am. St. Rep. 104 (1889), involved an assignment in Pennsylvania, valid
there, which was enforced in Illinois where no Illinois creditors were concerned.
'8 There is dicta on the point in the cases listed in the preceding footnote. See
also Heyer v. Alexander, 108 Ill. 385 (1884), where a deed of trust, executed In
Missouri, purporting to pass an Illinois leasehold for the benefit of creditors, was
held ineffective as against local attaching creditors.
19 See Merchants' & Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson, 69 F. (2d) 940
(1934). The plaintiff's contractual right to receive an assignment of accounts
receivable was upheld as against the receiver of the contemplated assignor on the
basis the accounts were impressed with a trust in plaintiff's favor. Although the
contract to assign was executed in Chicago, and the parties stipulated that Illinois
law should govern in order to obtain the advantage of Illinois interest laws, the
court justified Its choice of Illinois law on the preponderance of activity In that
state rather than upon any precise "place-of-making" or "intention-of-the-parties"
rule.
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out of property made the subject of a chattel mortgage or a
conditional sale contract entered into in another state.20 In that
regard, it is fundamental law that, before the forum will enforce
a foreign chattel mortgage, the requisite foreign formalities as to
filing must have been observed, 2 and compliance with such formalities must also be pleaded and proved. 2 2 It is essential, for
this purpose, that the filing of the chattel mortgage occur in
the jurisdiction where the property is situated at the time,2 3 for
the requirement will not be considered satisfied by any mere
expectation of removal to that jurisdiction in the future. 24 In
the event the property subject to the chattel mortgage is situated
in Illinois, a recording in that state will be sufficient and such
recording would not be invalidated by the fact that the mortgage
25
instrument was acknowledged in another state.
If the chattel mortgage is validly executed and recorded in
another state upon property situated there, the subsequent removal
of the property to this state, provided it is done without the consent
of the mortgagee, will be held ineffective to form the basis for
superior claims by a local creditor 26 or by a local bona fide pur20 In

general, see annotation in 13 A. L. R. (2d) 1312.

21 St. Paul Cattle Loan Co. v. Hansman, 215 Ill. App. 190 (1919).
to comply with the foreign statute was shown in that case.

No attempt

22 St. Paul Cattle Loan Co. v. Hansman, 215 Ill. App. 190 (1919); Clough v.
Kyne, 40 Ill. App. 234 (1890).
23 Bridges v. Barrett, 126 Ill. App. 122 (1906), involved a chattel mortgage on a
race horse which was properly executed, recorded, and filed in Tennessee, but which
was held ineffective because the horse was not in Tennessee at the time.
24 The case of Doumas v. Mormella, 251 Ill. App. 397 (1929), concerned the filing,
In Michigan, of a chattel mortgage on a motor bus located in Chicago, done in
expectation that the motor bus would subsequently be removed to Michigan. The
filing was held to be insufficient to create a valid Michigan mortgage. See also St.
Paul Cattle Loan Co. v. Hansman, 215 Ill. App. 190 (1919), where a mortgage,
executed in Minnesota, was filed in Wisconsin in expectation that the cattle would
be removed to that state.
25 People ex rel. Cohn v. Barrett, 349 Ill. App. 236, 110 N. E. (2d) 452 (1953).
26 In Mumford v. Canty, 50 Ill. 370, 99 Am. Dec. 525 (1869), a Missouri mortgage
on mules, wagon, and harness was held valid as against a creditor who attached
the goods after they had been temporarily brought into Illinois in the course of
the debtor-mortgagor's work. Whether the mortgagee impliedly consented to the
removal does not appear. See also Armitage-Herschell Co. v. Potter, 93 Ill. App.
602 (1900); Hoyt v. Zibell, 259 F. 186 (1919).
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chaser without notice. 2 7 A similar rule has been applied to uphold
a security conveyance in trust as against a garnishing creditor.28
Three cases apparently announcing a contrary rule should
be noted and distinguished. In the first of them, that of Dawes
v. Rosenbamn,29 certain cattle which had been mortgaged in
Missouri were sold by the mortgagor in Chicago to a local merchant who, without actual notice of the facts, thereafter resold
the cattle to others. The mortgagee then made formal demand
on the merchant and followed up such demand with a suit in
trover, but lost when the court held the demand insufficient.3 0 In
the course of its opinion, however, the Supreme Court criticized
the general rule in the following terms:
We cannot conclude this opinion, however, without some suggestions as to the rule, apparently supported by numerous
adjudications, that the constructive notice of a mortgage resulting from its acknowledgment and recording in the State in
which it is executed, is also constructive notice in other States,
and to the citizens of other States to which the mortgaged
property may be removed, thus giving to the law of the State
in which the mortgage is executed extra-territorial effect. The
courts base this rule on the doctrine of interstate comity, but
it seems to us that the doctrine should not be extended to
the detriment of citizens of the State. In many cases the
rule that citizens of this State are bound by constructive
notice of a chattel mortgage executed and recorded in another
State, necessarily and inevitably operates to the detriment of
such citizens. . . . Is it not a serious question whether
27 First National Bank of Nevada v. Swegler, 336 Ill. App. 107, 82 N. E. (2d)
920 (1948); National Bond & Investment Co. v. Larsh, 262 1. App. 363 (1931);
Armitage-Herschell Co. v. Potter, 93 Ill. App. 602 (1900). In the last mentioned
case a New York mortgage was held valid as against a second mortgagee and
judgment creditors whose claims arose in Illinois. Dicta may be found in Shannon
v. Wolf, 173 Ill. 253, 50 N. E. 682 (1898), and Farmers & Merchants Bank v.
Arnold, 58 Ill. App. 349 (1895).
28 The case of Michigan Central Ry. Co. v. Chicago & Michigan Lake Shore Ry.
Co., 1 I1. App. 399 (1878), dealt with rolling stock conveyed in trust, in Michigan,
to secure a bondholders lien.
29 179 Ill. 112, 53 N. E. 585 (1909).

30 The basis for the distinction is pointed out in the case of First National
Bank of Nevada v. Swegler, 336 Ill. App. 107, 82 N. E. (2d) 920 (1948).
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interstate comity should be extended when its extension may

lead to such consequences 131
The other two cases 8 2 can best be explained on the basis of a
misinterpretation there given to the rationale for the holding in
the Dawes case.3 3 It is important to notice, however, that if the
foreign mortgage would normally be treated as ineffective or
fraudulent as to Illinois creditors or purchasers, the person relying
on the foreign law in an effort to have the transaction declared
34
valid must be prepared to plead and prove the foreign law.
Insofar as conditional sales contracts are concerned, the
present rule is that a conditional sale contract, provided it is
validly executed in another jurisdiction, will be entitled to enforcement against a local bona fide purchaser without notice, especially
in those instances where the property has been removed to this
state without the consent of the conditional vendor.8 5 The present
rule reflects a change from the former rule, which declared such
31 179

il.

112 at 123-4, 53 N. E. 585 at 589.

32 National Bond & Investment Co. v. Moss, 263 Ill. App. 187 (1931), and Snow
for the use of Ainsworth v. Breene, 248 Ill. App. 518 (1928).
33 The decision in First National Bank of Nevada v. Swegler, 336 II.
App.
107, 82 N. E. (2d) 920 (1948), should prevent any further perpetuation of the
error.
34 See In re Richheimer, 221 F. 16 (1915). London bankers, in New Orleans, had
taken trust receipts on a cargo of Brazilian coffee belonging to an importer. The
latter warehoused the coffee in Chicago and negotiated the warehouse receipts
to holders without notice of the bankers' security title. Treating the trust receipts
as being subject to the Illinois chattel mortgage recording statute, the court gave
priority to the holders of the warehouse receipts on the ground that one who
sends property into another state impliedly submits to the laws thereof. The case
can be distinguished from the general rule either because the trust receipt holders
apparently consented to removal of the coffee from Louisiana or else because Louisiana law had not been shown to validate the security interest as against third
parties.

35 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Fatz. 346 Ill. App. 541, 105 N. E. (2d) 789 (1952).
enforced a Kentucky conditional sale contract in Illinois, the court declaring the
situation to be "almost identical" with that found in First National Bank of Nevada
v. Swegler, 336 Ill. App. 107, 82 N. E. (2d) 920 (1948). In Graver Bartlett Nash
Co. v. Krans, 239 Ill. App. 522 (1925), judicial recognition was accorded to a
change In the Illinois policy with respect to conditional sales. Although formerly
considered fraudulent as to creditors of the vendee, Section 20 of the Sales Act
of 1915 had been construed, in Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N. E.
225 (1925), to permit such contracts. The earlier case of Waters v. Cox, 2 Ill.
App. 129 (1878), similar in result, had treated a Michigan conditional sale contract
the same as a bailment, so as to uphold it as against a later Illinois chattel mortgage.
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contracts to be fraudulent as against local creditors unless they
had been recorded here.3 6
3.

Negotiation and its Effects

Whether or not an instrument is transferable as a negotiable
instrument, with all the consequences attendant upon this fact,
will be determined according to the law of the place where the purported assignment takes place, under the most recent case in
point,8 7 rather than according to the law of the place where the
instrument was originally issued. Earlier cases are in conflict,
determining the question of negotiability variously upon general
principles without reference to any particular law, 3 8 by the law
of the forum, referred to as the place of payment,3 9 or according
to the law of the forum, referred to as concerning a matter of
40
remedy.
36 The cases of Merz v. Stewart, 211 Ill. App. 508 (1918), and Judy v. Evans,
109 Ill. App. 154 (1903), must be regarded as overthrown by reason of this change
in policy.
37 See Pflueger v. Broadway Trust & Savings Bank, 265 Ill. App. 569 (1931),
affirmed without contest on the conflicts point in 351 Il1. 170, 184 N. E. 318 (1933).
Certain debentures, issued and made payable in New York, were accepted in Chicago as collateral security for a loan. Although, in a contest between the original
holder and a third party claiming title, the court eventually concluded the debentures were negotiable under either New York or Illinois law, it first dealt with
the conflicts problem, reviewed the English and American cases, distinguished the
continental rule which uses the law of the place of issue to fix character, and
aligned itself with the American doctrine that negotiability depends upon the law
of the place where the transaction of negotiation takes place. According to Hakes
v. Bank of Terre Haute, 164 IlL 273, 45 N. E. 444 (1896), a note negotiable by the
laws of Illinois will be presumed to be negotiable by the law of the place where
made, where assigned, or where payable unless the contrary is pleaded and proved.
38 Smith v. Meyers, 207 Ill. 126, 69 N. E. 858 (1904), suit by an endorsee against
an accomodation endorser.
39The case of Farmers Trust Company v. Schenuit, 83 Ill. App. 267 (1898),
concerned a note made in Nebraska and payable in Illinois, but the place of assignment was not made clear and, apparently, was considered to be immaterial. The
court said that, since the note was to be paid in Illinois, it had to be presumed
that the parties contracted with Illinois law in mind. Nevertheless, it went on
to add that, if the defendant wished to show non-assignability, he had to plead and
prove the foreign law. This latter statement, together with the omission to consider
the place of assignment and the emphasis on the intention of the parties, weakens
the court's statement as to a place-of-payment rule.
40 Roosa v. Crist, 17 Ill. 450, 65 Am. Dec. 679 (1856), a suit in debt on a note
dated in New York, assigned there, and presumably payable there. The court considered the right of the assignee to sue in his own name as bearing on the matter
of remedy, governed by the leer fori, and applied Illinois law, when that law denied
the assignee the right to sue. Skinner, J., dissented from the holding, saying: "The
effect of the negotiation by delivery in New York was to transfer the legal title
to the plaintiff below, and by the law of comity, in my judgment, he may sue in
this State in his own name, adopting the forms of remedy afforded by the local
law."
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Collateral matters as to the operation of an assignment ought
also be considered. Several older cases, dealing with the question
as to whether a check should operate as an assignment of a part
of a fund, uniformly held that the law of the place of payment
should govern.4 1 Far more provocative, because of its continuing
importance and the divergent resulting decisions upon the point,
is the question as to which law should govern an endorser's liability to the endorsee, and the steps which must be taken to
charge the endorser. Where all of the important elements of
making, endorsement, and the intended place of payment fall
within the same state, the law of that place will govern. 42 These
cases, of course, support the proposition that the forum will apply
foreign law in the enforcement of foreign-created rights, rather
than the law of the forum, 43 but otherwise they are entitled to
little weight for conflict of laws purposes as the statements therein
do not reflect settled rules on this question. Once foreign law
has been shown to be applicable, it is, of course, necessary to plead
44
the existence thereof and to prove compliance therewith.
Where there has been a division of the elements of making,
assignment, and place of payment between two states, the choice
of law rules are far from uniform. Two cases indicate that the
law of the place where the instrument was endorsed should determine the steps which an endorsee must take to charge an en41 Abt v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 159 Ill. 467, 42 N. E. 856, 50 Am. St.
Rep. 175 (1896), concerned a draft drawn in Illinois, upon a New York drawee,
made payable in New York. The parties were held presumed to have contracted
with reference to New York law. See also National Bank of America v. Indiana
Banking Co., 114 Ill. 483, 2 N. E. 401 (1885); Union National Bank v. Oceana
County Bank, 80 Ill. 212, 22 Am. Rep. 185 (1875) ; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Reeves,
42 Ill. App. 154 (1891).
42 Dunnigan v. Stevens. 122 Ill. 396, 13 N. E. 651, 3 Am. St. Rep. 496 (1887),
dealt with notice of nonpayment. Gay v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221, 31 Am. Rep. 76 (1878),
involving the same question, concerned an accommodation endorsement, made in
Louisiana, on a note delivered for negotiation in Illinois, where it was made and,
presumably, was payable. In Schuttler v. Piatt, 12 Ill. 417 (1851), the question
was whether a lack of diligence against the maker could be excused. See also
Humphreys v. Collier, 1 Ill. 297 (1829), and Belford v. Bangs, 15 Ill. App. 76
(1884).
43 See cases listed in the preceding footnote except for Schuttler v. Piatt, 12 Iil.
417 (1851), where the events occurred in Illinois.
44 In Bond v. Bragg, 17 Ill. 69 (1855), plaintiff's proof of notarial protest was
regarded as Insufficient proof of demand and notice of nonpayment. Vaughan v.
Potter, 131 Ill. App. 334 (1907), also treated a notarial protest as insufficient proof
of presentment.
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dorser.4 5 In one of them, that of Holbrook v. Vibbard,46 the note
involved, made and endorsed in New York, was payable in Illinois.
Addressing itself to the conflict of laws problem, the court held
that New York law controlled the necessity of presentment at the
place of payment, saying as it did so:
it is very clear that the law of the country where the endorsement was made is to determine the liability of the endorsers.
Under this rule, the replication of the plaintiff, which attempted to put in issue the immaterial facts of residence of
the makers and endorsers, and the place of payment, was
properly holden vicious. The drawer of a note or bill is
liable according to the law of the place where the note or bill
is drawn; and the endorser, according to the law of the place
of endorsement. The endorsement is a new and substantive
47
contract.
The court then followed this statement with the following corroboration, one which is rather puzzling in the light of subsequent cases, to-wit: "This has sometimes been suggested to be
a departure from the rule that the law of the place of payment
is to govern; but it is held to be in entire conformity to the rule."
If the court really meant what it said, it was certainly contemplating a "harmony" which was very close harmony indeed,
at least for the pre-Civil War times. For, although the Holbrook
case had an ineffectual following, 4 serious doubts were cast upon
the holding therein by the later case of Skelton v. Dustin,4 9 where
the court clearly applied a place-of-payment rule to determine a
question concerning days of grace. That case was a striking one
indeed because the place of payment was isolated in one state,
45Barber v. Bell, 77 Ill. 490 (1875), concerned makers residing in Ohio of a
note made payable there but assigned in Illinois. The place of making was not
made apparent. The court held that diligence against the makers was to be governed by Illinois law, where the note was assigned, but there is no indication of
any conflict in the laws of the two states. See also Holbrook v. Vibbard, 3 Ill.
465 (1840).
463 111.465 (1840).
47 3 I. 465 at 467.
48 Barber v. Bell, 77 Ill. 490 (1875).
4992 Ill. 49 (1879).
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Indiana, while all the other elements of making and endorsement
were situated in Illinois. Subsequent, and less striking cases,
have applied the place-of-payment rule to decide questions of
notice to endorser 5" as well as with regard to days of grace. 51
The question remains, then, as to whether or not the Holbrook
case has been overruled by the decision in Skelton v. Dustin and
its sequels. As both deal with requisite steps necessary to charge
an endorser, the chronology of the cases would, at first glance,
indicate an overruling, but there may be grounds for rationalizing
and retaining the two holdings. In that regard, it should be noted
first that the court in the Holbrook case considered the holding
there to be in entire conformity with, rather than in opposition
to, the place-of-payment rule. Second, if there is a material distinction to be drawn between necessity of presentment on the one
hand and days of grace on the other, at least in respect to the
governing law, the cases may be rationalized on that ground.
Such a distinction was suggested in a dictum achieved by the
Appellate Court for the First District in the later case of Vaughan
v. Potter5 2 for it there said:
The contract of the maker was a Missouri contract; that of
the endorser-it being conceded that he made the endorsement
in Illinois-is an Illinois contract. But the time of maturity
of the paper enters into both contracts, and the law of the
place of performance governs the question of the proper time
of presentment and demand. 53
Assuming this distinction to be valid, the question is then one as
to whether it can be extended, or used by way of analogy, to a
case where the issue is as to the law which should govern the
requisite notice of nonpayment to the endorser. The case of
50 Wooley v. Lyon, 117 Il. 244, 6 N. E. 885, 57 Am. Rep. 867 (1886), a suit on
a note made and payable in Illinois but endorsed in Michigan.
51 Although the case of Vaughan v. Potter, 131 Ill. App. 334 (1907), involved a
note issued and endorsed in Illinois, payable in Missouri, the statement concerning a place-of-payment rule regarding days of grace is dictum.
52131 Ill. App. 334 (1907).
53 131 Ill. App. 334 at 339.
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Wooley v. Lyon 54 applied the law of the place of payment to
determine just such a question, but it seems doubtful whether the
distinction suggested by the Vaughan case can be used to separate
the holding in Wooley v. Lyon from that in Holbrook v. Vibbard,
much as it might be possible to distinguish these cases on other
grounds.55 As a consequence, the solution of the choice of law
problem in the two-state transactions must be said to remain in
an ambiguous state. For that matter, no case has been found in
which the elements of making, endorsement, and place of payment
occurred in a series of states, so uncertainty exists in this respect
also.
Of course, the law regulating the defenses which an endorser
may offer against the endorsee will be fixed by the place of endorsement 56 whereas those of the maker against the endorsee will
57
be governed by the law of the place where the note was made.
4.

Third-Party Beneficiary Contracts

Several cases have arisen in Illinois involving contracts made
for the benefit of third parties which have called for a consideration
of conflict of laws rules but it can only be said that the facts in each
case have operated to render all of them inconclusive as authority
or precedent in other situations. Where the contract was both
made and was to be performed in another state, Illinois courts
have applied the law of that other state in deciding whether the
contract right was enforcible in favor of the third-party beneficiary, paying lip service as they did so either to a "place of
54 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885, 57 Am. Rep. 867 (1886).
55 In each case, the court applied the law of the state in which two of the three
elements of making, assignment, and place of payment were situated.
56 The case of Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill. 263 (1853), dealt with the availability of
the defense of want of consideration offered against a note made, and presumably
payable, in Kentucky which had been assigned in Illinois after it became due.
A concentration of important ele57 Evans v. Anderson, 78 Ill. 558 (1875).
ments in one jurisdiction tends to weaken two other cases in point. In Scholten
v. Barber, 217 Ill. 148, 75 N. E. 460 (1905), a mortgage note was made, presumably was assigned, and was payable in Missouri. The defendant failed to prove
alleged Missouri law to the effect that a subsequent endorsement would operate
to discharge the maker. Stacey v. Baker, 2 Ill. 417 (1837), dealt with notes
executed in, and presumably payable in, Kentucky which had been assigned there.
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making or performance" rule, 58 or to a simple "place of making"
rule. 59 Two other cases deal with the question as to whether or
not a right of sufficient dignity has been created in favor of the
third-party beneficiary so as to preclude the original contracting
parties from altering or revoking the contract without the beneficiary's consent. 60
Although such contracts are potential trouble makers, in that
the existence of the third party presents an opportunity for a
scattering of the important elements of the case, it is likely that
there will be relatively few conflict of laws cases dealing with
basic questions as to whether or not such contracts should be
recognized, for that question has been determined affirmatively
in an almost unanimous fashion by most American courts.6 1
58 Harris v. American Surety Co. of New York, 372 Ill. 361, 24 N. E. (2d)

42

(1939), concerned a suit on a construction bond brought for the use of a
sub-contractor. A judgment for defendant, based upon Illinois law, was reversed
on the ground that the law of Pennsylvania, where the contract had been made,
was to have been performed, and where the defendant was organized, permitted
enforcement of the contract, hence Illinois law was immaterial. The case is valuable as authority in choice of law problems only for its conclusion against the law
of the forum. Following retrial, judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in 314
Ill. App. 479, 41 N. E. (2d) 987 (1942).
59 See Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. The Northern Lumber Co., 146 Ill. App. 371 (1909),
where the defendant agreed to pay plaintiff an amount owed by a third party, all
events occurring in Michigan. Analogous cases may be found in Edwards v. Schillinger, 245 Ill. 231, 91 N. E. 1048, 137 Am. St. Rep. 308 (1910), and Bell v. Farwell,
176 Ill. 489, 52 N. E. 346, 68 Am. St. Rep. 194, 42 L. R. A. 804 (1898). The last
mentioned case indicates that an Illinois court would enforce, in favor of a third
party, a liability imposed upon the contracting parties by statute, absent any
volitional act of their own.
60 The case of Ford v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 283 Ill. App. 325 (1936), involved
a suit by the insured to recover the cash surrender value of a policy. The company argued that the insured had no right to surrender without the consent of
the beneficiary; relying on Illinois law rather than stipulated New York law. The

court applied Illinois law, that state being the place of both making and performance, on the ground that the stipulation of the parties would have to yield to any
Illinois policy or statute designed for the protection of its citizens. In Blackmore
v. Randolph, 249 Ill. App. 121 (1928), a contract for the sale of stock, giving the
vendee an option to re-sell to the vendor, was made in Missouri by a guardian of

certain minors, the latter apparently residing in Illinois. Suit by vendee on the
option was resisted by the vendor on the ground the rights of the minors would be
violated. Missouri law, as the place of making and performance, was held to control
in favor of the plaintiff. Both the facts and the vagueness of the conflict make
the case weak authority.

361 at
61 In particular, see Harris v. American Surety Co. of New York, 372 Ill.
366, 24 N. E. (2d) 42 at 45 (1939).
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PERFORMANCE AND BREACH

There is, generally, no discrepancy in American law on the
point as to whether or not a party, once he has been shown to
be obligated by the terms of a contract, has performed his obligation thereunder or has been guilty of a breach thereof. For that
reason, there is little occasion to consider whether the law of any
particular state would apply to resolve these questions, for the
answer would be the same no matter which law was chosen. Some
matters related to the contract or to its enforcement, however, are
so closely connected with the place where performance is to be
rendered that it would seem unreasonable to apply any law other
than the lex loci solutionis in deciding them.1 While it is difficult
to draw the line between matters of "obligation" and matters
of "performance," '2 a number of Illinois cases have apparently
attempted to make this distinction, hence this section is included.
In addition to dicta,3 numerous cases, including those in which
an alternative ground was available because important events were
concentrated in one state, as well as those in which the contract
4
was made in one state and was to be performed in another,
indicate that excuses for non-performance, legality of purpose,
consideration or performance,6 matters of presentment, notice and
1 See Goodrich, op. cit., p. 293.
2 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 358, comment b, discusses the practical line

for separating questions of obligation from questions of performance.
3 Such dicta appears in Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 311 Ill. App. 111, 35
N. E. (2d) 522 (1941), affirmed in 388 Ill. 474, 58 N. E. (2d) 460 (1944) ; Scudder v.
Union National Bank, 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245 (1875). Lemp Brewing Co. v.
Ems Brewing Co., 164 F. (2d) 290 (1947), provides even more recent clear dictum
that the law of the place of performance will prevail over that of the place where
the contract was made, but no actual conflict appears therein.
4The cases are segregated in succeeding footnotes.
5 Same state: Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 387 Ill. 378, 56 N. E. (2d) 399
(1944), dealing with the effect of insured's failure to prove disability before attaining a certain age; Hamilton v. Darley, 266 Ill. 542, 107 N. E. 798 (1915), relating
to exemption laws; Ingersoll v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 Ill. App. 568 (1910),
concerning forfeiture of a policy for non-payment of premiums.
6 Same state: Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577, 74 Am.
St. Rep. 189, 64 L. R. A. 738 (1899), writ of error dismissed 187 U. S. 651, 23 S.
Ct. 841, 47 L. Ed. 349 (1902), dealing with a contract In general restraint of trade
where the New Jersey domicile of the corporation was the only foreign element
present. Made in one state, performable in another: George v. Haas, 311 Il1. 382,
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payment of negotiable instruments, 7 breach,8 and damages' should
be governed by the lex loci solutionis.
The presence of legality cases in this grouping may well be
open to question inasmuch as matters of legality are generally
considered to concern " essential validity" or "obligation" rather
than "performance."
However, an examination of these cases
will disclose that an alternative ground existed in each case, making
the usual rationale of the lex loci solutionis, to-wit: that matters
of final detail must be controlled by the local law at the place
of performance, inapplicable. Thus, in one case, 10 involving
usury, the court probably sought to uphold the contract under
whatever law was available; another was decided on local policy
grounds;" while still another could just as well have been decided
12
either on policy grounds or under the rule of lex loci contractus.
Negotiable instruments cases dealing with the steps necessary
to charge an endorser have been discussed and will not be repeated
but it seems clear that the lex loci solutionis will govern time for
performance in matters of this nature,1" and it would also probably control in questions as to the notice to be given to the en4
dorser before he could be charged on his endorsement.
143 N. E. 54 (1924) ; Thomas v. First National Bank of Belleville, 213 Il1. 261, 72
N. E. 801 (1904); Lewis v. Headley, 36 Ill. 433, 87 Am. Dec. 227 (1865); Price
v. Burns, 101 Ill. App. 418 (1902). See also Stone v. Appel, 12 Ill. App. 582 (1883).
Made in one state, performable in several: Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank,
245 Ill. 180, 91 N. E. 1041 (1910).
7 Made in one state, performable in another: Emerson v. North American Transportation Co., 303 Ill. 282, 135 N. E. 497 (1922) ; Wooley v. Lyon, 117 Ill.244, 6
N. E. 885, 57 Am. St. Rep. 867 (1886) ; Skelton v. Dustin, 92 Ill.
49 (1879) ; Vaughan
v. Potter, 131 Ill.
App. 334 (1907); Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Oster, 74
Ill. App. 139 (1897).
8 Made in one state, to be performed there: Lust v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co.,
267 Il1. App. 60 (1932). Made in one but to be performed in another: North Packing & Provision Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Ill. App. 275 (1887).
9 Made and to be performed in the same state: Britton v. Chamberlain, 234 Ill.
246, 84 N. E. 895 (1908); Morris v. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627, 43 N. E. 837 (1896);
Guignon v. Union Trust Co., 156 Ill. 135, 40 N. E. 556, 40 Am. St. Rep. 186 (1895).
10 George v. Haas, 311 Ill. 382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924).
11 Thomas v. First National Bank of Belleville, 213 Ill. 261, 72 N. E. 801 (1904).
12 Lewis v. Headley, 36 Ill. 433, 87 Am. Dec. 227 (1865).
13 Skelton v. Dustin, 92 Ill. 49 (1879); Vaughan v. Potter, 131 Ill. App. 334
(1907).
14 Wooley v. Lyon, 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885, 57 Am. St. Rep. 867 (1886).
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MATTERS RELATING TO REMEDY

Suit for breach of contract having become necessary, it then
becomes important to notice that there is a significant distinction
between matters of remedy and matters of basic contractual obligation, which distinction has been widely accepted.1 In general,
matters of remedy include the manner by which an aggrieved
party goes about obtaining relief before the courts, but the scope
of the concept of "remedy" can well vary from one jurisdiction
2
to the next.
In Illinois, as elsewhere, the basic rule is that the law of the
forum governs the time, extent, and mode of the remedy on claims
arising within and without the state 3 but that the criminal and
penal laws of other jurisdictions will not be enforced. "Remedy,"
for this purpose, extends to include a determination of what
constitutes the commencement of an action, 4 to matters of evidence, 5 whether the suit should be at law or in equity,6 the right
to bring garnishment proceedings against allegedly exempt property, 7 the scope of doctrines relating to joinder of parties," a
defendant's right to a set-off, 9 the capacity of a married woman, 10
' The case of Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill. 521 (1847), clearly makes such a distinction. A note made in Massachusetts was usurious where made but an Illinois
court, construing the Massachusetts law, found the forfeiture provision did not
declare the note absolutely void but had bearing on the remedy only, hence was
inoperative in the forum. In general, see Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in
the Conflict of Laws," 42 Yale L. J. 333 (1933), particularly p. 344.
2 Stumberg. Principles of the Conflict of Laws (The Foundation Press, Inc.,
Brooklyn, 1951), 2d Ed., pp. 155-7, notes the varying scope of such matters as
relate to evidentiary presumptions and burden of proof.
3The Illinois rule was first announced in Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill. 521 (1847).
4 Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 48 N. E. 914 (1897).
5 See, for example, McAllister v. Smith, 17 Ill. 328, 65 Am. Dec. 651 (1856), where
the court applied the Illinois law of evidence, as derived from various authorities,
to determine the competency of witnesses.
6 Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill. 489, 52 N. E. 346, 68 Am. St. Rep. 194, 42 L. R. A.
804 (1898), and Burchard v. Dunbar, 82 Ill. 450, 25 Am. Rep. 334 (1876). Dictum:
Halley v. Ball, 66 Ill. 250 (1872).
7 Mineral Point R. R. Co. v. Barron, 83 Ill. 365 (1876).
8 Page v. Hallam & Co., 212 111. App. 462 (1918).
9 Leathe v. Thomas, 218 Ill. 246, 75 N. E. 810 (1905), writ of error dismissed
207 U. S. 93, 28 S. Ct. 30, 52 L. Ed. 118 (1907); Miller Fruit Co. v. Kellerman,
229 Ill. App. 499 (1923).
10 Johnson v. Huber, 143 Ill. 511, 25 N. E. 790 (1890).
See also Grosman v.
Union Trust Co., 228 F. 610 (1916), affirmed in 245 U. S. 412, 38 S. Ct. 147, 62 L.
Ed. 368 (1918).

CHOICE OF LAW:

CONTRACT

CASES

a third-party beneficiary,11 of an assignee of a negotiable instrument 12 to bring suit in his or her name, and to issues arising
under statutes providing for the limitation of actions. 1 3 On the
other hand, the amount of interest to be allowed as a part of the
damages may be "substantive" rather than part of the remedy,' 4
and a statute providing that an insurance company should not
plead fraud unless a copy of the application had been attached to
the policy has been declared to be "substantive," rather than
15
remedial or penal.
The general scope of "remedy" was once well described by
Chief Justice Taney when he wrote:
Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration does
not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect
is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by action on
the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In either case
it is prohibited by the Constitution. . ..
It is difficult, perhaps to draw a line that would be applicable in all cases between legitimate alterations of the remedy and provisions
which, in the form of remedy, impair the right. But it is
manifest that the obligation of the contract, and the rights
of a party under it, may, in effect, be destroyed by denying
a remedy altogether; or may be seriously impaired by burdening the proceedings with new conditions and restrictions, so
as to make the remedy hardly worth pursuing. And no one,
we presume, would say that there is any substantial difference
11 Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. The Northern Lumber Co., 146 Ill. App. 371 (1909).
The case contains only dictum, unsupported by the facts.
12 Hakes v. Bank of Terre Haute, 164 Ill. 273, 45 N. E. 444 (1896) ; Roosa v.
Crist, 17 Ill. 450, 65 Am. Dec. 679 (1856).
13 On this point, see post, note 27.
14 In Britton v. Chamberlain, 234 Il. 246, 84 N. E. 895 (1908), the foreign rate
of interest was allowed upon enforcement of the foreign decree. See also Morris
v. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627, 43 N. E. 837 (1896); Guignon v. Union Trust Co., 156
Iln. 135, 40 N. E. 556 (1895) ; Chumasero v. Gilbert, 24 Ill. 293 (1860). In the last
mentioned case, the rule was assumed but the leo fori was applied since the foreign
law had not been pleaded.
15 Hartliep Transit Co. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 288 Ill. App. 140, 5 N. E.
(2d) 140 (1937).
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between a retrospective law declaring a particular contract
or class of contracts to be abrogated and void, and one which
took away all remedy to enforce them, or encumbered it with
conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable to
pursue it. 16
Within these limits, a state is free to confine the remedy upon a
foreign cause of action to the matrix it provides for its own citi17
zens on their local claims.
The basic rule against local enforcement of foreign penal or
criminal laws' 8 naturally gives rise to an inquiry as to what
may be considered to be "penal" within the meaning of that rule.
Several cases serve to indicate the scope of the term. One such
case held that a contract upon condition, providing merely for
liquidated damages in the event of the breach thereof, would not
be penal in character. 19 Others indicate that special statutory
remedies against shareholders in foreign corporations may be
regarded as arising from contract, rather than from foreign penal
laws, under the more recent view on the subject, 20 although earlier
cases were to the contrary. 2 1 A foreign law providing for the forfeiture of three-fold the interest reserved in a loan contract which
was usurious in character would apparently be considered punitive, 2 2 but one calling for the forfeiture of interest only, permitting
23
a recovery on the principal, seems not to be so regarded.
16Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 311 at 316, 11 L. Ed. 143 at 145 (1843).
17 But see the case of First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
342 U. S. 396, 72 S. Ct. 421, 96 L. Ed. 360 (1952), holding unconstitutional that
part of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, which denies the right to sue in
Illinois upon a foreign wrongful death if service of process can be had upon the
defendant in the state where the death occurred. The statute was, in this respect,
held to deny full faith and credit.
18 Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill. 521 (1847).
19 Smith v. Whitaker, 23 Ill. 309 (1860).
20 Edwards v. Schillinger, 245 Ill. 231, 91 N. E. 1048 (1910) ; Bell v. Farwell, 176
Ill. 489, 52 N. E. 346, 68 Am. St. Rep. 194, 42 L. R. A. 804 (1898).
21 Tuttle v. National Bank of the Republic of St. Louis, 161 Ill. 497, 44 N. E. 984,
34 L. R. A. 750 (1896) ; Fowler v. Lamson, 146 Ill. 472, 34 N. E. 932, 37 Am. St.
Rep. 163 (1893), writ of error dismissed 164 U. S. 252, 17 S. Ct. 112, 41 L. Ed. 424
(1896) ; Smith v. Kastor, 195 Ill. App. 458 (1915). Statements in Hayward v. Sencenbaugh, 141 Ill. App. 395 (1908), are dictum.
22 Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill. 521 (1847).
28 Granite City National Bank v. Cross, 188 Ill. App. 242 (1914).
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Notwithstanding the rule against the enforcement of foreign
penal laws, Illinois courts have given enforcement to remedies
2
arising under federal statutes, whether considered penal or not,
on the theory that such statutes were to be considered a part of
Illinois law. In suits brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, therefore, federal procedural rules have been followed
in state courts, 25 although federal courts sitting in Illinois, while
applying local "substantive" law, 26 follow their own procedural
system.
Special attention must be given to questions concerning limitions affecting the right to sue on the foreign cause for, while
these generally bear on the remedy and would be governed by
the lex fori under the basic rule, 27 an exception exists where the
action rests upon a foreign statutory cause, not of common law
origin, and the special foreign limitation relates to the right and
not simply to the remedy.28
Pursuant to the injunction of Section 20 of the Illinois Limi24 See Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210
(1944). The court there said: "The result is that whether the act be regarded as
penal or remedial makes no difference in this case. It is not a law of a foreign
sovereignty. The Emergency Price Control Act is a law of Illinois and enforceable
as such. The courts of Illinois have not been denied jurisdiction by the act. Such
jurisdiction has been expressly granted to them, concurrent with the Federal
courts." 386 Ill. 284 at 301, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 at 218. See also the annotation in
162 A. L. R. 373.
25 Williams v. East St. Louis Junction R. R. Co., 349 Ill. App. 296, 110 N. U.
(2d) 700 (1953). See also Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. R. Co., 342
U. S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RIvrEw 364.
26 Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278 (1946). citing Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938). See also
annotation in 21 A. L. R. (2d) 247.

27 In Chenot v. Lefevre, 8 Ill. 637 (1846), an action based on notes made in
France, the court held that evidence relating to the French statute of limitations
was properly excluded. See also Metcalf v. Metcalf, 219 Ill. App. 96 (1920), and
Harden v. Whitman, 209 Ill. App. 106 (1917). The case of Emerson v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 303 Ill. 282, 135 N. E. 497 (1922), recognized
the rule but avoided its use as a measuring stick to determine whether a cause of
action had arisen growing out of the nonpayment of a certificate of deposit.
28 See, for example, the case of O'Neal v. National Cylinder Gas Co., 103 F. Supp.
720 (1952), where a federal court sitting in Illinois applied the two-year limitation
of the Arizona wrongful death statute, where the action arose, rather than the
Illinois one-year limitation.
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tations Act, 29 local courts have refused to enforce a cause which
has become barred under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction, particularly where both the parties were nonresidents and continued to
be such until after the cause of action had become barred. 3 This
section has frequently been applied both by express reference, 31
and without reference,3 2 and it was apparently pursuant to this
section that the court adopted a foreign "nonclaim" statute, or
short statute of limitations, as the basis for barring a claim against
33
a decedent's estate.

One seeking to invoke this section will find it necessary to
plead and prove the foreign statute of limitations 34 for, by the
terms thereof, the party relying on the foreign law must show
that a "cause of action has arisen" in the foreign jurisdiction.3
In that connection, the quoted phrase has been construed to mean
that jurisdiction must have existed in a court somewhere to adjudicate the matter between the parties, if such jurisdiction had been
invoked, without regard to the place where the cause of action
had its origin,36 although this interpretation, of course, will be
limited by the requirement already stated that both parties must
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 21, embodies the original act of 1872
which has been carried forward without change. Shortly after adoption, the
statute was given retroactive effect in the case of Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 256
(1876).
30 Orschel v. Rothschild, 238 Ill. App. 353 (1925).
The federal cases of Pond
Creek Mill & Elevator Co. v. Clark, 270 F. 482 (1920), and Osgood v. Artt, 10 F.
365 (1882), erroneously apply the section to cases where one party is a resident.
The Orschel case adheres to prior Illinois cases requiring both parties to be
nonresidents.
31 Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 48 N. E. 914 (1897) ;
Glenn v. McDavid, 316
Ill. App. 130, 44 N. E. (2d) 84 (1942) ; First National Bank of Boulder v. Hurlbut,
224 Ill. App. 297 (1922); Speich v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 1. Co., 178 Ill. App.
266 (1913).
32 Hurtt, Adm'r v. Steven, 333 Ill. App. 181, 77 N. E. (2d) 204 (1947).
33 Wernse v. Hall, Adm'r, 101 Ill. 423 (1882).
34 McGuigan v. Rolfe, 80 Ill. App. 256 (1898), holds that there is no presumption
that a cause of action is barred by a foreign statute.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 21, states: "When a cause of action has
arisen in a state or territory out of this state, or in a foreign country, and, by
the laws thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained in this state."
36 Strong v. Lewis, 204 Ill. 35, 68 N. E. 556 (1903) ; Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 256
(1876) ; Delta Bag Co. v. Leyland & Co., Ltd., 173 Ill. App. 38 (1912) ; O'Donnell
v. Lewis, 104 Ill. App. 198 (1902); National Bank of Denison v. Danahy, 89 Ill.
App. 92 (1899) ; Great Western Telegraph Co. v. Stubbs, 55 Ill. App. 210 (1894);
Humphrey v. Cole, 14 Ill. App. 56 (1883).
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have been nonresidents at the time.3 7 In
court adopts the foreign limitation act, it
standards to determine whether or not the
"commenced" within the time fixed.38 In

the event an Illinois
will then use Illinois
action was sufficiently
contrast to the foregoing, the fact of a debtor's removal to another state, once a cause
of action has arisen against him within this state, will not enable
him to obtain the advantage of the foreign statute of limitations.39
In the not too distant past, a party relying on foreign law
for any purpose was expected to plead and prove such law as a
matter of fact 40 in the trial court, for it was not possible to introduce evidence with respect thereto on appeal. 4 1 Necessity for the
making of such proof might have been obviated if the alleged
foreign law was admitted, as on demurrer, 42 but if not, the burden
of proving the foreign law fell upon the plaintiff if he relied on a
right not accorded by Illinois common or statutory law, or upon
the defendant in case he asserted non-enforcibility under some
governing foreign law.4 3 Since 1939, with the adoption in Illinois
of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 44 proof of
foreign law in conflicts cases has been greatly facilitated, 4 5 witness the increasing use made of the statute in a number of recent
37 Wooley v. Yarnell, 142 Ill. 442, 32 N. E. 891 (1892); Orsehel v. Rothschild,
238 Ill. App. 353 (1925) ; Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Townsend, 203 Ill. App. 457
(1916) ; Delta Bag Co. v. Leyland & Co., Ltd., 173 Ill. App. 38 (1912) ; National
Bank of Denison v. Danahy, 89 Ill. App. 92 (1899) ; Berry v. Krone, 46 Ill. App.
82 (1891) ; Story v. Thompson, 36 Ill. App. 370 (1899).
38 Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 48 N. E. 914 (1897).
39 Hibernian Banking Ass'n v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago, 157 Ill. 524,
41 N. E. 919 (1895) ; Wooley v. Yarnell, 157 Ill. 442, 32 N. E. 891 (1892).
40 Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. 1111 (1893) ; Alcorn v. Epler, 206 Ill.
App. 140 (1917) ; Barth v. Farmers & Traders Bank, 195 Ill. App. 318 (1915);
Wald v. Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R. R. Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E.
888, 53 Am. St. Rep. 332 (1898) ; Robinson v. Holmes, 75 Ill. App. 203 (1897). See
also Simpson Fruit Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 Ill. App. 158 (1910), where an
attempt was made to prove the wrong law.
41 Davis v. Mosbacher, 252 Ill. App. 536 (1928); Davis v. Wirth, 249 Ill. App.
544 (1928) ; Gunning System v. LaPointe, 113 Ill. App. 405 (1904).
42 Watson v. Canadian Pacific R. R. Co., 237 Ill. App. 478 (1925).

43 Walker v. Lovitt, 250 Ill. 543, 95 N. E. 631 (1911) ; Dearlove v. Edwards, 166
Ill. 619, 46 N. E. 1081 (1897) ; Deem v. Crume, 46 Ill. 69 (1867).
44 Laws 1939, p. 495; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, §§ 48g-48n.
45 See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 Unif. Laws Anno. 399.
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Illinois cases 4" some of which indicate that the courts will now
take judicial notice of the statutes 47 as well as of the common
law of the other states.
Although no Illinois case has yet decided the extent to which
a court may or must go to take judicial notice of foreign law upon
its own initiative, there is some indication that the chief effect
of the uniform statute has been to relax the strict common-law
rules of evidence with respect to proof of foreign law while
retaining the necessity for pleading or the giving of some reasonable notice with respect thereto, 48 and the making of at least some
proof.49 It has also been held that the statute has operated to
remove the former rule that, unless the matter had been finally
determined by the highest court of the appropriate foreign jurisdiction, an Illinois court would presume the common law to be
there in force, giving no weight whatsoever to a decision by an
intermediate court.5 0 Particular applications heretofore made of
choice of law principles in contract cases decided prior to the
adoption of this statute may, therefore, be open to challenge in
the future, but it is unlikely that basic principles will be changed in
any material respect.
46 The case of People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 77 N. E. (2d) 812, 11 A. L.
. (2d)
865 (1948), actually falls in the field of Criminal Law, but see Moscov v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 387 Ill. 378, 56 N. E. (2d) 399 (1944), for a use made of the statute
In an insurance contract case; Shorthose v. Shorthose, 319 Ili. App. 355, 49 N. E.
(2d) 280 (1943), a divorce case; and O'Neal v. Caffarello, 303 .11. App. 574, 25
N. E. (2d) 534 (1940), a tort case.
47 People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 77 N. E. (2d) 812, 11 A. L. R. (2d) 865 (1948).
In O'Neal v. Caffarello, 303 fll. App. 574, 25 N. E. (2d) 534 (1940), the court
noticed the non-existence of a Minnesota "guest" statute.
48

In particular, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 48J.

49 In McCallum v. Baltimore & Ohio B. R., 379 Ill. 60 at 67, 39 N. E. (2d) 340
at 343 (1942), the court said: "In this case the parties have not pleaded or made
proof of any Indiana statute which outlines the procedure of that State In the
enforcement of an attorney's lien. In the absence of a pleading or proof of such
a foreign statute, the courts of this State will, if it pertains to the common law,
assume that the common law is in force in the sister State . . . Where the matter
to be decided is not of common law origin and there .has been no proof of the
law of the foreign State, it will be assumed that the laws of the sister State are
the same as in this State." Cases construing the uniform law have been collected
in an annotation in 23 A. L. R. (2d) 1437.
50 See Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 387 11.

378, 56 N. E. (2d) 399 (1944).
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REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

Before proceeding to general conclusions, it may prove useful
to scan the entire field of cases examined in the preceding summary, to call particular attention to certain areas of difficulty
disclosed thereby, and, most important of all, to consider the probable ingredients of those difficulties.
While it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern any
golden thread running through the case law, it can be seen that,
in general, the law of the place of contracting has been applied
to questions of capacity and formal validity. Unless contrary to
local public policy, the same rule determines the choice of law for
questions concerning the presence of an agreement, and those of
legality, although several cases stating a place-of-performance rule
were noted.1 Regarding the legality of loan contracts, and, apparently, the question as to what constitutes consideration, the court
has been inclined to apply that law which would uphold the contract, generally looking to the intentions of the parties for support.
The law to be used in the construction of a contract has been
selected in a variety of ways, often according to the type of contract, the court sometimes paying lip service to the law which the
parties had in view, or were presumed to have intended, 2 but
usually ending with an application of the lex loci contractus principle. Matters growing out of the assignment of negotiable instruments disclose a conflict in the rules announced, probably because
of the increased complexity of the fact situation. Certainly, a
majority of the cases dealing with matters of performance applied
the lex loci solutionis rule, although a few hold to the lex loci
contractus.3 Questions of remedy, of course, have typically been
determined by the lex fori.
It is also apparent that an application of either the lex loci
1 Note particularly the case of North Packing & Provision Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 70 Ill. App. 275 (1897), and the related case in 89 Ill. App. 301
(1899), affirmed without conflicts discussion in 188 Ill. 366, 58 N. E. 958 (1900),
on the point of agreement, and Lewis v. Headley, 36 Ill. 433 (1865), as to legality.
2 Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 69 Ill. 260 (1873).
3 Barber v. Bell, 77 Ill. 490 (1875) ; Holbrook v. Vibbard, 3 Ill. 465 (1840).
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contractus rule4 or the lex loci solutionis rule 5 may be purely arbitrary and mechanical, without any particular attempt at justification. Again, with an eye primarily on the common sense and justice
of the matter at hand, the court may refer to the presumed intention of the parties, whether that points to the law of the place where
the contract was "made," '6 or to that of the place where it was to
be performed.7 In one instance, seemingly overruled by statute, this
approach lost its flexibility when it became crystallized into a
rule of "substitution," with the court, slavishly obedient to the
expressed intention of the parties, applying the stipulated law
to defeat a contract which could easily have been upheld under
the law of the place of contracting." Subsequent thereto, it was
indicated that the expressed intention of the parties would take
precedence over a general stipulation incorporating the law of a
particular jurisdiction.9 As if these variables were not enough,
words and phrases such as "comity," "public policy" and the
like, together with that unpredictable procedure by which courts
sometimes review all the facts and determine that, therefore, "the
law of X must govern,"1 0 still remain to perplex the lawyer.
Separation of the cases according to the issues presented in
them undoubtedly operates to reduce the apparent contradictions
but, in certain areas, even these groups of cases retain difficulties
within themselves which call for study. In particular, with respect to the statute of frauds, the two-state case of Scudder v.
Union National Bank of Chicago" applying the law of the place
12
of contracting on the one hand, and the cases of Mason v. Dousay
and Hall v. Cordell,"3 applying the law of the place of performance
4 As in Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, 106 N. E. 206 (1914).
5 Lewis v. Headley, 36 Ill. 433 (1865); Price v. Burns, 101 Ill.App. 418 (1902).
6 Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 69 Ill. 260 (1873).
7 George v. Haas, 311 Ill. 382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924).
8 McAllister v. Smith, 17 Ill. 328 (1856).
9 Rose v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 144 Ill. App. 434 (1908), affirmed on different
reasoning in 240 Ill. 45, 88 N. E. 204 (1909).
10 See, for example, Pomeroy v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 398 (1866).
1191 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245 (1875).
12 35 Ill. 424, 85 Am. Dec. 368 (1864).
13 142 U. S. 116, 12 S. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956 (1891).
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on the other, seemingly present a direct conflict. When it becomes
necessary to determine the applicable law governing the steps
to be taken to charge an endorser on an assigned negotiable instrument, the two-state cases of Holbrook v. Vibbard14 and Wooley v.
Lyon, 15 adopting place-of-contracting and place-of-payment rules
respectively, will prove troublesome. In construction matters, although a majority of the cases seem to apply the law of the place
of contracting, others indicate that the law of the place of performance, or that intended by the parties, should control so that,
even in the sub-group dealing with insurance contracts, contradictions remain. The difficulty of drawing the line between matters
of basic contractual obligation and of performance also seems to
be resting on the Illinois doorstep, inasmuch as a number of cases
apparently apply the lex loci solutionis to control those matters
closely connected with the place where performance is to be
rendered. Finally, whether public policy will prove so strong in
a particular case that it will serve to strike down a foreign-made
16
contract has not always been made clear.
A study of the entire group of cases reveals certain weaknesses in the Illinois law of conflicts where buttressing is called
for, as well as certain abuses which ought to be corrected, if the
local system of case law is to be improved. These, in the main,
constitute the ingredients for most of the difficulty. One such
ingredient lies in the citation habits of the court. Occasionally,
an Illinois court will confine itself to a consideration of only the
Illinois cases on a conflict of laws point. It is submitted that this is
wrong for, if it is the function of the conflict of laws to attain a
uniformity of decision regardless of forum, 17 it would be better for
143 Ill. 465 (1840).

15 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885, 57 Am. Rep. 867 (1886).
16 This problem, latent in all groups, is most prominent of course in those cases
dealing with legality and agreement.
17 Caton, C. J., in Barnes v. Whitaker, 22 Ill. 608 (1859), pointed out that the
court should "enforce the obligation which the contract created between the
parties ... Otherwise a contract would be one thing in one jurisdiction and another
in another jurisdiction." See Stumberg, op. cit., 2d Ed., p. 159. This purpose has
not been unanimously agreed upon. See Harper, "Policy Bases of the Conflict of
Laws," 54 Yale a. J. 1155 (1947), criticizing the over-emphasis on uniformity and
the under-emphasis with regard to social values. See also Cheatem, "Conflict of
Laws Theories," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1945).
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the court, when handling conflicts matters, to corroborate Illinois
citations with leading American cases in point. Such cross-citation
would tend to maintain the international character of conflict of
laws rules.
The evil to be found in the "nationalization" of the rules of
private international law is best illustrated in that glaring series
of cases following upon the decision in Dawes v. Rosenbaum.'
That case held that the plaintiff, a chattel mortgagee under a
Missouri contract, had not made a sufficient demand upon the
Illinois resident to entitle him to maintain trover, but the court
there saw fit, by way of dictum, to criticize the general American
majority rule entitling the out-of-state chattel mortgagee to enforce his lien against a local creditor or bona fide purchaser. In
the case of St. Paul Cattle Loan Company v. Hansman,19 the
court achieved a similar decision, citing the Dawes case in a
corroborating dictum. When the case of Snow for the use of
Ainsworth v. Breene20 arose, the court treated the critical dictum
in the Dawes case as the significant point thereof and made it the
basis for decision, citing the two previous Illinois cases as the only
authority on the conflicts question. The case of National Bond &
Investment Company v. Moss 2 1 followed suit, likewise citing only
Illinois cases. It was not until the case of First National Bank
of Nevada v. Swegler,22 wherein the Appellate Court for the First
District carefully studied the cases, pointed out the mistake, and
corroborated its conclusion with a reference to outside state and
federal decisions, that the erroneous Dawes series of cases terminated. If, in either of these ill-founded cases, a quick comparison
had been made with authority outside of Illinois, court and counsel
would have been put on notice of the general rule, and a careful
study of Illinois law would have disclosed the correct rule.23
18 179 Ill. 112, 53 N. E. 585 (1909).
19 215 Ill. App. 190 (1919).
20 248 Ill. App. 187 (1928).

21263 Ill. App. 187 (1931).
22336 Ill. App. 107, 82, N. E. (2d) 920 (1948).
23 See Mumford v. Canty, 50 Ill. 370, 99 Am. Dec. 525 (1869).
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By way of contrast, in Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Company,2 4 the Supreme Court displayed unusually fine respect for
the various issues and fact situations involved in the cases offered
as controlling authority. The question before the court was as to
which of several statutes of frauds should control in the case of
a contract of employment, entered into in Pennsylvania, to be
performed in several states. Although the ultimate holding, applying the law of Pennsylvania, is consistent with the decision in
Miller v. Wilson,25 a case wherein all the events were concentrated
in one state, the court declined to base its decision on such weak
26
grounds. It likewise stepped gingerly around Walker v. Lovitt,
where the concentration of events precluded any real conflict of
laws issue, and properly rejected the decisions in Roundtree v.
Baker 27 and Pope v. Hanke,2 8 since they involved issues of legality
and public policy not encountered in a simple question involving
formal validity. The holding in George v. Haas, 29 one presuming
that the parties intended the law of the place of performance to
control, while approved, was also distinguished on the basis that
it concerned a two-state situation with performance to be given
in one jurisdiction only. The tacit approval which the court gave
to the last mentioned case appears to overlook the further distinction that the issue there involved was one of legality, specifically usury in a loan contract, rather than one of formal validity,
but the general approach to the entire problem is commendable.
It offers the hope that, with increased accuracy in citation, Illinois
courts may yet materially advance the refinement of the Illinois
set of conflict of laws decisions.
A second ingredient concerns itself with the geographical
"place" concept and its pitfalls. One of the more significant, or
24 388 I. 474. 58 N. E. (2d) 460 (1945), affirming 311 II. App. 111, 35 N. E. (2d)
522 (1941).
25 146 Il1. 523, 34 N. E. 1111 (1893).
26 250 Ill. 543, 95 N. E. 631 (1911).
27 52 Ill. 241, 4 Am. Rep. 597 (1869).
28 155 Il. 617, 40 N. E. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568 (1894).
29 311 I1. 382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924).
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at least often used, weapons in the judicial arsenal of terminology
is the phrase "place of making" and its correlative "place of
performance." The decisions do not indicate how the latter place
is to be found, possibly because it is so clear in many cases, but
the place of "making" is clearly held to be that place where the
last act necessary to consummate a binding contract takes place.30
The significance of this term as supplying an element of certainty
is weakened, however, by a number of cases which do not seem
to regard it as essential to discover the particular "place" but
rather draw upon all the facts, attributing the contract generally
to one jurisdiction or another. 3 1 Perhaps this procedure is the
outgrowth of doubt as to the validity of the "place" concept as a
controlling factor in choice of law, or an outgrowth of the notorious uncertainty as to the state of the law. Whatever the reason,
this approach does not clarify the law but only causes the rules
of lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis, in various fact situations, to lose whatever quality of certainty they had. The ad hoc
32
process is somewhat akin to the English "proper law" system
or to the "most substantial factor" approach, but Illinois courts
have not been noticed to ground their decisions expressly on any
such bases.
30 In Walker v. Lovitt, 250 Ill. 543 at 546, 95 N. E. 631 at 632 (1911), the court
stated: "The place where a contract is made depends not upon the place where It
is actually written, signed or dated, but upon the place where it is delivered, as
consummating the bargain." See also Smith v. Myers, 207 Ill. 126, 69 N. E. 858
(1917) ; City of Carthage v. Munsell, 203 Ill. 474, 67 N. E. 831 (1903), an action
in debt to recover a penalty for violation of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of
liquor, which turned on the acceptance by delivery to a carrier in Iowa as creating a sale in Iowa; City of Carthage v. Duvall, 202 Ill. 234, 66 N. E. 1099 (1903) ;
Gay v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221, 31 Am. Rep. 76 (1878) ; Davis v. Wirth, 249 Ill. App.
544 (1928) ; Tokheim Mfg. Co. v. Stoyles, 142 Ill. App. 198 (1908).

31 Hamilton v. Darley, 266 I1. 542, 107 N. E. 798 (1915) ; O'Dea v. Tbrom, 250
Ill. App. 577 (1928), reversed on other grounds in 332 Ill. 89, 163 N. E. 390 (1929),
dealing with negotiations between parties in Florida and Illinois, with the court
deciding that an "Illinois" contract was involved; Dean & Son v. W. B. Conkey
Co., 180 Ill. App. 162 (1913) ; Ingersoll v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 Ill. App. 568
(1910) ; Rose v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 144 Il. App. 434 (1908), affirmed on different
reasoning in 240 Ill. 45, 88 N. E. 204 (1909), where the Supreme Court held that
delivery was not essential as the last act, but that a final acceptance and delivery
into the hands of the acceptor's agent without condition would complete the
contract.
32 See Cheshire, International Contracts (Jackson, Son & Co., Glasgow, 1948),
pp. 12-5; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons, London, 1949), 6th Ed., pp.
579-603.
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The "last act necessary" approach itself possesses a serious
weakness. If the law of the place of contracting is significant, the
last act may occur in some purely fortuitous place, or in one
arranged by one or both of the parties, with the result that an
unexpected and unintended law would be applied.3 3 One of the
traditional objections to the "place of making" phrase is that it
may be difficult to define when the parties have negotiated from
different places. 34 A further objection lies in the fact that a
finding as to the "place of contracting" becomes a condition
precedent to a determination of the validity of the very contract
in question." Put differently, one must presume a valid contract
before one can determine its validity! Although there is some
authority to indicate that the "last act necessary" approach will
be utilized even in those cases where the place of making, as thus
determined, constitutes the only foreign element, 6 at least one case
has expressly held, in a situation where it would be manifestly
unjust to use that approach, that a finding of the place of contracting will not be conclusive as to which law should govern. 87
It is believed, then, that the "place of making" and "place
of performance" concepts should have no significance independently of the fact situations in which they are employed, being
33 As in O'Dea v. Throm, 250 Ill. App. 577 (1928), reversed on other grounds in
332 Ill. 89, 163 N. E. 390 (1929).
34 One writer has objected to the fact that such a "contact" as the place of
making could well be made the subject of arrangement by the parties: Kronstein,
"Crisis of 'Conflict of Laws' ", 37 Geo. L. J. 483 (1949).
35 See note 33, ante, this section, and Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1942), pp. 365-6.
86 In Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, 106 N. E. 206 (1914), the court applied the law
of the place of contracting in determining the question of capacity, although the
party in question was in that place only temporarily. Barber v. Bell, 77 Ill. 490
(1875), seems to support this position. In a suit against an endorser, where the
makers of the note resided in Ohio and the note was payable there, although it
was endorsed in Illinois, it was held that requisite diligence against the makers
was to be determined according to Illinois law. The case of Davis v. Mobacher,
252 Ill. App. 536 (1928), one wherein all events except delivery occurred in Missouri, contains a strong statement that Illinois law should control, as delivery
occurred in Illinois. The fact that Missouri law was not adequately proved on
trial, however, provided an alternative ground for applying Illinois law.
37 Illinois Terra Cotta Lumber Co. v. Owen, 167 Ill. 360, 47 N. E. 722 (1897).
The case would indicate that if a party seeks to avoid liability on some technical
ground, as by arranging the "making" of the contract in a particular state, he
would not be entitled to the benefit of the rule usually applied.
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nothing more than convenient shorthand labels for indicating the
conclusion of a particular court in a particular case. It would,
at least, appear from the statute of frauds cases that a determination as to the "place of contracting" will not be conclusive, and
the same thing is true in those cases involving steps to charge
an endorser on an assigned negotiable instrument. These cases
must be rationalized on some other ground 5
Another ingredient of difficulty comes from the use of the
term "presumed intention of the parties." Frequent reference
has been made to the fact that the intentions of the parties as to
the law which should govern ought to control. Although this
reference is sometimes supported by an express stipulation of
the parties,3 9 courts have more often relied upon what the parties
must be presumed to have intended, even when they probably had
no intention at all.40 If the latter approach is involved, the pre38 It may be noted that, in cases of this type, the court has applied the law of
the state in which two of the three elements of making, assignment, and place of
payment were situated: Wooley v. Lyon, 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885, 57 Am. Rep. 867
(1886) ; Holbrook v. Vibbard, 3 Ill. 465 (1840).

39 As in Reighley v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank, 390 Ill. 242, 61 N. E. (2d)
29 (1945), where the contract involved recited that Illinois law was to govern,
,and in Mowery v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 443, 7 N. E. (2d)
334 (1937), containing an express stipulation as to controlling law. Three cases
recognize, to a greater or lesser degree, reference by the parties to laws of private
institutions. Thus, in Benza v. New Era Association, 323 Ill. 297, 154 N. E. 129
(1926), reversing 238 Ill. App. 435 (1925), the court held that, In Illinois, members
of a fraternal benefit society could contract to limit their right of appeal to the
courts until after they had submitted the matter to a tribunal created by the association. In Stone v. Appel, 12 Ill. App. 582 (1883), the parties had agreed to
marry on a certain day and in accordance with religious custom. When it appeared that religious custom forbade marriage on the day set, the court held
the defendant not in breach for postponing the marriage, even though it would
have been valid under state law if performed on that date. See also Fauntleroy
v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908), where claims arising
out of a gambling transaction were submitted to *arbitration and it was held
that a Missouri judgment based on such arbitration had to be enforced by
Mississippi under the full faith and credit clause.
40 George v. Haas, 311 Ill. 382, 143 N. E. 54 (1924), a usury case; Benedict v.
Dakin, 243 Ill. 284, 90 N. E. 712 (1910) ; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174
Ill. 13, 50 N. E. 1019 (1898), where there was no evidence that the parties had a
"view" to any law other than that of the state where the contract was made;
Lewis v. Headley, 36 Ill. 433, 87 Am. Dec. 227 (1865) ; Oakes v. Chicago Fire
Brick Co., 311 Ill. App. 111, 35 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941), affirmed in 388 Ill. 474, 58
N. E. (2d) 460 (1945); Altland v. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 151 Ill. App. 291
Note also the
(1909) ; Farmers Trust Co. v. Schenuit, 83 Ill. App. 267 (1898).
case of Tilden v. Blair, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 241 at 247, 22 L. Ed. 632 at 633
(1875), a usury case, where the court, after discussing the events in the making
of a bill of exchange, said: "What more cogent evidence could there be that it
was intended to create an Illinois bill?" Italics added.
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sumption becomes subject to the limitation that the law presumed
to be intended must be either that of the place where the contract
was made or else that where it is to be performed, 4 ' and there
would seem to be some doubt as to which should first be presumed. 42 A federal court decision suggests, as the only limitation,
that the law stipulated must have a" normal relation" to the transaction, but the term "normal relation" was not there further
defined.43
Cases involving questions of usury, consideration, and construction, have been especially productive of this type of reasoning. There does not, however, appear to be such a trend, in those
cases which have assumed the importance of the parties' intentions, as to warrant the conclusion that courts are establishing a
rule for private autonomy in Illinois. 44 Chief Justice Scates, in
McAllister v. Smith,4 5 described with some particularity what he
called a "rule of substitution" but his formulation has not been
generally adopted. Because of this, it is believed that resort to
the actual, or presumed, intention of the parties represents not an
Adams v. Robertson, 37 Ill. 45 (1865).
42Adams v. Robertson, 37 Ill. 45 (1865), states it to be the lex loci contractus.
This presumption was clearly assumed to be in force in the cases of Illinois
Central R. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13, 50 N. E. 1019 (1898), and Altland v. A., T.
& S. F. R. R. Co., 151 Ill. App. 291 (1909), but in George v. Haas, 311 Ill. 382,
143 N. E. 54 (1924), a usury case, and in Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co., 311 Ill.
App. 111, 35 N. E. (2d) 522 (1941), affirmed In 388 Ill. 474, 58 N. E. (2d) 460
(1945), a statute of frauds case, the court looked first to the law of the place
of performance.
43 Merchants' & Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson, 69 F. (2d) 940 (1940),
relying on Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626, 71
L. Ed. 1123 (1926).
44 A recent discussion of conflicting theories as to private autonomy appears in
Yntema, "'Autonomy' in Choice of Law," 1 Am. J. of Comp. Law 341 (1952).
45 17 11. 328, 65 Am. Dec. 651 (1856).
Chief Justice Scates there said that the
laws of this state "would, had the parties been silent, have become part of the
contracts for the construction and meaning of the parties, in ascertaining and fixing
their mutual rights and obligations. But parties may substitute the laws of
another place or country . . . both in relation to the legality and extent of the
original obligation, and in relation to the respective rights of the parties ...
This is allowed in all civilized countries, and recognized as part of the iu8 gentium
or law of nations respecting private and personal rights, and in all cases, where
the subject matter of the contract is not malum in 8e, Immoral, or contrary to
the local policy, or dangerous to the peace and good order of the particular community, in which it is sought to be enforced."
See 17 Ill. 328 at 332, 65 Am.
Dec. 651 at 654-5. While the holding has been criticized and has, apparently,
been overruled by statute, the views expressed are valuable with respect to other
kinds of contracts than notes involving usury.
41
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application of a definite theory or rule but rather an escape to a
refuge, one adopted in preference to quagmires apt to be found in
an ill-developed system of conflict of laws rules.
Further difficulty is encountered with respect to judicial
expressions regarding public policy. It is familiar doctrine that
courts will not apply the rule of comity, giving effect to foreign
laws, if to do so would violate local public policy. 46 While there
is little occasion to question this attitude, the statement of the
general principle naturally provokes the inquiry: What is the
public policy of Illinois under which a court should refuse to
enforce the foreign-made contract when, except for such policy,
it would have enforced the sameI
One of the better definitions appearing in the conflict cases is
that provided by the Supreme Court in the case of Zeigler v.
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank. 47 In that case, the court said:
There is no precise definition of public policy, and consequently no absolute rule by which a contract can be measured
or tested to determine whether or not it is contrary to public
policy. Each case, as it arises, must be judged and determined according to its own peculiar circumstances. The public
policy of the State or of the nation is to be found in its constitution and its statutes, and when cases arise concerning
matters upon which they are silent, then in its judicial decisions and the constant practice of the government officials.
[Citations omitted] Courts will not look to other sources to
determine the public policy of a State. As was said in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad
Co., supra: "The public policy of a State or nation must be
determined by its constitution, laws and judicial decisions,46 Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co., 256 I1. 66, 99 N. E. 893 (1912).
In
Campbell v. Albers, 313 Ill.App. 152 at 158, 39 N. E. (2d) 672 at 676 (1942),
the court stated: "How far foreign laws should be enforced under the doctrine
of comity depends upon whether any wrong will be done a citizen of the domestic
state, whether the policies of its laws will be contravened or impaired, or whether
the court can do complete justice to those affected by the decree."
47245 Ill. 180, 91 N. E. 1041 (1910).
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not by the varying opinions of laymen, lawyers or judges as
4
to the demands of the interests of the public."
The application of a local public policy, then, is subject to certain
limitations. It is clear that the forum may not arbitrarily refuse
to enforce a foreign contract, for the constitutional limits of full
49
faith and credit, and of due process, lie in the background.
Furthermore, the legislature may not prohibit the making of foreign contracts without violating due process.50
Drawing a line on public policy is, of course, difficult. It is
not clear where that dividing line is with respect to contract cases.
On the one hand, a mild public policy of the forum may declare a
local contract illegal and void yet would not strike down a foreign
contract if the same was valid where made. On the other hand,
it is clear that, at times, a stringent public policy would strike
down even a valid foreign contract. Fortunately, some Illinois
decisions appear to border on the line so they may serve as guide-

posts.
Perhaps the most striking example of restraint in the use of
the public policy exception to the comity rule may be found in
Raundtree v. Baker,51 a case involving a suit on a note made, and
presumably payable, in Kentucky which the defendant urged had
48 245 Ill. 180 at 193, 91 N. E. 1041 at 1045-6.
49 See Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
On the question of due process, see Home Life
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926, 74 A. L. R. 701 (1930),
where it was held to be a denial of due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment, for a Texas court to apply a Texas statute to strike down a provision in a
contract of which all elements were foreign. But see Buell v. Breese Mill & Grain
Co., 65 Ill. App. 271 (1896), where a contract of insurance with respect to Illinois
property was entered into by an Illinois resident, in Wisconsin, with a Wisconsin
company not authorized to do business in Illinois, and the court refused to permit
the company's receiver to enforce an assessment against the policyholder.

50 The case of Walker v. Lovitt, 250 i. 543 at 549, 95 N. E. 631 at 633 (1911),
declared: "The legislature of a State has no power to prohibit its citizens from
making, beyond the limits of the State, contracts lawful in the place where they
are made, even though such contracts may concern property within the State."
In support thereof, the court relied on the case of Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana,
165 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832, 17 S. Ct. 427 (1897). See, however, the annotation
in 1 A. L. R. 1665 on the constitutionality of statutes relating to insurance
contracts.

5152 Ill. 241, 4 Am. Rep. 597 (1869).
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been given in connection with the sale of a slave, an act forbidden
in Illinois. The court there said:
Our courts would not enforce a contract for the sale of a
slave, whether made in this State, where slavery has always
been prohibited, or in a State where such contracts are binding, because it is against public policy. But after the parties
have fully executed their contract, and a note is given for the
price, under this comity which exists between States of the
republic, the note may be collected, and it is not for us, from
caprice, or because we may abhor the system of slavery and
the sale of human beings, to refuse to lend the aid of the courts
for the collection of the money. It is not against the policy
of our State to allow its collection, nor is it contrary to the
interests of our citizens. Under the laws of Kentucky the
sale was authorized, and there was a sufficient consideration.

52

Thus the court applied a place-of-making rule without invoking
the public policy exception.
Attempts to place limitations upon the liability of a common
carrier have also apparently been close to the dividing line between a mild and a stringent public policy. In Ginsburg v. Adams
Express Company,53 the Appellate Court for the First District held
a carrier's receipt limiting liability to $50, unless a special value
was declared, not to be in violation of Illinois public policy, apparently limiting the scope of the policy to cases where enforcement
would "contravene our criminal law, or would sanction vice or immorality, or be opposed to natural justice, or transgress a positive
prohibition of law, or be opposed to the general interests of our
citizens. ' ' 54 But, in Nonotuck Silk Companyi v. Adamns Express
Company,55 the Supreme Court, with respect to just such a receipt
limiting liability, held that it would be "contrary to the established
52 52 Ill.241 at 247, 4 Am. Rep. 597 at 601.
53 160 Il1. App. 566 (1911). See also, to the same effect, Brown v. L. & N. R. R.
Co., 36 Ill. App. 140 (1890).
54 160 Ill. App. 566 at 569.
55256 Ill. 66, 99 N. E. 893 (1912).
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public policy of this state to permit such a contract as this to be
enforced.'' 6 The Supreme Court opinion would normally be
taken as controlling but, inasmuch as it was handed down only
one year after, and failed to account for, the Ginsburg case, it
would seem reasonable to assume that limitations as to liability
of this character come close to the dividing line.
Far over on the stringent policy side of the line are the cases
involving gambling contracts. 5 7 In Pope v. Hanke,58 for example,
the court refused to enforce a note given in connection with a
wagering contract. The note was made, endorsed, and was to
be paid, in St. Louis, Missouri. It was given for the difference
between the contract and the market price of goods, pursuant to
a futures contract under which the parties never delivered, nor
intended to deliver, any goods but used the commodity market as
a basis for their wager. Denying recovery, the court said: "We
had held, that dealing in futures or options is productive of mischievous results, and have characterized it as a 'dangerous evil,'
and 'a vice that has in recent years grown to enormous proportions '. ',5
It would seem that the only distinction between the Roundtree
case and the holding in Pope v. Hanke would lie in the fact that,
in the former case, enforcement of the contract would no longer
operate to encourage the making of similar contracts for slavery
had, by then, been abolished in Kentucky and elsewhere, hence
there was no danger of a repetition likely to prove harmful to
citizens of Illinois. On the other hand, a refusal to enforce the
wagering contract would, to some degree, operate as a deterrent
to further transactions of the sort or would tend to discourage the
bringing of such actions in Illinois, thus operating to maintain
the dignity of the law. The practical effect of a given decision,
56

256 Ill. 66 at 76, 99 N. E. 893 at 897.

See McMath, Speculation and Gambling in Options, Futures and Stocks in
Illinois (G. I. Jones, Chicago, 1921), and, in general, the annotation in 173 A. L. R.
695.
58 155 Il1. 617, 40 N. E. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568 (1894).
57

59 155 Ill. 317 at 629, 40 N. E. 839 at 843.
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then, would seem to weigh at least as heavily as an abstract notion
concerning policy or morals, for it can hardly be said that a wagering contract would be more repugnant to good morals and public
policy than would be the case of a contract for the sale of human
beings.
Recapitulating what has already been said, the foregoing study
indicates that few general conclusions concerning the state of
Illinois choice of law rules with respect to contracts would be warranted. First, the cases have long been considered to be in a
confused state, a condition feared by some but perhaps cherished
by others. Lack of any comprehensive synthesis or analysis
has undoubtedly been the producing cause but unnecessary
dicta and an occasional glaring miscitation have helped add
to the confusion. Second, probably because of difficulties in
achieving an understanding about the growing mass of cases,
courts have tended to make more or less ad hoc determinations as to the law which "must govern." This, the nethermost
in choice of law procedures from the standpoint of predictability,
can do nothing to clarify the law and could be expected, if anything,
to make matters worse than they are.
There seems, however, to be a parallel tendency to resort to
the intentions of the parties, whether expressed, presumed, or inferred, a technique which has been employed in a considerable
number of cases and which might be said to be the most significant characteristic of the decision. This technique may become
the potential candidate for the job of giving a coherent theoretical
basis to the Illinois decisions for, while courts do not generally
expressly make the intention of the parties the basis for decision,
resort to this device could become crystallized into a system for
want of a better integrated scheme relating to conflicts in law.
Public policy will certainly remain an important limiting factor,
but only the constant production of new decisions will make it
possible to plot the critical line" with any degree of certainty on
specific issues.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
COMMERCF--LICENsES AND PRIVILEGE TAXEs-WHETHER OR NOT A
MUNICIPAL LICENSE TAX IS VIOLATIVE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE WHEN
LICENSEE's INTERSTATE AND LOCAL BUSINESSES ARE INSEPARABLE-There
is some reason to believe that the Supreme Court of the United States

has recently decided to allow local taxation to invade previously prohibited
territory, by an extension of the "home
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theory, judging by the
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outcome of the case of City of Chicago v. Willett Company.1 In that case,
a cartage company engaged in business within a city without first having
obtained, and having paid for, a license required by a municipal ordinance. 2 The eity failed to secure a conviction for a violation of the ordinance and, on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court because the
validity of a municipal ordinance was involved,3 the judgment of acquittal
was there affirmed when the court concluded that the defendant was not
subject to the license tax since it could not separate its loads into interstate and intrastate business, nor could it discontinue any part of its
service. 4 The Supreme Court of the United States thereafter granted
certiorari but, being uncertain as to whether the state court decision had
been reached on the basis of a constitutional question, it remanded the case
for clarification. 5 After the state supreme court had clearly held that the
ordinance ran afoul of the commerce clause of the federal constitution,6
the Supreme Court of the United States again took the case and this time
it reversed the holding, declaring that the tax involved no violation of
the federal commerce clause even though the defendant's interstate and
local business operations were inseparable and the tax purported to apply
7
only to the latter.
Settlement of the problem of determining whether or not local taxation
places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce has always been
a troublesome matter at best, as is well illustrated by the split of the judges
in the instant case, but, since Brown v. Maryland,8 the principle that an
occupational tax cannot be exacted for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce has been firmly adhered to in American law.9 It was there
that Chief Justice Marshall announced the firm rule to be that, in the
1 - U. S. -, 73 S. Ct. 460, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 333 (1953). Justice Douglas wrote
a dissenting opinion.
2 Municipal Code, Chicago, 1931, Ch. 163.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, provides for direct appeal in such
cases.
4 See 406 Ill. 286 at 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 195 at 200 (1950).
5341 U. S. 913, 71 S. Ct. 734, 95 L. Ed. 1349 (1951).
6 The clarifying opinion, which appears in 409 Ill. 480, 101 N. E. (2d) 205
(1951), was based on the proposition that a carter who engaged in both interstate and intrastate business could not validly be made subject to the ordinance
when every load contained intrastate and interstate property, which could not
be separated, and the carter could not continue either of its operations without
the other.
7 Mr. Justice Reed, with whom the Chief Justice joined, wrote a separate concurring opinion, basing it on the fact that the carter did intrastate business on
the streets of Chicago and vicinity. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
regarded the tax as unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce.
8 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827).
9 The opinion in the instant case, - U. S. - at -, 73 S. Ct. 460 at 464, 97
L. Ed. (adv.) 333 at 338, lists the cases.
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interest of federal power over interstate commerce, neither a state nor
an instrumentality thereof could tax interstate commerce in any form or
manner which would impose a direct burden on such commerce. 10
Since taxation of any sort would, in some way, constitute an imposition
upon interstate commerce, it became necessary to modify this rule to an
extent sufficient to permit local taxation affecting interstate commerce in
an incidental, rather than a direct, fashion; otherwise interstate commerce
would enjoy an immunity from taxation while enjoying the benefit of
state and local services. Various forms of indirect levy have, therefore,
been upheld and the privilege has been extended to include the taxation
of the occupation of interstate motor transportation so long as the tax
proves to be reasonable and is fixed according to some uniform, fair, and
practical standard." This extension, made necessary in order to allow the
states to receive reasonable compensation for the expense entailed in providing and maintaining roads, has been classified as coming under the
police power of the states, a power which the state may delegate to a
municipality, entitling it to exact a tax or fee from the interstate motor
carrier for the same purpose. 12 The tax involved in the instant case, however, could not be justified as coming under the police power since it did
not meet the aforementioned requirements. It was called an occupational
tax by the Illinois Supreme Court,'8 and this classification was accepted
by the federal court.
While states may, in the exercise of the police power, regulate or affect
the business of interstate transportation in a variety of ways without
violating the commerce clause, they have not been permitted to withhold
the right to engage in interstate commerce, nor have they been permitted
to make the existence of that right depend upon the fulfillment of stateimposed requirements. Thus, in Spector v. O'Connor,14 a statute of- Con10 In the course of dealing with an argument made in Brown v. Maryland, 25
U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419 at 448, 6 L. Ed. 678 at 689, to the effect that a construction of the commerce power so as to prevent a state government from levying
duties on imports would abridge the acknowledged power of a state to tax its
citizens, Chief Justice Marshall said: "We admit this power to be sacred; but
cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct the free course of a power
given to Congress. We cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct or
defeat the power to regulate commerce."
11 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915).
12 Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L. R.
45 (1928). The police power was utilized, in the more recent case of Bode v.
Barrett, - U. S. -, 73 S. Ct. 468, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 343 (1953), to sustain a flat
license fee, measured by the gross weight of a truck used both in interstate and
intrastate commerce, assessed by Illinois for the privilege of using the state
highways.
13 See 406 Ill. 286 at 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 195 at 200.
14340 U. S. 602, 71 S. Ct. 508, 95 L. Ed. 573 (1951).
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necticut sought to impose a tax on the privilege of doing business within
the state, which tax also fell upon motor carriers. The tax was held invalid,
insofar as it related to exclusively interstate trucking operations, even
though the tax was purported to be calculated only on the profits realized
from local business. On the other hand, a state or one of its instrumentalities may, by appropriate legislation, require payment of an occupation
tax on the part of one engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce
so long as (1) the tax is imposed solely on account of the intrastate business; (2) the amount exacted is not increased because of the interstate
business done; (3) a person engaged exclusively in interstate commerce
is not made subject to the imposition; and (4) a person taxed may discontinue intrastate business without being forced to withdraw from his
interstate operations. 15 The instant case fell short of this established pattern in the last respect.
Principles developed over a period of years in an attempt to harmonize
the prohibition against burdening interstate commerce with the right of
a state to place licensing taxes on occupations conducted within its borders
help to sharpen the contrast provided by the case at hand. Take, for example, one of the earliest and clearest cases on this problem, that of
Leloup v. City of Mobile. 6 A New York telegraph company doing business in Alabama there failed to pay a license tax as required under the
terms of a city ordinance relating to telegraph companies which did business in the city. Holding the tax invalid, the United States Supreme Court
treated it as a general license tax affecting the entire business, interstate
as well as local. Two years later, this principle was again invoked, in
Crutcheer v. Kentucky, 7 at the instance of a foreign express company
which did both local and interstate business and the court found the tax
objectionable since it might also fall on one engaged only in interstate
activity.
These cases found a logical sequitur in the decision achieved in the case
of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas i s where it was held that
a state could not exclude a foreign corporation from doing merely local
business if such exclusion would unreasonably burden its non-excludable
interstate business. Kansas there endeavored to collect a charter fee of
a given percentage of the entire capital stock from all corporations doing
local business, regardless of where the property was located. While the
court felt that the tax might have been sustained if it had been imposed
15 Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L.
R. 45 (1928).
16 127 U. S. 640, 8 S. Ct. 1380, 32 L. Ed. 311 (1888).

L. Ed. 649 (1890).
18 216 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355 (1909).

17 141 U. S. 47, 11 S. Ct. 851, 35
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on local property only, despite its use in connection with interstate commerce, and clearly indicated that the tax would have been upheld if it
had been apportioned to that part of the capital utilized in intrastate
activities, the primary basis for the decision rested on the fact that &
burden could not be imposed on interstate activity through the guise of
placing a burden on domestic commerce, when domestic and interstate
transactions were inseparable.
Paralleling this line of development is another line of cases wherein
local impositions have been upheld apparently because the tax fell exclusively on the intrastate portion of the business conducted. In Osborne v.
Florida,19 for example, a Florida statute required the payment of a license
fee before doing intrastate business. The agent of an express company
engaged in both interstate and local business failed to pay as he felt the
tax did not apply in his case. The state sued and won on the theory that
the license was exacted only from intrastate business, was one which could
have been avoided if the company had refrained from doing intrastate
business, and because the levy was in no way increased by reason of the
interstate activity. The same principle was relied upon in another case
where the tax was measured by the gross receipts arising from domestic
business and not influenced by receipts from interstate business. 20 Even
so, the principle is not one which can be easily applied, judging by the case
of Cooney v. Mountain State Telephone & Telegraph Company.21 The State
of Montana there attempted to impose an annual license tax upon each
telephone instrument used within the state which the taxpayer sought to
restrain as an undue burden on interstate commerce. The court agreed,
believing the tax to be improperly proportioned since, a larger number
of instruments being in use because of the interstate business, the tax
was increased because of the interstate activity.
Returning to the instant case, it is apparent that the case was not
one which clearly met the requirements previously established in order
to avoid a violation of the protection afforded by the commerce clause
for the intrastate and interstate business could not be separated; the
carter could not discontinue either operation without giving up the entire
business; the amount of the tax was increased because of the interstate
business; and there was no attempt to proportion the tax according to
the amount of intrastate business done. The fact that the defendant
engaged in interstate business obviously forced an increase in the number
164 U. S. 650, 17 S. Ct. 214, 41 L. Ed. 586 (1896).
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 12 S. Ct. 250, 35 L. Ed. 1035
(1892).
21294 U. S. 384, 55 S. Ct. 477, 79 L. Ed. 934 (1935).
19

20
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of trucks used, increased the tax and placed a direct burden upon interstate commerce via an occupational tax.
All of these considerations were disregarded when the court applied
the "home port" theory to bring all of the trucks under state jurisdiction
for purpose of taxation so as to make the flat license fee apply to all of
them. Two outstanding cases expounding the "home port" theory were
relied upon. In the first of them, that of New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Company v. Miller,22 the State of New York imposed a
franchise tax on all New York corporations computed on the amount of
capital stock employed in New York. It levied this tax against the railroad on the basis of the number of cars used by the company within the
state. The taxpayer contended the assessment was unfair as the cars
were constantly in and out of the state and that a proper assessment
could be made only by using some proportional factor such as the average
number of cars in the state throughout the taxing period or the relation
between the track mileage within the state when compared to the mileage
elsewhere. The court, however, held that the state of origin remained
the state of permanent situs of the property, notwithstanding the occasional excursion of the cars to foreign parts. It was also indicated that,
as the cars had not obtained a taxation situs elsewhere, they could properly
be taxed by New York.
The "home port" theory was extended even further in the second
case, that of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State of Minnesota,23 wherein
the state was allowed to tax all of the airplanes used by the carrier, a
Minnesota corporation, although the actual proportion of the mileage
flown in Minnesota was only fourteen per cent. of the total. It was said
that, with the presence of the "home port" in Minnesota, a relation
existed between the carrier and the state which existed with no other
state and the benefits ensuing from that relationship afforded the constitutional foundation for the property tax. While the case was not one
concerning an occupational tax, it should be noted that a requirement
calling for a determination of the exact proportion of property used
within the state had previously been enforced. 24
Selection of the "home port"
produced the result attained in
local corporation and all of its
accomplish that result in a case

theory, as expounded in these two cases,
the Willett case for the carter was a
trucks were based in Illinois, but, to
involving an occupational tax, it was

22 202 U. S. 584, 26 S. Ct. 714, 50 L. Ed. 1155 (1905).
23 322 U. S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed. 1283, 153 A. L. R. 245 (1944).
24 Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 54 S. Ct. 152,
79 L. Ed. 238 (1933).
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necessary to avoid the holding in Barrett v. New York. 25 The city had
there attempted to enforce a municipal ordinance requiring a local license
as a condition precedent to conducting an express business within the
city. The carrier, engaged in both intrastate and interstate transportation,
was able to show that its strictly intrastate activity amounted to only
two per cent. of its total business and, as a consequence, the court held
the tax was invalid and unduly burdensome on interstate commerce. As no
reference was made there to the Miller case, which had previously expounded the "home port" theory, the job of avoidance was not made very
difficult.
The Willett case, then, now establishes the law to be that a local
corporation, engaged in interstate and intrastate activities, with all of
its property based within the state, can be subjected to an occupational
tax without producing a violation of the commerce clause, unless it can
discharge the burden of showing the proportion of its interstate activity
and can demonstrate the fact that the tax constitutes an undue imposition
thereon. Its mere inability to make the division will not be enough to
avoid the levy. As the motor transport industry continues to grow, the
problem of the degree to which interstate motor carriers may expect to
receive protection under the commerce clause will grow more and more
important. Until recently, the United States Supreme Court had greatly
limited the right of a state government to tax such carriers, possibly
because the economic interests of the country demanded that protection
be afforded to fledgling corporations. The court seems to look at the
problem differently today.
R. M. SCHELLY
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONGRESS

MAY
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PROCESS OF
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LAW-WHETHER

ILLEGAL
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OR

NOT

GAMBLING

THERETO-

The Supreme Court of the United States, through the medium of the
recent case of United States v. Kahriger,l had occasion to pass upon the

constitutionality of the highly controversial Gambler's Occupational Tax
Act.2 An information, filed against Kahriger, alleged that he was in the
business of accepting wagers, had willfully failed to register 3 with the
Collector of Internal Revenue, and had failed to pay the occupational
25 232 U. S. 14, 34 S. Ct. 203, 58 L. Ed. 483 (1913).

1-U. S.-, 73 S. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 504 (1953), reversing 105 F. Supp. 322
(1952). Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion as did Mr. Justice
Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurred.
226 U. S. C. § 3285, et seq.
3 Ibid. § 3291.
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tax in question. 4 He moved to dismiss the information on the ground
the statutory sections relied on were unconstitutional for two reasons,
to-wit: (1) because Congress, under the pretense of exercising the taxing
power, had attempted to penalize a form of intrastate activity thereby
usurping a police power reserved to the states, and (2) because the registration provisions violated the privilege against self-incrimination. His
motion having been sustained by the district court, upon a declaration
that the tax measure was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, on direct
appeal, 5 reversed that decision when a majority of the court concluded
the tax statute was constitutional.
In order to reach this decision, the court had to determine three
things, to-wit: (1) whether Congress could lawfully tax a specified business which was not within its power to regulate; (2) whether the penalty
provisions in the tax statute were imposed for a breach of a regulation
which concerned activities in themselves subject to state regulations; and
(3) whether the information required by the registration provisions
amounted to a denial of the privilege against self-incrimination. It
answered the first question in the affirmative, indicating that an act of
Congress which, "on its face," purports to be a proper exercise of the
taxing power may not be regarded as any the less so because the tax
tends to restrict, suppress, or discourage the thing or activity taxed.
In such cases, the court said, it would refuse to inquire into unexpressed
motives which may have impelled Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it. On the second point, the court held that
the regulatory provisions of the tax statute were directly and intimately
related to the collection of a valid tax, hence were obviously supportable
as in aid of the revenue provisions. With regard to the third question,
the court decided that the privilege against self-incrimination applied only
to past acts, not to future acts which may or may not be committed,
and that the information required from the applicant did not force him
to disclose that he had, in the past, been engaged in gambling activities
but merely informed him that, to engage in future business of this type,
he would have to comply with the conditions prescribed in the tax statutes.
Congress, of course, has been given the plenary power "to levy and
collect taxes,"0 which generic phraseology includes all species of taxation:
duties, imposts, and excises, as well as other forms. The only express
limitation upon this power to tax, insofar as excise taxes are concerned,
lies in the fact that "all
excises shall be uniform throughout
Ibid., §3290.
Direct appeal, because of the constitutional issue, is authorized by 18 U. S. C.
§ 3731.
6 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
4
5
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the United States," a limitation which has been interpreted to be measured
merely in terms of geographical uniformity. 7 Except for this limitation,
it is axiomatic that Congress possesses complete discretionary power to
subject every person, every occupation, and every form of property to
such taxation as it may deem necessary and proper to impose s and, while
the primary purpose of taxation has been to obtain revenue, the power
may also be used to accomplish incidental regulatory results. In fact,
as it would be impossible to tax persons, things, and transactions without
generating social and economic consequences of a non-fiscal nature, Congress has heretofore initiated taxation policies intended to discourage
production, consumption, or the transfer of harmful, deleterious, or dangerous commodities 9 or to protect domestic industries against foreign
competition. 10
The absence of a general police power to regulate directly does not

deny the possibility that regulation for ulterior purposes, through the
exercise of a taxing power or some other delegated power, may not have

been furnished to the federal government, providing it with a degree
of police power incidentally derived therefrom. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court has sustained tax measures, despite their regulatory
features and even though they incidentally affected matters ordinarily
considered state concern, with respect to a tariff to encourage domestic

industries in competition with foreign producers,"

a tax on state bank

12
a license
notes which had the effect of driving them out of circulation,

tax on dealers in firearms of the type used mainly by gangsters,' 8 a tax
14
a tax
which discouraged the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine,
15
and a tax on
on the manufacture and sale of certain narcotic drugs,

the transfer of marihuana.

6

A different situation exists, however, when Congress attempts to use
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969 (1900).
s Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869).
7

9 See Grant, "Commerce, Production and the Fiscal Powers of Congress," 45
Yale L. J. 751 (1936).
10 Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1927).
11 The principal case on that point is Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394,
48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1927).
12 The holding in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482
(1869), depends in part on an alternative ground relating to the federal monetary
power.
1s Sonzinsky v. United States. 300 U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554, 81 L. Ed. 772 (1937).
14 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1904).
15 Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 48 S. Ct. 388, 72 L. Ed. 600 (1928);
United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214, 63 L. Ed. 493 (1919).
16 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42, 71 S. Ct. 108, 95 L. Ed. 47 (1950).
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the taxing power for the purpose of regulating matters wholly outside
the scope of any delegated federal power. In that connection, an attempt
to levy a tax on the employment of children under a specified age, 17 a
tax on every bushel of grain involved in a contract of sale for future
delivery,' 8 a tax on retail dealers in malt liquors predicated solely on a
violation of state law, 19 and a tax designed to regulate agricultural production, 20 have been invalidated.
The question naturally generated by the foregoing observations concerns itself with the extent to which the Supreme Court will act to
restrict Congress in the enactment of tax measures coupled with incidental
regulatory features. In an effort to provide some semblance of an answer,
the Supreme Court has evolved two directly contrary tests which appear
to have been mutually intended to strike a balance between the current
economic pattern of the country and the Constitution. The first of these
tests, developed in the case of McCray v. United States,2 ' might be called
the "on the face" test of constitutionality..
The McCray case grew out of the levy, imposed by Congress, of a
tax of ten cents per pound upon oleomargarine which had been artificially
colored to look like butter. The contention was made that this rate was
so high as to justify a presumption that the Congressional motive was not
that a revenue should be secured but that manufacture should be prevented, thereby rendering the act unconstitutional. The statute was upheld as being, upon its face, a revenue measure with the United States
Supreme Court saying that neither the motives of Congress nor the
ultimate effect of the law could be judicially inquired into. The court
then relied on four principles, to-wit: (1) there is a general presumption
of constitutionality which attaches to all statutes; (2) there are no constitutional limits upon the mere rate of taxation; (3) Congress has unlimited discretion in the selection of the objects of taxation; and (4) the
judiciary should not inquire into or explore the motives of Congress
which led to the exercise of the delegated power. This more or less
mechanically produced result was the one which could be expected to
17 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 47 (1922).
But see United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed.
609 (1941), wherein the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. 0. § 201 set seq., was
upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power, leading to an extention of congressional control over sub-standard labor conditions.
18 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 823 (1922). But see Board
of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839 (1923),
wherein the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., was upheld as a
valid exercise of the interstate commerce power.
19 United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223, 80 L. Ed. 233 (1935).
20 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1935).
21195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1904).
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flow from the use of the label of "a
application was correct or not.

revenue measure,"

whether the
22

The second test, achieved in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company,
might be dubbed the "purposes and effects" test. Congress once sought to
prevent the employment in industry of children of tender years by providing for a tax of ten per cent on the net profits for the year earned by those
who knowingly employed children within the prescribed age limits during
any portion of the year. The Supreme Court decided that the act was
unconstitutional because the various provisions of the statute indicated an
intention to regulate matters over which Congress could claim no authority. The decision rested on several points, to-wit: (1) the tax was suggestive of a punitive purpose in that the amount of the tax did not vary
with the amount of the thing being taxed; (2) the tax law drew a distinction between willful and unwitting employment of minors, a distinction
more nearly appropriate in a criminal law rather than a revenue measure;
(3) the statute provided for elaborate regulation of conduct over which
Congress had no control; and (4) such regulation of conduct was paramount and dominant rather than the incidental regulation typical of a
revenue measure. Under this test, the validity of a tax statute would be
determined by its purposes and effects as disclosed by a sensible construction of all of its provisions.

There is no doubt that the tax statute involved in the instant could
readily be sustained by an application of the "on the face" test of constitutionality, particularly since it was wrapped in the "verbal cellophane
of a revenue measure," 23 even though the holding would permit Congress
to achieve results in an area where it had no direct power to act and where
the attainment of social reform was the primary purpose with thought of
revenue a secondary matter. This rather dim acknowledgment, however,
leaves one in quest for a doctrine sufficient to sustain a regulatory tax
which would fall within the precise limits of the taxing power. The
wisdom of the legislature cannot be questioned, but the promotion of social
reform could have been accomplished in another fashion without causing
the guise of a regulatory tax measure to overshadow the police power of
the states. 24 Justification of the principle that Congress may use its
powers to aid the states in the enforcement of criminal laws may be found
in such instances as the provision for supplying information to state officers
after the same has been gathered by the division of identification and
22 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922).
23 See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, -

U. S. - at -, 73 S.
Ct. 510 at 518, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 504 at 513.
24 See Baker, "Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime," 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
Rmw
197 (1951).
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information of the federal Bureau of Investigation, 25 as in the federal
kidnapping act, 28 and in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. 27 Legislation of that character would have been more in keeping with the fundamental purpose here sought to be subserved.
R. JURCZAKrEWICZ
CORPORATIONS - MEMBERS AND STOCKHOLDERS WHETHER MINORITY
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oF SUm TENDERED--Certain minority stock-

holders, in the New York case of In re Silverman,' having duly objected
to the consolidation of their corporation with another, thereafter filed a
petition to secure a determination as to the valuation of their shares in
the manner prescribed by the New York Stock Corporation Law. 2 Dissatisfied with the valuation placed on the stock by an appraiser, they then
took the matter before the Supreme Court, Special Term, only to have
the appraisal there affirmed. Pending an appeal to the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court, several of the dissenting shareholders voluntarily
turned over their certificates to the corporation and were paid the adjudicated rate. Upon this showing, the Appellate Division granted a motion,
filed on behalf of the corporation, to dismiss the appeal as to these individuals, relying on the idea that the dissenters had relinquished all their
rights in the shares and had thereby turned the appeal into a moot case.
On further appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, this holding was
reversed when the high court concluded that awards made in stock valuation proceedings were to be regarded as among the listed exceptions to
the general rule that a litigant may not accept the benefits of a judgment
and also be permitted to appeal therefrom. 3
255 U. S. C. §340.

§ 1201 et seq.
Ibid. § 2311 et seq.
1305 N. Y. 13, 110 N. E. (2d) 402 (1953), reversing 117 N. Y. S. (2d) 920 (App.
Div., 1952). Froessel and Conway, JJ., dissented. The report of the proceedings
at Special Term appears in 115 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (1952).
2Thompson, N. Y. Consol. Laws, 1950 Supp., Stock Corporation Law, Art. 3,
§ 21. An interesting sidelight on statutes of this character is afforded by the
decision in the case of Booma v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., - Mass. -,
111 N. E. (2d) 742 (1953). In that case, a person who owned no shares on the
date notice was given of a special stockholders' meeting to vote on a proposed
consolidation but who acquired and secured registration of shares prior to the
date of the meeting, gave notice of dissent and demanded appraisal of his stock.
Relief was denied on the ground that he was not a person entitled to have the
benefit of the statute.
3 For a general discussion of this rule and its exceptions, see 2 Am. Jur., Appeal
and Error, §§ 214-5; 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, §§ 215-6; and annotation in 169
A. L. R. 987 and in 29 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1.
26 18 U. S. C.

27
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To offset the common law doctrine that no change could be effected
in the form of a corporate organization except by the unanimous consent
of all shareholders, 4 forty-two states today have statutes regulating the
procedure for corporate merger and consolidation upon the vote of less
than all the outstanding stock. These statutes do, however, grant recognition to a right on the part of dissenting shareholders to withdraw from
the enterprise and to have the value of their shares determined and
repurchased by the corporation. 5 Typically, these statutes provide for the
appointment by a court of disinterested appraisers, usually three in number, who are directed to place a valuation on the stock.6 If the valuation
so fixed is not objected to by either the shareholder or the corporation,
it forms the basis upon which the shares are repurchased. If, however,
either party is not satisfied with the appraisers' determination, the right
to secure judicial review thereof is made dependent upon the particular
statute governing the merger or consolidation procedure.
In that regard, the New York statute involved in the instant case provided that, upon objection to the appraised valuation of the stock, the
objector had the right to secure review only if action was taken to that
end within a designated time. The initial utilization of this right by the
dissenting shareholders concerned in the instant case gave rise to the
particular problem under discussion. It should be noted, however, that
the question as to whether or not this problem could arise in other jurisdictions would have to depend upon whether the particular statute makes
provision for an appeal under similar circumstances. A survey of the
various state statutes covering appraisal procedure would seem to indicate
that such statutes fall into one or the other of three possible categories.
A small number of these statutes not only declare that the valuation
of the appraisers is to be final and binding on all parties but also expressly
deny any right of appeal therefrom. 7 As a consequence, in these jurisdictions, the problem which faced the court in the instant case could never
arise. In several other states, forming the second category, the statutes
contain no expression with regard to the allowance or denial of a right
to appeal, these statutes merely stating that the appraiser's determination
4 Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dee. 617
(1867). But see Banet v. Alton & Sangamon R. R. Co., 13 Ill. 504 (1851).
5 Statutes bearing on the subject appear to be lacking in the states of Miss.,
N. D., S. D., Tex., Utah, and W. Va.
6 Mass. Ann. Laws 1948, Ch. 156, § 46e, serves as a good illustration. See also
Lattin, "A Reappraisal of the Appraisal Statutes," 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1165 (1940).
7 See, for example, Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 450.54, which declares:
"The
appraisers shall submit their determination to the circuit court for confirmation
and upon entry of an order confirming said report their determination shall be
final and conclusive and from such order there shall be no appeal."
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is to be "final and conclusive. "8 Whether an appeal could, by implication,
be had in these jurisdictions would have to depend entirely upon the
interpretation which might be placed upon such language. A typical
example of one possible interpretation is to be found in the Delaware case
of Chicago Corporation v. Munds,9 where the court held that, under the
language of the then Delaware statute, 10 the appraisers' valuation would
actually be final and binding upon all parties except for those reasons
which would make any appraisal open to inquiry. It is true that the court
there proceeded to modify the appraised value for the reason that the
appraisers had considered only the market value of the stock in arriving
at the determination, but it is doubtful whether further appeal from the
modified appraisal would have been permitted. It is, therefore, unlikely
that the instant problem could arise in these jurisdictions.
The third, and final, category includes by far a majority of the states,
those possessing statutes wherein allowance of appeal to a higher court
has been given legislative approval. In these jurisdictions, the problem
under discussion could well arise and the holding in the instant case may
provide persuasive authority for similar holdings. As the Illinois statute
in point,"' except for the element of compulsory appraisal, is like that of
New York, it becomes a matter of interest as to whether or not, given a
set of facts similar to those of the instant case, an Illinois court would also
permit a dissenting shareholder to accept the benefits of a judgment for
the value of his shares and still pursue an appeal therefrom. A survey of
Illinois decisions discloses no case directly in point, although cases do exist
in which review has been had over the point of the correctness of the
2
amount awarded.1
The attitude of the Illinois courts in analogous situations, however,
might be said to be revealed by the case of Holt v. Rees13 where the court
said: "A party cannot accept money directed to be paid to him by decree,
and then ask reversal on the ground that it did not give him enough."14
8 The statutes of Colo., Conn., Ida., Mass., Mont., Neb., N. H., N. M., and Wash.,
would appear to be of that form.
9 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934). The holding therein was followed in the
later case of Root v. York Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 351, 50 A. (2d) 52 (1946).
10 See Del. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 65, § 61. The statute was afterwards amended
to provide for review: Del. Corp. Laws Ann. 1951, Ch. 65, § 61.

11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.70, providing for a judicial determination of the valuation of the dissenter's shares, states: "The practice, procedure,
and judgment shall be governed by the Civil Practice Act of this State." Appeal
is regulated by ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201.
12 The cases are collected in a note in Ill. Bus. Corp. Act Annotated (Burdette
Smith Co., Chicago, 1947), Vol. 1, pp. 285-7.
'346 Ill. 181 (1867).
14 46 Ill. 181 at 183.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

This statement may be regarded as typical of a consistent position taken
by the Illinois courts in denying to a litigant, after he has accepted an
award or legal advantage under a judgment, a right to secure a review of
such adjudication as might again put in issue his right to the benefit
15
conferred.
Two principal exceptions do appear, but neither would appear to be
helpful in this connection. One such exception notes that there is no waiver
of the right to appeal where the benefit accepted under the judgment is
conceded by all parties to be due.' 6 The second supposes that no waiver
occurs where the appeal is taken from a separable part of the decree not
involved in the payment made. 17 While considerable latitude has been
exercised in the application of these exceptions by the courts of other jurisdictions,' 8 they appear to have been narrowly construed in Illinois,"9
,hence it is unlikely that either would prove to be of assistance in a matter
of the type under consideration.
While a contrary holding might seem to put the dissenting shareholder
at a disadvantage, since he may be ill able to afford the expense and delay
of prosecuting his appeal, 20 the legislature may have considered the liberal
provision for interest on the whole amount finally awarded 2 1 as a sufficient
offset to this burden. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Illinois court would
follow the New York view expounded in the instant case. The decision
does suggest, however, a possible point for further legislative consideration.
The statute might be revised to provide for the deposit in court of the
15 Gridley v. Wood, 305 Ill. 376, 137 N. E. 251 (1922) ; Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill.
287, 136 N. E. 659 (1922); Langher v. Glos, 276 Ill. 342, 114 N. E. 590 (1916);
'Corwin v. Shoup, 76 Ill. 246 (1875); Ruckman v. Alwood, 44 InI. 183 (1867);
Thomas v. Negus, 7 Il1. 700 (1845) ; Morgan v. Ladd, 7 Ill. 414 (1845). See also
'Powell v. Amestoy, 337 Ill. App. 631, 86 N. E. (2d) 557 (1949).
16 In Schaeffer v. Ardery, 238 Ill. 557, 87 N. E. 343 (1909), for example, it was
held that the acceptance of tax money admittedly due did not preclude the tax
collector from appealing from an unfavorable decision concerning disputed taxes.
17 Kerner v. Thompson, 365 Ill. 149, 6 N. E. (2d) 131 (1937).
15 Note the critical discussion of the case of Bass v. Ring, 210 Minn. 598, 299
N. W. 679 (1941), appearing in the annotation in 169 A. L. R. 985 at 1031.
19 Boylan v. Boylan, 349 Il1. 471, 182 N. E. 614 (1932).
In that case, the court,
concerned with an appeal from a decree of divorce, held the wife's acceptance of
a sum awarded for attorney's fees was sufficient to preclude her from questioning
other parts of the decree, first because the husband had not admitted liability for
such fees, and second, because the decree was deemed to be a unit and 'not composed of separable parts.
20 See Pierce, "Right of Dissenting Shareholders," in Current Trends in State
Legislation (Univ. of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 1952), pp. 145-63, particularly p. 151.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.70, provides for interest on the amount
fixed as fair value of the shares "to the date of such judgment." The judgment
itself would draw interest at the rate of 5% from date of rendition: ibid., Ch. 74,
§ 3.
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sum which the corporation is willing to pay for the dissenter's shares,
freeing it from the obligation to pay interest thereon, with recognition
of a right to the withdrawal thereof on the part of the dissenter without
jeopardizing the right to appeal, but with further costs, expenses, and
interest claims to abide the eventual result. 22 Such a revision would
embody the good features of the New York ase without leaving its acceptance open to the chance of judicial views on the point.
H. KEm
DIvORCE-DEFENSES-WHETHIIER

OR NOT THE RECRIMINATORY MISFOR DIVORCE
-Construction
of a statute relating to recrimination' was required in the
recent California case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh.2 The plaintiff there sued
her husband for divorce, charging extreme cruelty. In response thereto,
the defendant filed a cross-complaint for divorce, also relying on the
ground of extreme cruelty. The lower court, after receiving proof of the
alleged facts, found that the acts of each party had been provoked by the
other; that each had been guilty of a cause for divorce; that the doctrine
of recrimination applied; and that neither party was entitled to a divorce.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the judgment was reversed
principally because the court decided that cruelty which had been provoked
would not give rise to a cause of action for divorce, hence would not afford
a basis for the defense of recrimination, but it also interpreted the statute
in question so as to permit the trial court to exercise a sound judicial discretion as to the effect to be given to recrimination. It thereby promulgated
an opportunity for the application of the startling doctrine that a court
could grant a divorce, even though both parties were at fault, provided the
relationship of husband and wife had become such that the legitimate
objects of matrimony had been destroyed and a continuation of the mar3
riage would be against public policy.
CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF OPERATES TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION

22 Laws 1947, p. 905, held unconstitutional for reasons not here pertinent in
Department of Public Works v. Gorbe, 409 Ill. 211, 98 N. E. (2d) 730 (1951),
noted in 30 CHIOAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 142, could serve as an illustration for an
acceptable model.
1 Deering Cal. Civ. Code 1941, § 111, provides that "divorces must be denied
upon [a] showing . . . [of] recrimination." Section 122 thereof defines recrimination as a "showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff
in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce."
239 Cal. (2d) 858, 250 P. (2d) 598 (1952), reversing 109 Cal. App. 335, 240 P.
(2d) 625 (1952).
3 Edmonds, J., and Shenk, J., each wrote a dissenting opinion in which they
concurred In the reversal because of the failure of the lower court to distinguish
between recrimination and provocation, but voiced the opinion that the statute
was mandatory in character so that, any time it appeared that both parties were
at fault, the defense of recrimination would become absolute and the trial court
would then lack power to do anything except to dismiss the action.
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The doctrine of recrimination, originating in the twelfth century
turies later when Lord Stowell, sitting in an English ecclesiastical court,
Roman canon law, 4 appears to have been designed solely for the purpose
of protecting the property interests of the wife where both parties had
been guilty of adultery. It did not appear on the English scene until cendecided the case of Forster v. Forster,5 applied the doctrine of recrimination, and denied a divorce to the parties on that ground. While later
English courts appear to have realized the consequences of recrimination,
in that cohabitation between the parties was usually discontinued and immorality was usually increased, such courts were reluctant to overrule
the doctrine so established until the situation was remedied by the Matrimonial Causes Act 6 and its subsequent amendments 7 which operated to
transfer divorce jurisdiction from ecclesiastical tribunals to the common
law courts and empowered the judges thereof to exercise a discretion in
the matter of granting a divorce where both parties were at fault.
One of the leading cases in the United States on the subject of
recrimination as an absolute bar to divorce, oddly enough, is the California
case of Conant v. Conant.8 It appears to have been instrumental in causing
the enactment, in 1872, of the California statute here in question and it
achieved the absolute bar to divorce result promulgated earlier by Lord
Stowell. Since then, the doctrine of recrimination so developed has been
explained on a number of theories. One theory, used most frequently,
rests on the doctrine of unclean hands and is based on the equitable
principle that the court should not aid one who has been guilty of inequitable conduct, at least in relation to the matter in which he seeks
relief from the court. 9 Another explanation follows the mutually dependent
covenant theory.' 0 Under it, the marriage contract is considered as one of
mutually dependent covenants so that, if both parties have been guilty of
a breach of any of these covenants, neither can be granted relief in the
form of divorce.
Still another theory, one likewise calling for a denial of divorce, has
4 Beamer, "The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings," 10 U. of
Kansas City L. Rev. 213 (1941).
51 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. 504 (1790).
6 20 & 21 Vict., c. 86 (1857).

7 See 1 Edw. VIII, c. 31 (1936), and 1 Geo. VI, c. 57, § 4 (1937).
8 10 Cal. 249 (1858).
9 See, for example, Thorem v. Thorem, 188 Minn. 153, 246 N. W. 674 (1933),
and Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193 N. E. 657 (1933).
See, however, the
10 MacMillan v. MacMillan, 113 Wash. 250, 193 P. 673 (1928).
cases of Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P. (2d) 189 (1937), and Huff v. Huff,
178 Wash. 684, 35 P. (2d) 86 (1934), applying the doctrine of comparative rectitude in a state where there is no statute on the point.
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been designated as the pari delicto, or equal fault, doctrine"1 from which
there has appeared, by implication, a subordinate doctrine to the effect
that, where the parties are not equally at fault, divorce may be granted
to the one least guilty. This last mentioned doctrine, sometimes designated
as the doctrine of comparative rectitude, although designed to eliminate
some of the anomalous consequences of recrimination, has not yet received
wide acceptance either in statutory or case form. It has, however, been
12
adopted in Iowa through the medium of the case of Smith v. Smith,
and the courts of several other states, by way of dictum, have stated that,
in a sufficiently extreme case, a decree for divorce might be given to the
least guilty party.13
Independently of case-made law on the point, thirty-two American
jurisdictions make some provision by statute with respect to recrimination
while all others, with the exception of Connecticut, recognize some form of
the concept by judicial decision. 14 Twenty-nine of these states have statutes
which seemingly make it mandatory to deny divorce when the defendant
proves a recriminatory defense, 1 but many call for a consideration of
certain specific principles which must be complied with before recrimination may be established. In some instances, for example, recrimination
only applies where the ground relied on is of the same statutory character
as that asserted by the plaintiff.' 6 In others, the recriminatory charge is
confined to adultery only and does not apply to other grounds for divorce,17
nor may it be applied where the prior adultery has been condoned.' 8 In
"Johns v. Johns, 29 Ga. 718 (1860).
12 64 Iowa 682, 21 N. W. 137 (1884).
See also Innskeep v. Innskeep, 5 Iowa
204 (1857).
'3 Hoagland v. Hoagland, 218 Ky. 636, 291 S. W. 1044 (1927) ; Kolaks v. Kolaks,
75 S. W (2d) 600 (Mo. App., 1934) ; Mueller v. Mueller, 165 Ore. 153, 105 P. (2d)
1095 (1940).
14 See Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 2, § 78, at p. 87.
15 An exception could be noted with respect to the statutes of Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Nevada, which expressly authorize the exercise of discretion. See Kans. Gen.
Stats. 1949, § 60-1506. as applied in Lassen v. Lassen, 134 Kan. 436, 7 P. (2d) 120
(1932) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. 1951, Tit. 12, § 1275, and the case of Panther v. Panther,
147 Okla. 131, 295 P. 219 (1931) ; Nev. Comp. Laws 1931, § 9467.01. The District of
Columbia Code received a similar interpretation in the case of Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 79 App. 4. C. 153, 144 F. (2d) 509 (1944).
16 See Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, § 12732; Neb. Comp. Stats. 1929, Ch. 42, § 304;
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1931, § 35-110. In Carter v. Carter, 151 S. W. (2d) 884 at
885 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941), the court stated: "To bar divorce, complainant's misconduct need not be of equal degree with that of defendant's, but must be of the
same general character."
17 Ala. Stat. 1940, Tit. 34, § 26; Ariz. Stat. 1939, Ch. 27, § 806. See also Pavlevitch
v. Pavlevitch, 50 N. M. 224, 174 P. (2d) 826 (1946), overruling Chavez v. Chavez,
39 N. M. 480, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935).
'8 Dela. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 86, § 5; W. Va. Code Ann. 1937, § 4714; Wis. Stats.
1937, § 247.10.
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most of these statutes, however, the bar is stated as being applicable only
to mutual charges of adultery 19 although the ground may have been given
wider application as the result of judicial expansion upon statutory language. 20 In only three instances can it be said that legislatures have beensufficiently impressed with the doctrine of comparative rectitude to make it
the statutory ground for decision in cases calling for the application
21
thereof.
Despite this, a slow trend toward the acceptance of that doctrine-may
22
be noticed even in the face of certain evident reversals on the point.
Much as the instant holding may be open to criticism for its failure to fol23
low what would seem to be a positive statute on the point, the result
attained appears to be far more equitable and desirable than has been
true with respect to many of the earlier holdings. To say the least, it discloses a degree of liberality in the matter of granting divorce more nearly
in accord with present day practices.2

A. SrLvER

19 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 11, In part states: "If it shall appear . . .
that both parties have been guilty of adultery, when adultery is the ground of
complaint, then no divorce shall be decreed."
20 See, for example, the case of Grady v. Grady, 266 Ill. App. 271 (1931), where,
on a complaint for divorce charging adultery, the defendant recriminated by
charging cruelty and desertion and divorce was denied. See also Zacharias,
"Recrimination in the Divorce Law of Illinois," 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVrEw 217-39
(1936).
21 See statutes cited in note 15, ante.
22 The Michigan Supreme Court, in Legatski v. Legatski, 230 Mich. 186, 203 N. W.
69 (1925), retreated from the position it had taken in the case of Weiss v. Weiss,
174 Mich. 431, 140 N. W. 587 (1913). See also the case of Hove v. Hove, 219 Minn.
590, 18 N. W. (2d) 580 (1945), where a court, not yet committed either way,
refused to adopt the principle.
23 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1945), 2d Ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 358, commenting on the California statute, states: "It is simple and
unambiguous and is fairly based on the reasoning given by the courts for the doctrine of recrimination. This type of statute provides that in a suit for divorce
for any cause a defendant may show recrimination by showing that the plaintiff
is guilty of any cause. It is the same rule as exists in states having no statutes
on the subject. Denial of the divorce is mandatory."
24 Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. I. Rev. 749 at 751 (1936),
declares that "the manner in which present day divorces are handled is extremely
liberal. It is only in increasingly rare cases that the courts refuse to grant divorces.
Free consent divorce exists in the United States today as fact, not merely as a
phenomenon of the divorce mill, but as the standard practice throughout the
country."
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ADOPTION-JUDICIAL
WAIVE

STATUTORY

PROCEEDINGS-WHETHER

REQUIREMENT

THAT

CHILD

OR
TO

NOT
BE

COURT

ADOPTED

MAY
MUST

ACKNOWLEDGE HIS CONSENT THERETO IN OPEN COURT--The holding of the

Appellate Court for the First District in the recent case of Noel v. Olszewski' emphasizes the mandatory nature of the statutory requirement that
a child over fourteen years of age who is to be adopted in an Illinois proceeding must appear in open court and there acknowledge his written
consent 2 if the court is to have jurisdiction to enter a valid decree of
adoption. The action was one to establish title to realty in which the incompetent on whose behalf the action was being prosecuted died before a
decree could be entered. Claiming to be sole heir of the incompetent, the
intervening petitioner sought to be allowed to be substituted as plaintiff.
The issue of heirship thereby presented was complicated by the fact that
the incompetent, prior to his incompetency and death, had purported
to adopt three other persons as his children and two of these, represented
by a guardian ad litem, actively opposed the petition. Evidence showed
that the adoption decree on which they relied expressly waived the statutory requirement that they appear in open court for the purpose of consenting to the adoption inasmuch as they were then residing in Poland.
The trial court held the adoption decree valid and dismissed the intervening petition for want of equity.
On appeal by the intervenor, directly placing the validity of the adoption decree in issue, the attention of the Appellate Court was focussed
upon the absence of the allegedly adopted children from the proceeding,
leading to the holding that the adoption decree was void. The opinion in
the case, first of its kind since the enactment of the new statute regulating
adoption proceedings, rests upon three points, to-wit: (1) the statutory
language is clear, and there is nothing in Section 3-3 of the Adoption
Act to permit or to justify a waiver of appearance in open court; (2) a
proceeding in Illinois for the adoption of children is one of in personam
character wherein, absent proper consent as required by statute, the court
may not obtain jurisdiction by substituted service; and (3) the consent
given by a guardian ad litern in an adoption proceeding will not provide
the "substantial compliance" with statutory requirements called for by
the decision ih Hopkins v. Gifford.3 The instant holding, therefore, goes
a long way toward establishing the mandatory nature of the statutory
1350 Il. App. 264, 112 N. E. (2d) 727 (1953).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3--3.
3 309 Ill. 363, 141 N. E. 178 (1923).
actually appeared in open court.

In that case, the children to be adopted had
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provisions 4 and merits close attention for the effect it may have on other
war-generated adoption decrees.

DIVORCE--CuSTODY AND SUPPORT
TiON

oF DIVORCE

CREE CONTINUES

OF CHILDREN-WHETHER

COURT TO MODIFY CUSTODY PROVISIONS
AFTER

DEATH

OF

PARENT

TO

WHOM

JURISDIC-

OF DIVORCE

DE-

CUSTODY

WAS

AWARDED--Increased flexibility in procedure in certain custody cases is
very likely to result from the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in the
case of Jarrettv. Jarrett.) A decree of absolute divorce had there awarded
custody of a minor child to the wife. On her death two years later, the
father filed a motion to amend the decree so as to provide that custody
should be awarded to him. The maternal grandparent, with whom the child
had lived prior to the divorce, filed an intervening petition seeking to
secure custody. The Appellate Court for the Third District reversed a
decree in favor of the intervenor and directed that custody be granted to
the father. After petition for leave to appeal had been granted, the intervenor argued before the Supreme Court that the custody jurisdiction of
the divorce court had terminated upon the death of the parent to whom
custody had been awarded, 2 hence the proper remedy of the father was by
way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed,
rejecting the intervenor's argument, and holding that the custody jurisdiction of a divorce court survives the death of the parent, thereby permitting it to continue to deal with custody problems.
Decisions in other jurisdictions formed the chief base for the intervenor's argument that death of a party to a divorce case terminates the
proceeding altogether, both with regard to divorce and with regard to
matters of custody and the like, since the latter are merely incidental to
the former. 3 Looking to the Illinois statute, however, the Supreme Court
found no express limitation upon the duration of the custody jurisdiction,
but more nearly an implication that the jurisdiction should continue, for
the statute states: "The court may, on application, from time to time,
make such alterations in the ... care, custody and support of the children,
as shall appear reasonable and proper. "4 While no Illinois decision appears
4 But see Dickholtz v. Littfin, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N. E. (2d) 89 (1950), noted
in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW R VIEW 183, dealing with the right of the natural parent
to withdraw a consent to adoption prior to entry of the decree.
1415 Ill. 126, 112 N. E. (2d) 694 (1953), affirming 384 Ill. App. 1, 107 N. E. (2d)
622 (1952).

2 Although the intervenor did not raise this question until the filing of a petition
for rehearing in the Appellate Court, the point was not waived as it is permissible
to attack jurisdiction of the subject matter at any time during the proceeding.
3 See, for example, the cases of Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N. E. 595
(1914), and Leclerc v. Leclerc, 85 N. H. 121, 155 A. 249 (1931).
4 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
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to have limited this jurisdiction, there are persuasive statements in the
case of Stafford v. Stafford5 tending to support jurisdiction, and some cases
exist in which the divorce court actually exercised jurisdiction to modify
custody provisions after the death of one of the parties, although doing so
without directly considering its power in that regard. 6 Indeed, although
habeas corpus proceedings have been used under like circumstances, 7 two
cases commenced in that form indicate that modification of custody
arrangements ought to come from the court by which the decree was
rendered. 8
The Supreme Court has thus refused to follow the so-called "prevailing" view that custody jurisdiction must terminate along with divorce
jurisdiction upon the death of one party to the proceedings.9 In so doing,
the decision seems entirely proper on principle for, while it would take
a divorce action to invoke the custody jurisdiction of the court, the problem of determining what would be best for the welfare of the child is
one which necessarily continues throughout the minority of the child and
should not be made to depend upon the continued existence of both
parents.' 0 The instant decision, to say the least, possesses the virtue of
giving an authoritative and definite declaration of law on the point.

PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSIONS-HEARING

AND

REHEARING-WHETHER

PROVISION IN ILLINOIS PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT OPERATES TO
CREATE A TWO-YEAR PERIOD Op REPosF--Recently, in the case of Illinois

REHEARING

Bell Telephone Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission,' the City of
Chicago charged that the Illinois Commerce Commission lacked jurisdiction
to consider certain rate schedules filed by the telephone company inasmuch
as less than two years had elapsed since the granting of an earlier rate
order in favor of the utility. The contention so advanced was based on the
2
concluding sentence of Section 67 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act,
5 299 Ill. 438, 132 N. E. 452 (1921).
6 Note particularly the cases of Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Ill. App. 506, 71 N. E.
(2d) 920 (1947), and Price v. Price, 329 Ill. App. 176, 67 N. E. (2d) 311 (1946).

7 Smith v. Bruner, 312 Ill. App. 658, 39 N. E. (2d) 67 (1942); People ex rel.
Good v. Hoxie, 175 Ill. App. 563 (1912).
8 People ex rel. Hanawalt v. Small, 237 Ill. 169, 86 N. E. 733 (1918), cited with
approval in People ex rel. Burr v. Fahey, 230 Ill. App. 143 (1923).
9 See annotation in 74 A. L. R. 1352 at 1357.
10 This distinction was carefully made in the recent case of Cone v. Cone,
Fla. -, 62 So. (2d) 907 (1953).
1 Sub. nom. City of Chicago v. Ill. Commerce Commission ex rel. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 414 Ill. 275, 111 N. E. (2d) 329 (1953).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3, § 71.
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which reads: "Only one rehearing shall be granted by the Commission;
but this shall not be construed to prevent any party from filing a petition
setting up a new and different state of facts after two years, and invoking
the action of the Commission thereon." The city had moved the commission to cancel certain rate schedules filed by the utility but its motion was
denied.3 On appeal from such denial, the city was successful in the trial
court 4 but lost on further direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court 5
when that court, considering the spirit and purpose of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act as a whole, concluded that the language in question did not
constitute a two-year limitation on the right of a utility to seek revision
of its rate structure.6
The Supreme Court, in arriving at that decision, while recognizing
that no precise decision had previously been attained on the point, took
into consideration the fact that objections of the type in question had
been consistently overruled by the commission throughout a period of over
thirty years and that the commission had never been directly reversed on
that ground by any court. This pattern of conduct was deemed persuasive
of an indication of the legislative intent in the matter since the legislature,
although aware of these repeated rulings, had revised the Public Utilities
Act once, and had amended it several times, without changing the language
of the disputed sentence. The court also pointed out that this question
had been passed upon, at least inferentially, in the case of Chicago Railways Company v. City of Chicago,7 where it must have been considered as
rejected, even though not discussed, since it involved a jurisdictional
question.8
Despite this, the court, seeking for the legislative intent, approached
the problem from a two-fold aspect. The first involved an analysis of the
particular sentence when viewed in the light of the spirit and primary pur3 The commission did, however, suspend the proposed new rates on other grounds,
and the utility appealed from such holding.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3. § 72 authorizes judicial review of any
commission order at the instance of any party affected thereby.
5 Ibid., § 73, provides for direct appeal.
6 Actually, the court decided the city had no right to seek review of a favorable
order even though such order passed on other grounds than those urged by the city.
This aspect of the decision was more than mere dictum, however, since the same
issue came before the court on an appeal taken by the utility, progressing through
other trial stages but consolidated with the city's appeal when the matter reached
the Supreme Court. The case also deals with important aspects of public utility
law concerning the applicable base for rate-making purposes. Treatment thereof
has been reserved for discussion elsewhere in this publication.
7292 Ill. 190, 126 N. E. 585 (1920).
8 At 414 Ill. 275, p. 280, 111 N. E. (2d) 329, p. 332, the court stated: "It was the
rule then, as now, that it is the duty of this court to rule on a jurisdictional defect
at any stage of the proceeding that such a defect became apparent."
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pose of the Act itself. Since one such purpose was "to set up machinery
for continuous regulation as changes in conditions require," 9 it would
seem obvious that a restrictive sentence such as the one in issue, if extended
literally, would be directly opposed to the general purpose of maintaining
a flexible system of regulation capable of coping with possible rapid and
radical changes in conditions having bearing on a rate structure. The
second aspect of approach had been utilized in the case of American Steel
Foundries v. Gordon,10 where it was pointed out that any particular
clause of a statute ought to be construed in the light of the entire statute."
Accordingly, the court examined the whole statute, giving particular attention to two other sections thereof, 12 leading to the conclusion that if the
sentence in issue was to be construed in the manner contended for by the
city it would then be in conflict therewith. Reasoning of the character
under consideration well illustrates the paramount importance of considering and resolving statutory ambiguities with a breadth of vision capable
of permitting an unbiased comparative analysis of the relative importance
of particular statutory provisions observed in their proper perspective.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE-UNEMPLOYMENT

TION-WHETHER

PERSONS FORCED INTO UNEMPLOYMENT

LABOR DISPUTE ARE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSA-

BECAUSE OF A

COMPENSATION

BENE-

FITS WHEN THEIR EMPLOYER REPLACES THEM AT TIME OF RESUMPTION OF

PRODUCTION-In the case of Robert S. Abbott Publishing Company v. An-

nunzio,' certain composing room employees in a publishing plant left their
jobs because of a labor dispute with their employer. Without any settlement
of that dispute, the employer began hiring other workers, and, within a
period of several months, had the composing room fully staffed with normal
production resumed. The replaced employees then made claim to unemployment compensation benefits, but relief was denied by a deputy administrator on the ground the unemployment existed because of a labor dispute.2 Claimants then appealed to the Director of Labor who found that
the circumstance of their continued unemployment had changed, that they
were no longer unemployed due to a stoppage of work which existed
9 414 Ill. 275 at 281, 111 N. E. (2d) 329 at 333.
10404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 (1949).
11 See, in particular, 404 Ill. 174 at 180, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 at 468.
12 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3, § 36, prescribing the only method by
which a utility may change its rates, contains no time limitation as to when rate
schedules may be filed. Ibid., § 75, impliedly permits a utility to file a rate schedule within one year or less after rates have gone into effect.
1414 Ill. 559, 112 N. E. (2d) 101 (1953).
2The decision rested on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §223(d). A comparable provision appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 434.
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because of a labor dispute at the premises at which they were last employed, and were, therefore, entitled to the unemployment compensation
benefits sought. This decision was affirmed on judicial review before a
trial court and, on appeal by the employer to the Illinois Supreme Court,8
that court also affirmed when it held that on replacement of the former
employees and resumption of normal operations, a work stoppage because
of a labor dispute could be regarded as at an end even though the dispute
had not been settled in the normal fashion.
The problem in the instant case, arising under former Section 7(d)
of the Unemployment Compensation Act, 4 appears to be one which has
never before been passed upon by the Supreme Court of this state,
although it has arisen elsewhere, 5 and the view adopted accords with the
majority view on the point. In only one case, that of Board of Review v.
Mid-Continent Petrolewm Corporation,6 has a different result been achieved,
and the holding therein may be said to be discredited by the fact that the
claimants there concerned were not represented by counsel, that two
judges dissented from the holding therein, and because the statute involved
7
was subsequently modified.
It should be noted, however, that previously, when construing the
statutory phrase "stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute, " the Illinois court has placed emphasis on the presence of a "labor
dispute"' as the ground for denial of benefits,8 particularly since it once
expressed the belief that the legislature did not intend "to finance strikes
out of unemployment compensation funds." 9 The instant holding reflects
a change, for the emphasis has now been placed on the presence, or
Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 230. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 520.
See note 2, ante.
5 Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P. (2d) 528, 173 A.L.R. 480 (1947) ; M. A.
Ferst Limited v. Huiet, 78 Ga. App. 855, 52 S.E. (2d) 336 (1949) ; Carnegie-Illinois
Steel Corporation v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. (2d) 662 (1947);
Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 188 Md. 677, 53 A.
(2d) 579 (1947); Lawrence Baking Company v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W. (2d) 260, 154 A.L.R. 660 (1944) ; Mag3
4

ner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. (2d) 689 (1942) ; Deshler Broom Factory v.
Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N.W. (2d) 332 (1942); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306,
13 S.E. (2d) 544 (1941). Contra: Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P. (2d) 69 (1943).
6 Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141
P. (2d) 69 (1943).
7 Okla. Laws 1936, Ch. 52, § 5 (c) (2) (d). Compare with Okla. Stat. Ann. 1937,
1952 Supp., Tit. 40, § 215 (c) (2) (d).
8 American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 88 N.E. (2d) 465 (1949);
Fash v. Gordon, 398 Il1. 210, 75 N.E. (2d) 294; Local Union v. Gordon, 396 I1.
293, 71 N.E. (2d) 637 (1947); Walgreen Company v. Murphy, 386 Ii. 32, 53
N.E. (2d) 390 (1944).
9 Walgreen Company v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32 at 36, 53 N.E. (2d) 390 at 393 (1944).
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absence, of a "stoppage of work," without regard to the fundamental cause
thereof, so as to make the claimant "unemployed" if the plant or department is back in normal production. If the test of ineligibility for benefits
lies in some "fault" on the part of the employee, 10 it is rather strange to
find that test being reversed merely because the employer has been able
to resume production without the aid of the recalcitrant striking employee
and where the strike continues, or has been abated, without an actual
settlement.

WATER AND WATER COURSES-NATURAL WATER COURSES-WHETHER
LESSOR OF LAND LEASED FOR PURPOSES OF DRILLING FOR OIL MAY RECOVER
FOR CORRUPTION OF WATER SUPPLY WITHOUT PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE ON PART

OF LEsSFE-In the recent case of Phoenix v. Graham,1 plaintiff was the
owner of a farm, part of which had been leased to the defendants for the
purpose of mining oil and gas contained therein. After termination of the
lease, accompanied by a plugging and abandonment of the oil wells drilled
on the leased premises, plaintiff sued at law to recover damages allegedly

caused by the contamination of the farm water supply by reason of the
permeation thereof with salt water produced in connection with the drilling operations. 2 Plaintiff relied principally upon a statute which declared

it to be a public nuisance to permit
ground fresh water supply 3 and, on
in the trial court for the injury done
defendants to the Appellate Court

salt water to escape into any underthe basis thereof, recovered damages
to the entire premises. On appeal by
for the Fourth District, that court

reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings on the ground

that, at least as between lessor and lessee, the plaintiff was obliged to prove
actionable negligence on the part of the defendants and could not recover
4
simply upon a showing of a violation of the statute.

10 Bankston Creek Collieries v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E. (2d) 670 (1948).
Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E. (2d) 294 (1947).
1 349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N. E. (2d) 669 (1953).
2 Salt water had first appeared within one year after the oil wells were brought
in, but it had been run off into settling pits which occasionally overflowed. As the
volume of salt water Increased, defendants dug a large pit in a location approved
by the lessor, but there was some dispute as to whether this excavation went down
to sand or other porous material. As the farm water supply came from shallow
wells filled -with percolating surface waters, and not from artesian wells, the
pollution may have been produced by either the overflow, by seepage from the
.larger pit, or by both.
3 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 466(13).
4 The court, while agreeing that the correct measure of damage had been utilized.
held the proof with regard to damages to be inadequate, since all tests for contain
ination had been conducted on the leased portion of the premises and did not
to-wit: the difference between market value before and after the injury, also
extend over the entire area of the farm.

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

In this case, the first of its type to reach a reviewing court in Illinois,
the court relied primarily on six decisions achieved elsewhere to support
the view that civil recovery could not rest simply on the statute in question, but an examination of these decisions raises an issue as to their
applicability to the problem of negligence, rather than nuisance, in the
lessor-lessee relationship. In one of the decisions relied on, the plaintiff
was a stranger to the demised premises and no claim was advanced that
a statute applied or could be made to apply, 5 so it is of doubtful authority.
In two other cases, originating in Texas, there is also no mention of any
controlling statute and the debatable issue was one of causation rather
than the basis for liability. 6 The remaining three cases, all arising in
Oklahoma, are similarly of doubtful value, one because it dealt with the
matter of causation, 7 another because there was a failure to show an
escape of salt water from the pit in which it was confined," and the third
because the lease was construed to grant to the lessee all those rights which
might be deemed necessary to the extraction of oil and the court failed
to find any proof to the effect that the pollution of the water supply was
unnecessary to such production.9 The only Illinois case even closely approximating the instant situation, that of Benefiel v. Pure Oil Company,0
is likewise of little value since the plaintiff therein, who was denied
recovery against the oil-well operator, had been an agricultural tenant
whose estate had been created subsequent to the oil lease granted to the
defendant and the alleged harm had arisen from the trespass of the injured
cattle upon that part of the area used for oil-drilling purposes. It is
plain, then, that the law is far from clear on the subject.
If the instant case may be said to be an expression, by the court, of
what it believes to be a desirable public policy, to-wit: that there should
be no liability without fault, then such policy would seem to be contradictory to the one expressed by the legislature, for the statute in question
affords no exception by its language. 1 ' The adoption of a policy compar5 Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N. P. 309 (1899).
6 Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Truesdell, 187 S. W. (2d) 418 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1945); Carter v. Simmons Co., 178 S. W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App., 1944).

7 Walters v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 P. 906 (1922).
8 Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P. (2d) 389 (1934).
9 Marland Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 34 P. (2d) 278 (1934).
10 322 Ill. App. 5, 53 N. E. (2d) 726 (1944).
11 The Appellate Court for the Fourth District, in People v. Hensley, 325 II.
App. 291, 60 N. E. (2d) 114 (1945), acted to engraft an exception on the statute,
at least with regard to criminal prosecutions, for it there required a showing of
fault on the part of the defendant, charged with polluting a water supply by
permitting oil to escape from a pipe-line, in order to sustain a conviction.
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able to one which might justifiably exist in the more prominent oil states
would hardly seem to befit this state, where present favorable agricultural
and water conditions should be given protection.

WITNESSES--CREDIBILITY,
ROBORATION-WHETHER

IMPEACHMENT,

OR NOT

EVIDENCE

OF

CONTRADICTION,
CONVICTION

INFAMOUS WHERE COMMITTED BUT NOT INFAMOUS

OF

AND
A

COR-

CRIME,

UNDER LAW OF FORUM,

MAY BE ADMITTED TO IMPEACH CREiBmlTy-During the course of a trial

in an Illinois state court on a charge of burglary, the prosecution, in the
case of People v. WI.irkpatrick,l over objection, was permitted to impeach
the defendant's credibility by introducing the record of his conviction
in a federal court for a violation of the Dyer Act.2 Following upon
defendant's conviction, this ruling was made the basis of a writ of error to
the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant urging on that court that only
evidence regarding the conviction of those crimes declared to be infamous
by an Illinois statute3 could lawfully be used to impeach credibility. 4 The
Illinois Supreme Court, agreeing with the defendant's contention, held
the admission of the federal criminal record amounted to a prejudicial
error which required the remanding of the case for a new trial. 5
Under a common-law rule which had rendered a person convicted
and sentenced for an infamous crime incompetent to testify, numerous
cases arose wherein witnesses, convicted of crime in other jurisdictions,
sought to testify despite laws which would have disqualified them had the
prior offenses occurred within the boundaries of the forum.6 A majority
of these cases held that these witnesses could testify since the denial of
that privilege would, in effect, require the enforcement of the penal judgments of sister states, 7 but a few courts did take an opposing position,
12 See Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P. (2d) 389 (1931), but note that
the lease referred to therein permitted the passage of salt water over the surface
of the leased premises.
1413 Ill. 595, 110 N. E. (2d) 519 (1953).
2 18 U. S. C. §§ 10, 2311-3, prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles.
3 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 587, lists the offenses regarded as being
infamous in Illinois.
4 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734, provides that no person shall be disqualified as a
witness by reason of his having been convicted of any crime but adds "such ...
conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility."
5 The court also held that it was prejudicial error to select the trial jury from
the same panel which had, on a separate occasion, tried and convicted an alleged
accomplice involved in the same offense.
6An exhaustive treatment of this topic appears In an annotation in 2 A. L. R.
(2d) 579. See also 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, §§ 137-40.
7 A leading case for this view may be found in Commonwealth v. Green, 17
Mass. 515 (1822).
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reasoning that the objective of the rule was not to penalize the convict
so much as it was intended to protect the courts of the forum from the
8
possibility of perjury.
Numerous statutes have been enacted with a design to modify the
common-law rule regarding incompetency of witnesses. They usually provide that no person may be excluded as a witness because of a criminal
conviction but do allow the conviction to be shown so as to affect credibility. As a consequence, earlier problems regarding disqualification have
become almost obsolete 10 but there has been a shift in interest centering
around the possibility of impeachment of credibility upon proof of a conviction obtained in another jurisdiction. While many courts have refused
to allow the foreign record to operate to disqualify a witness, cases do
exist in which the foreign record has been utilized to support a right to
impeach credibility," particularly where the earlier conviction could be
regarded as being infamous in both of the jurisdictions. Even so, courts
still reserve the right to apply their own local law in determining whether
or not the particular crime relied on is infamous in nature. 12 As the Illinois legislature has specified the offenses it considers to be infamous,'3 the
strict application of the statute given by the Supreme Court in the instant
case makes possible a uniform treatment of the problem throughout the
state, without taking into consideration possible variations existing elsewhere. It remains to be determined, however, whether the converse of the
14
problem would produce a similar result.

8 The leading case taking the opposite view may be noted in the holding in
Chase v. Blodgett, 10 N. H. 22 (1838). No criminal case has been located where
a witness expressly declared competent under the law of the forum, but Incompetent at the place of conviction, has been denied the right to testify. As to the
view with regard to civil cases, see Bowers v. Southern Ry. Co., 10 Ga. App.
367, 73 S. E. 677 (1912), and Day v. Lusk, 219 S. W. 597 (Mo. App., 1920).
0 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1851, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734. For statutes in
other states, see Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 987.
10 The problem still remains in a few states which have retained the element of
disqualification as to those witnesses convicted of perjury or related crimes: 58
Am. Jur., Witnesses, § 140.
11 Impeachment of credibility has been allowed in Nelson v. State, 35 Ala. App.
168, 44 So. (2d) 802 (1950) ; State v. Foxton, 166 Iowa 181, 147 N. W. 347 (1914):
City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 30 N. E. (2d) 278 (1940).
12 See State v. Witsil, 7 W. W. Harr. 553, 187 A. 112 (Del., 1936).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 587. The inflexibility of the statute has
not gone without criticism: Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 987, at p. 583.
14 If fear of perjury is the basis for decision, it would seem that one convicted
elsewhere for an offense not infamous where committed, but classified as such by
the Illinois legislature, should be exposed to impeachment in Illinois, for the conduct demonstrating probable testimonial unworthiness would be the same, regardless where committed.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: Text and Cases. Orvill C. Snyder.

New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953, Pp. xvi, 776.
Ernst W. Puttkammer. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. vii, 249.

ADMINISTRATION OP CRIMINAL LAW.

With the passage of time, publications intended for use by law students appear to have shifted from one extreme to the other. Early casebooks contained little beyond selected reported decisions, out of which, by
struggle and effort, students were expected to deduce applicable or controlling principles composing the body of the common law. Later works, with
an eye to universal appeal, added footnotes of the catalog variety, tabulating the pertinent decisions of all jurisdictions, so that the student,
whether from Maine or California, could prepare his own gloss for local
use. Still later, explanatory footnotes were often used, amplifying upon
the reported cases, intended to aid the novitiate in his effort to achieve
understanding or to deal with side issues. The impact of statute law
called for still further revision and supplementation in teaching materials,
but the final step came with the publication of "materials," as well as
cases, either to furnish a more comprehensive picture or to serve as an
introduction to those problems handled in the selected cases. It has, however, been left to Professor Snyder to achieve the penultimate step, for his
new book, designed to instruct the student in the basic principles of criminal law, consists more nearly of textual introduction and description
than it does of selected cases.
If the book were to be shorn of the approximately one hundred illustrative decisions reproduced at length therein, each so labelled as to remove all elements of mystery, it could, more accurately, be designated as
a text. Those who still believe in the "sink or swim" method of teaching
will have little use for it. Others, not so drastic in their teaching approach,
may find it useful but may have qualms as to whether beginning students
will, from so much spoon-feeding, develop that toughness of mind which
must be the concern of first-year instructors, particularly those charged
with drilling students in legal method as well as the responsibility of providing instruction in basic courses. Except for these criticisms, Professor
Snyder's work possesses an excellence beyond that normally found in books
prepared for schoolroom use.
One area has, however, always been marked for attention, not only in
the discussion of works bearing on the field of criminal law but also in
the reports of bar association committees and the like. It has to do with
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the matter of procedure in criminal cases. The distaste displayed on the
part of many lawyers when asked to appear in court on behalf of persons
accused of crime, often rationalized on the ground that the attorney prefers not to associate with such people, not infrequently stems from the fact
that the civil lawyer, adept though he may be in the handling of civil
trials, often feels a sense of loss when faced with the distinctive procedures
utilized in a criminal case. Too frequently the real fault lies in the fact
that many law schools, in circular fashion, seize upon this anticipated lack
of interest as justification for giving only passing attention to criminal
procedure. If that is not the source, then the fault lies in the fact that
many casebook authors, from much the same motive, furnish only a
modicum of material on the point. Professor Snyder's book, in this
respect, does more than most others, but it still falls short of providing the
full training the student should receive.
There is at hand, fortunately, still another book which can serve to
fill the gaps. Professor Puttkammer, long a noted expert in the field of
criminal law, through his engaging study entitled "Administration of
Criminal Law," has now provided a sufficiently comprehensive account of
a criminal case, from inception to conclusion, as will serve to supply all
the knowledge every but the most exacting student would wish or expect
to acquire short of entrance into actual practice. Written for the benefit
of the interested layman as well as the student, but with thought in mind
for the practicing lawyer who normally has little professional contact with
the criminal law in operation, the book makes no pretension of being a
technical work of the type expected from the customary legal text. It
does, however, provide answers for most of the issues raised in the administration of criminal law.
One experienced in the philosophy behind this segment of law might
be inclined to skip the first twenty-odd pages, although they do provide
a well-stated commentary on the several theories advanced to support
punishment for crime. The balance of the book should, by contrast, receive
close attention, not because it is difficult to read for actually it is most lucid
in its style but because, as is true with any condensed account, practically
every word has been made to count. Those few digressions which do appear
afford welcome relief against this need for close concentration. As the
book contains both descriptive and analytic passages, it permits the author
an opportunity to express his own ideas about some reforms which well
could be made in an area of law long marked by a degree of irrational
technicality. His thoughts on that score would alone make the book worthy
of attention. The balance of its contents, therefore, represent a bonus
originating from a long-distilled teaching experience.
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1952. Legislative Research Center,
University of Michigan Law School. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University
of Michigan Law School, 1952. Pp. xvii, 580.

CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGIsrATION

Through an explanatory preface to this book emphasizing the need
for organized study of contemporary statutes, state constitutions, and other
forms of "written" law, Dean Stason describes the formation, development, and activity of one of the most significant institutions recently
created to work in an area of law where opportunities for effective service
are legion. Professor Estep, Director of the Legislative Research Center,
in another preface, amplifies that description with a delineation of the
purposes, methods, and objectives of the Center and its personnel, from
the mere statement of which it is apparent that, over the years, a substantial void in the literature of the law regarding state statutory enactments
will be filled. Specifically, it is the promise of the Center, not necessarily
annually but at least periodically, to do much the same thing for the realm
of statute law as has been done, in the past, with respect to legal developments accomplished by the courts.' The emphasis, however, is not to be
simply along the line of a reportorial statement as to statutes enacted or
amended but is, rather, to be directed toward the production of critical
analyses in those areas where legislation may be needed, or with existing
statutory attempts intended, to fill notable deficiencies in private law.
Written for legislators who must consider the need for, as well as the
form of, statutory proposals and for lawyers who will have to advise
clients who may be affected thereby, these studies in current trends in
legislation should prove to be a most effective tool in the promotion of
reasonableness, if not of uniformity, in written law.
Turning to the current volume, the first in what it is hoped will be
an extended series of equally worthy successors, it may be noted that
eleven topics here chosen for current study, involving the reproduction
of an equivalent number of valuable monographs by six different authors,
range through such wide-spread areas as to denote that neither issues of
geography nor of relative importance will be permitted to reduce the
series below the rank of national, if not even of international, interest.
Aspects of tort law, family law, procedural law, corporation law, mortgage
law, trust law, and of evidence law here considered serve to demonstrate
that the Legislative Center will be catholic, to say the least, in its selections, while the treatment accorded to legislation originating in such
diverse states as North Carolina, Montana, New Jersey, and New York
1 See, for example, any of the recent volumes of Annual Survey of American
Law, prepared by New York University School of Law, written at the national
level; the December issues of the CmCAGo-KENT LAW REvIEW for the last fifteen
years, for changes in Illinois law; and comparable surveys published in the law
reviews issued in a number of other states.
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reveals that issues of narrow parochialism will not be allowed to mar the
output of the Center's personnel.
Examination of these monographs also discloses that there is much at
hand which should concern the Illinois lawyer. Does this state, for example, have adequate statutory coverage for the problems involved in
defamation by radio ;2 for notice with respect to the approval of the
accounts of trustees over common trust funds ;' for administrative enforcement of civil rights measures ;4 or in relation to the protection of the rights
of dissenting minority shareholders, 5 especially with regard to the conduct
of derivative suits or allocating the burden borne by the director in conducting a successful defense ?6 Further study will reveal that the recently
adopted statute designed to compel the defaulting and non-resident parent
to bear the cost of support is far from complete ;7 that the regulation concerning bank deposits made in trust s is woefully inadequate; that reliance
on judicially developed doctrines regarding the handling of interpleader
suits 9 or in the application of a discretionary policy concerning forum
2 The pertinent section of the Illinois Criminal Code, reputedly enacted because
a careless master of ceremonies in a Chicago night-club once broadcast the statement that a prominent public official was present at a ring-side table when he was
actually home in bed, would appear to be inadequate, not only with respect to
civil liability but also for its relation to defamation via television, since it is confined to malicious defamation by means "of what Is commonly known as the
radio." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 404.1. Italics added.

3 Contrast Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 16-1/2, § 60, with the discussion of
the Mullane doctrine, growing out of a comparable New York statute, to be found
beginning at page 33 of the book under review.
4 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 125 et seq., places enforcement in the
hands of the courts. The provisions of ibid., Ch. 29, § 17, bearing on discrimination
in connection with public contracts, and § 24a, as to defense work, are likewise
limited in character.
5 There is a noticeable lack of stimulus to good-faith negotiation to arrive at a
"fair value" for the dissenter's shares in the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 1, Ch. 32, §§ 157.70 and 157.73, as well as an absence of coverage regarding
the manner of distributing the burden of costs in suits based thereon. The discussion of the right of the dissenting shareholder to appraisal, beginning at page
145 of the book, demonstrates the existence of many other flaws.
6 See note in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 344-8 on the case of In re E. C.
Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N. W. (2d) 388 (1950), for one method of handling
this problem.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 50 et seq., enacted in 1949, does not provide for enforcement of the non-resident child's obligation to support an indigent
parent, nor does it permit a public agency, on subrogation, to secure reimbursement for money advanced to a dependent person.

8 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 16-1/2, § 23.
9 A crucial defect in relation thereto, insofar as it affects jurisdiction over a
non-resident claimant to the fund, may be noted in the monograph entitled "Recent
Legislation Designed to Eliminate Double Liability," appearing at pages 523-60.
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non conveniensl ° may be less than wise; and that the present limited
statute regarding the giving of mortgages to secure future advances"
might well be expanded. The discussion relating to the use of photographic
also opens
copies of business records as evidence, in lieu of the originals,
2
up interesting vistas concerning proof in civil cases.1
Comment with respect to Illinois could readily be duplicated for practically every state in the union. Armed with material of the character to
be found in this current survey, legislators and lawyers everywhere should
be capable of dealing more intelligently with such matters as the constitutionality, the effectiveness, or the basic wisdom in statutory proposals;
drafting bodies should be able to phrase enactments in more comprehensive or appropriate language; and schools should be in a position to do
a much better job in the conduct of courses on legislation. The plaudits
of the legal profession, in all its branches, should, therefore, be extended to
Dean Stason and his colleagues for undertaking to do a job which sorely
needed to be done and for initiating the project with a display of ability
which, despite apprehensions concerning sailing over uncharted seas,
speaks highly of the careful planning, extensive research, and excellent
judgment revealed in these collected papers.
W. F. ZACHA
EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING.

AS

Frank E. Cooper. Indianapolis, Indiana: The

Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1953. Pp. x, 313.
"Rhetorical techniques," says Professor Cooper, opening this new
book designed to do something about popular complaints concerning
lawyers' writing, "are as important to the lawyer as to any other writer.
In every phase of practice, the successful lawyer must be an effective
writer." Since that thesis is not open to contradiction, the prime concern
of the reviewer, when dealing with a book of this character, must necessarily be confined to a testing of the techniques suggested, an examination
10 There would appear to be a striking inconsistency between upholding the right
of a court to refuse to take jurisdiction because of a lack of convenience in the
handling of a case, as evidenced by such decisions as the one attained in Whitney
v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, 79 N. E. (2d) 593 (1948), cert. den. 335 U. S. 828, 69 S.
Ct. 55, 93 L. Ed. 382 (1948), and denying to the legislature, as by I1l. Rev. Stat.
1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, the right to limit suits in wrongful death actions to those
cases which arise in the forum or where the suit must, for some other reason,
necessarily be conducted there. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980,
95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951), noted in 30 CICAGo-KENiT LAw REVlEW 174, and First
Nat. Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396, 72 S. Ct. 421, 96 L. Ed. 441 (1952).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 37a.
12 The policy underlying Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 3, authorizing the

use of photographed or microfilmed business records, runs counter to Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 446, which requires the preservation of original records
for purpose of determining the extent of liability to pay a retailers' occupation tax.
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of the methods followed, and an estimation of the results which might be
achieved from the materials thus supplied, for it goes without saying that
there is much to be deplored in the written product turned out by most
students, many lawyers, and even by some judges.
The place to begin correction probably lies quite early in the educational process, where spelling, syntax, rhetoric and grammar should be,
but too frequently*are not, stressed as much as they ought to be. For
that matter, expansion in the use made of media for mass communication,
such as the radio or television, has derogated against reading, the one
time primary source for the acquisition of a broad vocabulary or for
training in the art of conviction through effective word organization. Too
frequently, therefore, the would-be lawyer is poorly equipped in terms of
language knowledge and urgently in need of books on the subject under
consideration. If they are not works on correct English usage, and this
one is not, one thing an author could do would be to point out some glaring examples of language faults and leave the lessons to drive themselves
home as best they may. Professor Cooper has done this, using some vivid
illustrations drawn from judicial records for the purpose, offering other
and model specimens to heighten the contrast. The author might also,
as does Professor Cooper, place emphasis on words and phrases to be
avoided, particularly those likely to drop from the lips of lawyers prone
to follow the embalmed language of legal tradition. In other respects also,
Professor Cooper, in his own style, repeats what has been said before in
works of comparable character. To this point, then, the needful person
has his choice and could gain equivalent benefits from the perusal of any
one of several works listed in an accompanying bibliography.
The one principal difference, one which makes this book not only significant but also one of inestimable value, lies in the fact that it is a work
book, full of exercises and assignments based on included materials calling
for the development of a series of skills if the user is to produce acceptable
forms of opinions, letters, pleadings, briefs, contracts, wills, statutes and
registration statements. Undeniably useful in connection with a class in
legal writing, where individual comment could be made regarding the
degree of success achieved, the book could still be used by itself for, while
it furnishes no model forms to be copied slavishly, it sets up its own criteria
for evaluation. Since nothing like precision in the use of language can be
gained without effort in its use, the student, lawyer, or judge, who realizes
his own deficiencies is invited to work out a few of the assignments. He
would soon find that the author's techniques and methods are capable of
producing worth while results.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Revised Edition.
Chester Rohrlich. Albany, New York: Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc., 1953. Pp. xvi, 506.

ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,

The appearance, in 1949, of the original edition of this work was noted
by the comment that it was an "unconventional" book in arrangement,
one that was "suggestive, instead of exhaustive" in character, but withal
one that deserved attention.1 The new edition departs but little from
its progenitor, following generally upon the same arrangement and building upon much of the text originally there set forth, but it does contain
considerable amplification in those areas where change has occurred and the
footnotes have been brought up to date with many recent citations. One
noticeable improvement lies in the fact that whereas the original edition
appears to have been planographed from varitype, the revision has been
printed, making it possible to reproduce a much larger volume of material
in fewer pages. Any discrepancy, therefore, between the number of pages
in the two editions should not be regarded as representing an undesirable
condensation. If anything, the newer one actually contains more "meat"
than was the case with the earlier editioh for roughly one hundred pages
previously devoted to tax and similar tables have been deleted in favor
of an expansion of textual materials.
Albert J. Harno. San Francisco,
California: Bancroft-Whitney Company, 1953. Pp. v, 211.

LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

As no analysis of the legal profession would be complete without the
giving of some attention to the manner by which most lawyers gain their
training for professional service, it was to be expected that one of the
topics included in the current monumental Survey of the Legal Profession
would deal with an historical and critical evaluation of legal education in
the United States. Selection of that topic almost inevitably led to the
choice of Dean Harno of the University of Illinois College of Law as
the person to report thereon for he has not only been well known to all
law teachers, having presided over the affairs of the Association of American Law Schools, but he has also enjoyed a wide acquaintance with practicing lawyers through his official connections with many professional
associations. His recently released masterly summary of the stages through
which education in law has progressed, his penetrating analysis of the
difficult task the law schools have been forced to perform, and his record
of the achievements they have accomplished bear evidence to the fact that
the choice was well made. Lest it be assumed that this report amounts to
1 See review of the first edition appearing in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW
261-2 (1949).
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no more than a paean for legal education as it is presently administered,
it should be emphasized that there is much in these brief pages to prod
the teaching side of the profession to a realization that not all is well in
this best of all possible worlds.
In that regard, however, the practicing side of the profession is not
without fault: first, for its insistence that the schools abide by quantitative, rather than qualitative, educational requirements; second, for its
insistence that educational costs be kept at a low level, to preserve a
democracy of the bar, without evidencing a willingness to provide the
schools with adequate financial support to offset inevitable expense; third,
for its unwillingness to comprehend what modern law schools are capable
of accomplishing in the time allotted to them; and fourth, for an unwarranted insistence that the graduate of the law school room be prepared
to perform, without hesitation and delay, those tasks which can be performed only after an apprentice-type period of training with actual,
rather than theoretical, situations. The furnishing of money, the granting
of an addition to the training time, will not alone provide the cure. Poor
logic has been displayed, for example, in the demand that, to a large
extent, the law school staff should devote its full time to instruction, cut
off from the vitality of practice, while the bar bemoans the fact that the
product of the law school, despite sound training in theory, emerges in
far too green a state of practical ability. For that matter, organized
insistence upon instruction in the ethics of the profession, based on the
assumption that an ethical character can be developed simply from the
perusal of some appropriate book, runs counter to those mores too frequently demonstrated in fields of practice.
It is time, therefore, that the law schools and the profession get
together upon some understanding basis concerning the educational functions and capabilities of each. This book, despite its tendency to state
briefly and to over-simplify, serves to mark out these fields. It provides the
practicing lawyer, especially one not too well-versed in modern law school
methods, with an adequate picture of what is, and what is not, within the
scope of formal instruction. It marks, for the law schools, those areas
wherein intensified effort or expanded development could produce desired
results. While not too charitable toward part-time legal education, it
nevertheless presents a reasonably comprehensive statement of the pro and
con of the university, as opposed to the proprietary, school. For these and
other reasons, the book is one which should command attention..
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LEGAL SECRETARY'S COMPLETE HANDBOOK.

Besse May Miller. New York:

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953. Pp. xxii, 662.
Except as the practicing lawyer may be fortunate enough to be able
to hire an already well-trained competent legal secretary, one on whom
he may safely rely for the handling of much of the routine activity around
the law office, he will find it necessary to spend many, and frequently unfruitful, hours of valuable time educating the current incumbent of the
stenographer's desk in the standard practices, forms, and usages of a
well-run office. Too often, alas, the job of training must be done over again
when Tillie, or whatever her name might happen to be, sees fit to trade the
typewriter for a wedding ring and a new incumbent arrives to take over
in her place. Let the lawyer faced with that problem now take heart for
here, in straight-forward but authentic fashion, is a running account of
what the lawyer has a right to expect from one entitled to the designation
of legal secretary, written so that she-the species is generally feminine in
gender--can learn for herself the differences existing between a will, a
deed, and a brief, and may then, quite rapidly, turn out an acceptable
draft of each.
While not intended to make a lawyer out of a stenographer, the book
contains an amazingly large amount of information of help to the uninformed. It should, if read understandingly, prevent the return to the
employer of his choice dictated phrase, whether Latin or otherwise, in that
garbled typewritten form which often inverts duces tecumr into a poker
hand where "deuces take 'em," or corrupts amicus curiae into a strange
form of expletive. For that matter, the telephonic response "He ain't in"
might, through recourse to this book and without too much prodding, be
turned to something more appropriate for use around a refined office with
an estimable clientele. It provides enough competent instruction to make
a secretary into an adequate bookkeeper if not a certified public accountant. She should, after some study, to use a common expression, be able
to tell a hawk from a handsaw. If, perchance, she still cannot remember
all of these things, but is worth keeping around until someone better
qualified appears, there is a well-compiled index to the book and a quick
glance should put her in touch with what she ought to know.
Against the possibility that verbal instruction may not be enough,
the author, with the aid of an advisory committee composed of members
of legal secretaries associations working around the country, has provided
an abundance of illustrations, charts, diagrams, and facsimile reproductions of common legal instruments to serve as working models. Some
legal secretary may well be prompted to remark that she wished her
employer knew as much about office practice as the author. It might be
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wise, then, to read this book before passing it on to another. It should aid
the lawyer as well as his secretary.
John Alan Appleman. IndianAPPELLATE TECHNIQUES.
apolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1953. Pp. vii, 1081.

SUCCESSFUL

Quite a few lawyers, perhaps not without pride for their authorship,
have caused their appellate briefs and records to be bound in substantial
volumes, backed with their names in gilt, and have thereafter placed the
same in prominent spots of their library shelves as permanent, if not
entirely valuable, mementos of their experiences in practice. Few such
lawyers would regard collections of this character as being significant
products of legal scholarship, much less consider them worth being dignified as legal texts, although they might regard them highly for their worth
as form books open to use when the need for some particular specimen
should arise. It has remained for the author of the current work, by the
addition of necessary supplementation, to turn this not uncommon practice into an acceptable work for the guidance of those less experienced in
the techniques of preparing and presenting cases on appeal before the
reviewing tribunals.
The supplementation referred to takes the form of explanation, comment, criticism, and precept offered by way of preface to those model
forms of appellate documents used by the author, often with success, in
his practice before a wide variety of courts. Following thereon, sample
forms are reproduced in extenso to make up the bulk of the book. Practically every problem which could arise, from the laying of the foundation
for appeal in the trial court to the presentation of a petition for rehearing
before the highest court, has been covered herein, yet the book falls short
of being an elaborate text on appellate procedure for it lacks the treatinent and. documentation usually found in texts of that type. Despite this,
the work should have a wide appeal to local lawyers for many of the model
forms presented were successfully utilized in cases coming before the
courts of Illinois. The value of these forms might have been made more
apparent had the author provided appropriate citations, but these, if
needed, can be uncovered with little difficulty since case names are given
in connection with each. The longest, and incidentally the most effective,
piece of supplementation, a discussion filled with many practical pointers,
deals with oral argument on appeal. While preferring not to pose as an
expert on appellate processes, the author has, in this highly practical fashion, benefited the bar and has acted to aid the courts, by making his commnonplace book available to the profession.
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FOOL'S HAVEN. Clifford C. Cawley. Boston, Massachusetts: House of Edinboro Publishers, 1953. Pp. 210.
Fictional works are rarely considered as suitable material for analysis
in the columns of a law review, not because fiction has no bearing on law'
but rather because busy practitioners and overworked students have little
time for anything but serious reading. Nevertheless, here is a novelette of
purely fictional character which, although brief and quickly read, serves
to point up a serious legal problem, to-wit: whether faith healers and the
like should be held criminally responsible for the harm they have caused
,to the State and its citizens under the guise of religious practices or with
respect to advice concerning purported religious beliefs. The line between
charlatanism and religion could be hard to draw;2 the basis for responsibility with regard -to criminal neglect might be difficult to establish ;3
but the fact remains that much of that which has been done in the name
of religion has possessed a profound impact on law4 and there is genuine
occasion, at this time, to review all the applicable principles.
Mr. Cawley has not written a very good novel but he makes no secret
of the fact that he believes unsuccessful faith healers are actually, if not
in law, the equivalent of accessories before the fact to murder in case their
misguided victims should die. Others may doubt the validity of his thesis,
yet there can be no question as to the unique social significance of his
ideas. His message, like a small pebble dropped in a pool, could well
bring about some wide-spread repercussions, if not some worth-while
reforms.

1 Many classical novels serve
operations. See a list of over
Dean Wigniore and others, in
2 See the attempt to do so in
3

to enrich the study of law or throw light on legal
three hundred such novels, compiled by the late
2 Ill. L. Rev. 574 (1908).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 38, § 290.

Ibid., Ch. 38, § 95, dealing with the endangering of the life or health of a child,

requires that the conduct or omission must be "wilful" in character.
4 See, for example, People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N. E.
(2d) 769 (1952), cert. den. - U. S. -, 73 S. Ct. 24, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 36 (1952),
vindicating the right of the State to intervene, as parens patriae, when the parents
of a new-born child, on religious grounds, refuse to permit the administration of
vitally needed blood transfusions.
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for the year 1951-1952

Relation between master and servant: Whether or not a union
employee may bring a class suit
in a state court to specifically
enforce a collective bargaining
agreement made between his
union and his employer 257-61
LANDLORD AND TENANT
See also Contracts, Intoxicating
Liquors
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
69-71 and 96-7

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

L (Cont'd)
Premises and enjoyment and use
thereof: Whether lessor of land
leased for purposes of drilling
for oil may recover for corruption of water supply without
proof of negligence on part of
lessee
378-80
Whether or not landlord owes duty
to tenant to remove snow and
ice from private walk used to
enter leased premises
271-3

MARRIAGE
See also Divorce, Family, Husband
and Wife
Bibliography: Mariano: A Psychoanalytic Lawyer Looks at Marriage and Divorce
288-9
Contract to marry: Whether or not
third persons are liable for
maliciously interfering with a
contract to marry so as to cause
a breach thereof
175-9
MASTER AND SERVANT
See also Brokers, Charities, Conflict of Laws, Courts, Damages,
Labor Law, Negligence, Principal
and Agent, Unemployment Coinpensation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
3-7
for the year 1951-1952
MORTGAGES
See also Conflict of Laws, Pledges
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
71

NAMES
Identity: Right to amend pleadings
to cure misnomer despite running of period of limitation 35-6
NEGLIGENCE
See also Actions, Automobiles,
Charities, Damages, Death, Intoxicating Liquors, Landlord and
Tenant, Principal and Agent,
Torts

Whether or not right to possession
of external walls of a demised
premise passes to lessee
190-1
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
See also Conflict of Laws, Death
Statutes of limitation: Whether or
not addition of limitation clause
to Illinois Dram Shop Act operates to bar a cause of action
which had accrued prior to date
of such amendment
273-5

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
See also Actions, Government,
Housing, Pu b l i c
Utilities,
Schools and School Districts,
Street Railroads
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
91-2
Bibliography:
Hellerstein:
State
285
and Local Taxation
Rhyne: The Law of Municipal
Contracts with Annotated Model
285-6
Forms
Police
power and regulations:
Whether building permit granted
under zoning ordinance Is revoked by a subsequent amendatory zoning ordinance
192-3
Whether or not a municipal license
tax is violative of the Commerce
Clause when licensee's interstate
and local businesses are Inseparable
353-9

Acts or omissions constituting negligence: Whether or not landlord
owes duty to tenant to remove
snow and Ice from private walk
used to enter leased premises
271-3
Contributory negligence:
Whether
or not a boy scout, Injured on
scoutmaster's trailer while assisting in collection of waste
paper, Is within comprehension
of a "guest" statute
151-7

INDEX-DIGEST

OIL AND GAS
Operation of mines, quarries, and
wells: Whether lessor of land
leased for purposes of drilling

for oil may recover for corruption of water supply without
proof of negligence on part of
lessee
378-80

PARTIES
See also Actions, Administrative
Law, A d o p ti o n, Judgment,
Names, Schools and School District8
In general: Survey of Illinois law
29-30
for the year 1951-1952
Plaintiffs: Whether or not a married
woman, in a community property
state, is the proper person to
bring an action for personal injuries in her own name and for
her own benefit
251-6
Whether union member may bring
class suit to secure specific performance of collective bargaining agreement made between his
union and his employer
257-01

Pledgee's power to assign 201-2
Rights and duties of pledgee's
assignee
202-5

PATENT LAW
Bibliography: American Society of
Composers, Authors and PubUshers: Fourth Copyright Law
282
Symposium
PLEDGES
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
25-6 and 73-4
Nature and essentials in general:
The Pledge as an Illinois Security Device:
94-140, 201-35
Acts necessary to create a pledge:
103-24
Need for delivery of possession
103-7
What constitutes delivery of
107-11
possession
What constitutes possession in
pledgee
111-20
Need for continuity of possession
1214
Introduction
99-103
Rights and duties of parties at
maturity:
205-35
Pledgor's rights and duties
205-18
Pledgee's rights and duties
218-35
Rights and duties prior to maturity:
Pledgee's rights and duties
12440

PRACTICE AND PLEADING
See also Actions, Adoption, Appeal
and Error, Appearance, Conflict
of
Laws,
Contempt, Costs,
Court8, Creditors' Rights, Griminal Law and Procedure, Damages, Declaratory Judgment,
Divorce,
Evidence,
Forcible
Entry and Detainer, Garnishment, Habeas Corpus, Judges,
Judgment, Limitation of Actions,
Parties, Release, Specific Performance, Trial Procedure
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
2746
Amended and supplemental pleadings and repleader: Whether a
complaint for personal injury,
filed the day of but after death
of injured
party, may be
amended to state a cause of action for wrongful death
184-5
Bibliography:
Millar:
Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Illstorical Perspective
288-4
Vanderbilt: Cases and Other Materials on Modern Procedure and
287-8
Judicial Administration
Form and allegations in general:
Whether general statute requiring notice to transit authority of
fact of injury as condition precedent to suit applies to cases
based on assumption by authority of its predecessor's tort liabilities
280-1
Motions: Whether defect in complaint, arising from failure to
allege case in the alternative, is
waived by defendant's failure to
present motion to dismiss 275-6
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
See also Brokers, Conflict of Laws,
Labor Law, Schools and School
Districts
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
3-7

CIIICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

P (Cont'd)
Rights and liabilities as to third persons: Whether or not a principal, liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, may be held
in damages for a greater amount
than the agent through whom he
acted
277-8
PROPERTY
See also

Automobiles, Brokers,

Commerce, Conflict of Laws,
Contracts, Copyrights, Descent
and Distribution, Future Interests, Husband and Wife, Joint
Tenancy, Landlord and Tcnant,
Pledges, Real Property, Sales,
Taxation, Titles, Trusts, Water
and Water Courses, Zoning

In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
61-80
Ownership and incidents thereof:
Whether an Illegitimate collateral heir, or his descendants,
are entitled to take property by

descent upon
intestate

death

of owner
268-70

PUBLIC UTILITIES
See also Administrative Law, Municipal
Corporations, Street
Railroad's
Hearing and rehearing: Whether rehearing provision in Illinois
Public Utilities Act operates to
create a two-year period of
374-6
repose
Regulation and operation: Whether
or not a municipal license tax Is
violative of the Commerce Clause
when interstate and local businesses of public utility operator
are inseparable
353-9
Whether or not general statute requiring notice to transit authority of fact of injury applies
where the authority has assumed
the liabilities of its predecessor
280-1
tort-feasor

QUO WARRANTO
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
34-5

REAL PROPERTY
See also Brokers, Conflict of Laws,
Descent and Distribution,Forci-

ble Entry and Detainer, Illegitimates, Joint Tenancy, Landlord
and Tenant, Mortgages, Oil and
Gas, Security Transactions, Taxation, Trusts, Zoning

In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
61-71
Persons entitled and their respective
shares: Whether death of one
entitled to elect either dower or
statutory fee within time for

SALES
See also Brokers, Commerce, Contracts, Pledges
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
24

election operates as a waiver of
dower
267-8
RELEASE
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
18-9 and 40-1
Construction and operation: Whether
minority shareholders release
right to question correctness of
allotted share values by surrender of share certificates and
acceptance of sum tendered
364-8

SCHOOLS AND
SCHOOL DISTRICTS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
90-1 and 93-5

INDEX-DIGEST

S (Cont'd)
Public schools: Whether a public
school district, as a quasi-municipal corporation, is immune
from tort liability when it car279-80
ries insurance
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
See also Conflict of Laws
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
24-6 and 714
Pledges: The Pledge as an Illinois
Security Device:
99-140, 201-35
Acts necessary to create a pledge:
103-24
Need for delivery of possession

103-7

What constitutes delivery of possession
107-11
What constitutes possession in
pledgee
111-20
Need for continuity of possession

121-4
Introduction
99-103
Rights and duties of parties at
maturity :
205-35
Pledgor's rights and duties

205-18

Pledgee's rights and duties
218-35
Rights and duties prior to maturity :
Pledgee's rights and duties

12440

Pledgee's power to assign 201-2
Rights and duties of pledgee's
assignee
202-5
SOCIAL SECURITY AND
PUBLIC WELFARE
Unemployment
o m p e n s a t i o n:
Whether persons forced Into unemployment because of a labor
dispute are entitled to unemployment compensation benefits when
their employer replaces them at
time of resumption of production
376-8

TAXATION
See also Commerce, Future Intere8t8, Social Security and Public
Welfare
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 19.Il-1952
93-5

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Contracts enforcible: Whether or not
a union employee may bring a
class suit in a state court to
specifically enforce a collective
bargaining agreement made between his union and his employer
257-61
STATES
Bibliography: Gellhorn: The States
198-200
and Subversion
Puttkammer: Administration of
382-8
Criminal Law
STATUTES
See also Uniform Laws
Bibliography: Legislative Research
Center, University of Michigan
Law School: Current Trends in
State Legislation, 1952
384-6
STOCKHOLDERS
See also Corporations, Joint Tenancy, Pledges
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
1-3
Rights and liabilities as to corporation: Whether minority shareholders who dissent at time of
merger lose right to question
correctness of allotted share
values by surrender of share
certificates and acceptance of
sum tendered
364-8
STREET RAILROADS
Regulation and operation: Whether
or not general statute requiring
notice to transit authority of
fact of injury applies where the
authority has assumed the liabilities of its predecessor tortfeasor
280-1
SURETYSHIP
See also Conflict of Laws, Pledges
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
24-6

Bibliography:
Hellerstein:
State
285
and Local Taxation
Stanley and Kilcullen: The Fed290
eral Income Tax, 2d Ed.
Constitutional requirements and restrictions: Whether or not Con-

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

T (Cont'd)
gress may constitutionally tax
intrastate gambling transactions
359-64
Legacy, inheritance and transfer
taxes:
Whether a decedent's
beneficial interest in a trust of
foreign realty is of such character as to be subject to an inheritance tax imposed by decedent's domiciliary state 169-75
TITLES
Persons entitled and their respective
shares: Whether death of one
entitled to elect either dower or
statutory fee within time for election operates as a waiver of
dower
267-8
Termination of title: Whether or not
the entry of an interlocutory
decree for partition operates to

terminate title in joint tenancy

270-1
TORTS
See also Automobiles, Charities,
Damages, Death, Husband and
Wife,
Infants,
Intozicatinq
Liquors, Landlord and Tenant,

Negligence, Principal and Agent,
Workmen's Compensation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
60-1 and 95-8
Acts or omissions constituting breach
of duty: Whether or not landlord owes duty to tenant to remove snow and ice from private
walk used to enter leased premises
271-3
Interference with or injuries in personal relations: Whether or not
third persons are liable for maliciously interfering with a contract to marry so as to cause a
breach thereof
175-9

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
7-11
Grounds for compensation: Whether
persons forced into unemployment because of a labor dispute
are entitled to unemployment

Invasion of personal safety, comfort,
or privacy: Whether or not interference with an individual's
privacy amounts to an actional
injury in Illinois
261-6
TRIAL PROCEDURE
See also Appearance, Contempt,
Criminal Law and Procedure,
Damages, Evidence, Judgment,
Jury, Witnesses
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
36-9
Bibliography: Botein: Trial Judge
1S7-8
Millar: Civil Procedure of the
Trial Court In Historical Per288-4
spective
Reception of evidence: Whether or
not a defendant in a felony proceeding may be cross-examined
as to a prior conviction for a
similar offense
246-51
Whether or not evidence of conviction of a crime, Infamous where
committed but not infamous under law of forum, may be admitted to impeach credibility
380-1
TRUSTS
See also Charities, Equity, Future
Interests, Taxation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
74-5
Execution of trust by trustee or by
court: Whether federal capital
gains tax should be charged to
income or to corpus
194-5
Management and disposal of trust
property: Whether a decedent's
beneficial Interest in a trust of
foreign realty Is of such character as to be subject to an inheritance tax Imposed by decedent's domiciliary state
169-75

compensation benefits when their
employer replaces them at time
of resumption of production
376-8
UNIFORM LAWS
In general: Survey of Illnois law
for the year 1951-1952
72-3, 86

INDEX-DIGEST

VENUE
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
27-8

WATER AND WATER COURSES
Natural water courses: Whether lessor of land leased for purposes
of drilling for oil may recover
for corruption of water supply
without proof of negligence on
part of lessee
378-80
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
qee also Descent and Distribution,
Executors and Administrators,
F-uture Interests, Joint Tenancy,
Taxation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
76-80
Bibliography: James: Illinois Pro289-90
bate Law and Practice
Requisites and validity: Whether a
subqequent agreement to a ma-

ZONING
See also Administrative Law, Aiinicipal Corporations
Governmental powers and functions
in general: Whether building

tured endowment contract providing conditionally for distribution of proceeds after death is
testamentary in character 161-8
WITNESSES
Credibility, impeachment, contradiction, or corroboration: Whether
or not evidence of conviction of
a crime, infamous where committed but not infamous under
law of forum, may be admitted
to impeach credibility
380-1
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
See also Labor Law
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1951-1952
3-4 and 12-7

permit granted under zoning ordinance is revoked by a subsequent amendatory zoning ordinance
192-3

